Evidence of meeting #6 for National Defence in the 40th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was insurgents.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk of the Committee Mr. Paul Cardegna
Honourable members of the committee I see a quorum.
We are now ready to proceed with the election of the chair. I am ready to receive motions.
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
Denis Coderre Liberal Bourassa, QC
Mr. Chair, point of order.
I am flabbergasted at the situation today. I find it unacceptable.
First, I would like to commend, congratulate and thank Mr. Rick Casson for his work. He was a remarkable chairman. I would like to know why Mr. Casson is not the chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence today.
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk
As I'm sure you're aware, as clerk of the committee I can't entertain points of order or motions aside from nominations for the position of chair.
Sir?
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk
I have a nomination for Maxime Bernier.
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk
Are there any further motions for nominations of the position for the chair?
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
Denis Coderre Liberal Bourassa, QC
I don't want the issue of the member for Beauce to become a personal matter, but I think that the defence committee is going to lose a great deal of credibility. Given that this will be noted in the minutes, I want our message to be the following: in the case at hand, the Liberal members will abstain from voting as a protest. We'll let it go this time, but we find today's situation unacceptable.
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk
Yes. If the committee agrees, we can do that.
3:35 p.m.
Conservative
Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB
Then I would just put this question to the other Liberal members of this committee. The answer will come with your vote, but I would suggest that it's not compulsory that this is a personal vote, and you should vote the way your head tells you to vote.
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
Denis Coderre Liberal Bourassa, QC
Since when do you dictate what the Liberals will do? Vote with your head and we'll vote with ours.
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk
Does the committee wish to proceed to a recorded division?
I will take that as tacit consent.
It's been moved by Laurie Hawn that Maxime Bernier be elected as chair of the committee. I will start in alphabetic order.
(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])
3:35 p.m.
The Clerk
Maxime Bernie has been duly elected chair of the committee.
I'd like to invite him to take his seat here.
3:35 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Maxime Bernier
First of all, I want to thank all the members of this committee for their confidence in me as the chair.
I see this new responsibility as a privilege and I will chair the committee with my usual objectivity. I will work to build consensus and I will play the role of chairman appropriately, according to the rules of Parliament. I would like to thank you for your support.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and to the motion adopted on Monday, February 23, 2009, the briefing session on Canada's involvement in Afghanistan hereby begins.
We can now commence our business. Our first witness is Brigadier-General Champagne.
Brigadier-General Champagne, the floor is yours.
3:40 p.m.
BGen G. Champagne Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ladies and gentlemen, members of Parliament, colleagues, thank you for the opportunity to brief you this afternoon. I am Brigadier-General Gerry Champagne, the Director General Operations for the Strategic Joint Staff of the Canadian Forces. In other words, I am the head of operations for the Canadian Forces.
It has been some time since my predecessor briefed this body. In August, Brigadier-General Peter Atkinson briefed you on the general state of operations and Canadian Forces support, especially the support received from the Canadian International Development Agency to help repair the Dahla Dam. He also gave you some details on the Afghan National Police.
During the meeting of your committee on February 9, the Minister of National Defence and the defence team also provided you with an update on the budget, especially concerning the Afghanistan component. He also answered a series of questions that provided an update on the operations in Afghanistan.
As has been stated previously, the achievement of our goals in Afghanistan, and in particular the building of a secure environment that is able to underpin all other efforts in development, reconstruction, and development, comes at a price. This was very urgent this past week when we saw Warrant Officer Dennis Raymond Brown, Corporal Dany Olivier Fortin, Corporal Kenneth Chad O'Quinn, and, unfortunately, lately, yesterday, Trooper Marc Diab killed while carrying on our mission.
My intent today is to bring you up-to-date on a number of issues. First is security, and second is the Afghan National Security Forces and the whole-of-government effort. I also want to deal with some of the issues that have been on your agenda for the last six months, specifically the counter-IED, post-2011, and the elections. But I will obviously be at your disposal to answer any of your questions after my quick introduction.
Prior to moving into the meat of my presentation, there are two points that warrant mention.
First, for those who have recently been appointed to the committee, it bears remembering that much of what we are dealing with is, by necessity, classified. I am therefore limited in what specific details I may be able to provide to you. This should not be misconstrued as an attempt to be unduly secretive. Rather, it is being done in order to protect the operational security of those Canadians, and our allies, who are doing our nation's bidding overseas. Should you ask a question that I am unable to answer, I will do everything in my power to provide you with an answer and ensure that you receive answers separately, where necessary.
Second, there are items that you may wish to ask me about that fall outside of my lane, or are more appropriately answered by another military or political authority. In the case of these types of questions I will, of course, tell you who I think is best suited to give you the details that you need.
Before getting into the existing security situation, it is worth spending a minute or two on the notion that in order to win a counter-insurgency fight, a military force requires additional efforts in the spheres of governance and security in order to create an environment where a legitimate authority can govern. Strictly speaking, this is absolutely true. I have been unable to find a single case in modern history where a western-style military has been able to defeat an insurgency without the assistance of partners from the civilian side. And I could quote from my own experience in Srebrenica.
The truth of the matter is that it is only by using a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach, addressing the fundamental issues underlying an insurgency while providing protection via a security bubble, can an insurgency be defeated. This is why the Canadian Forces are in Afghanistan, and it is this fundamental understanding of the insurgency that has formed the foundation of our whole-of-government approach.
The commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan works very closely with the Canadian ambassador and the representative of Canada in Kandahar, namely, the RoCK, and the whole-of-government team that is committed to delivering the government's six priorities.
I would also stress that strategic progress in Afghanistan can only be measured over a long period, while tactical progress continues to be achieved every day by our soldiers, working in concert with our whole-of-government partners, our allies, partners, and Afghans.
That being said, where are we with regard to the security situation in Kandahar province? Succinctly put, the overall situation has not changed very much in the past six months and continues to pose serious challenges. The violence level within Kandahar City is slightly higher than the last time we reported to you, although there has been a seasonal drop in violence across the rest of the province. This owes to the onset of winter and the departure of the insurgent leadership to winter quarters.
Members of the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police, have been operating at a sustained high tempo and have been suffering a correspondingly high number of casualties.
As was noted in the last quarterly report, quantifying the perceptions of the citizens of Kandahar regarding security is difficult. All of you who read the last quarterly report will likely have noticed the comments concerning the perception of security by the local population. The perception of the civilians is a very important parameter of the degree of success we are having. I, like you, note the comments in the report that more and more Kandaharis feel the security situation has become worse and that the number of people who believe the situation is getting better has fallen dramatically.
Recognizing their inability to succeed using direct engagement, the insurgents have moved to intimidation, harassment, and improvised explosive devices to foster the perception of worsening security. Notwithstanding the effects of these operations being conducted by the insurgents, the recent voter registration activities in support of the upcoming national elections demonstrate the willingness of Afghans to return to normalcy and to establish a responsible and legitimate government. Significant numbers of Kandahar's population are standing up to exercise their democratic rights despite being warned otherwise by insurgent propaganda. Were they to perceive the situation as intolerable or completely insecure, it is quite likely that voter registration would have been significantly different.
From a Canadian perspective, one of the major events in the past six months was the deployment of the force enhancement called for by the Manley report and a 2008 parliamentary motion. The deployment of our Chinook and Griffon helicopters, as well as our enhanced unmanned aerial vehicles, the UAVs, is starting to show a positive impact, as you saw this weekend. Together, they have helped minimize and mitigate the risk to our soldiers from improvised explosive devices, the IEDs.
We are now starting to find more IEDs before they are used against us than after they are used against us. By way of example, this past December there were 106 incidents involving IEDs; however, only 45 were actually effective against us. The remainder, or approximately 60%, were found by either using our new capability or because of our ongoing effort to educate the Afghans and subsequently having them report their findings to us.
As you are likely aware, we also recently witnessed the rotation of both the headquarters for Joint Task Force Afghanistan and various elements of the Canadian military contingent. This routine actively sees new, fresh forces move into place, while members of the outgoing contingent are able to rest, refit, and retrain to fight.
The current commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan, Brigadier General Jon Vance, has brought a solid and experienced team with him, many of whom have previously served in Afghanistan. The current battle group is based on the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment out of Petawawa, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Barrett.
Looking ahead, it is worthwhile to comment on two specific areas. The first is the direction that our upcoming campaigns will be taking, as directed by the commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, or CEFCOM. The second is the additional forces coming into Regional Command (South) from the United States.
The commander of CEFCOM has been quite specific in articulating the principles that will guide and direct the planning, conduct, and operations. In light of the current security situation and the upcoming increased presence of U.S. forces in the upcoming months and years, a revised approach will focus on empowering the Afghans, protecting the civilian population where they work and sleep, concentrating our efforts in the city of Kandahar and its approaches, and aiming to make a visible and tangible difference in the lives of ordinary Afghans. More than anything, the intended effect of this approach to operations should be to shift the perception of Afghans and provide clear evidence to them that the situation is improving.
Part and parcel of this will be to continue our efforts to avoid civilian casualties. Clearly, the Canadian Forces operate with rules of engagement and targeting procedures that intend to ensure that only legitimate military targets are dealt with and avoid causing needless suffering to the people we are there to assist. We will continue to ensure that these processes are followed and that our soldiers operate within the boundaries articulated by the international human rights laws, international law, and the Canadian Criminal Code.
The second aspect I wish to speak on, which will serve to define the tour for the current task force, is the inflow of American forces into the region. The increased American contribution to ISAF and their ability to significantly improve security in Regional Command (South) can be expected to have some fairly dramatic effects. It is likely that we will see an increase in insurgent activity in the short term. This may be considered similar to what happens when a farmer knocks over a beehive.
American forces are going to be able to dominate more terrain and areas where we have not been able to maintain a significant presence due to our currently available forces. It is therefore extremely likely that we will be seeing more engagement with insurgents within the regions; however, these are battles we will win, and the result will be a weakened Taliban and a more secure Afghanistan.
Capacity building within the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police is a critical element in the conduct of our military mission in Afghanistan.
Our stated goal in this regard is to enable the ANSF in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order. To this point, we have had some success.
Some of our Afghan Kandaks and their associated Headquarters are now demonstrating leadership abilities, and leading operations against the insurgents. This was shown by the performance of 1-205 Brigade, the Afghan National Army Brigade in Kandahar province, which has demonstrated the ability to plan and execute operations with a minimum degree of support from ISAF or our forces.
Similarly, the various units mentored by the Canadian Forces are now achieving higher levels with regard to their capability milestones. For those of you who might not be aware, we gauge progress with the Afghan National Army using a system of capability milestones. When a unit has reached ACM one, it is capable of conducting near-autonomous operations with limited support from ISAF enablers. This is the highest level assigned to a unit and may be equated to full operational capability. ACM two sees a unit able to do this some of the time, although with a higher level of ISAF support. This may be seen as an initial level of operational capability. Lower capability milestones equate to lower levels of capability.
As reported in the recent quarterly report, we now have one of our ANA Kandaks, and its Brigade Headquarters, capable of operating on its own or at CM one. This situation continues to improve and other Kandaks are also approaching this capability. The fact that the headquarters and one of our Kandaks have achieved this level is a feat, considering the difficulties that exist in training Kandaks in Afghanistan. The effects of this increase in capability have been noteworthy.
Over recent months, one Kandak was deployed on a Regional Command South operation, where it fought well against significant resistance. Another Kandak, whose capabilities continue to improve, was engaged in route clearance operation within the province which resulted in a significant decrease in the number of IEDs on the route for which the ANA were responsible.
What is perhaps not as widely known, is that these types of ANA-led operations are becoming more and more frequent, and growing in complexity. We are now seeing operations where the Afghan Brigade is coordinating their actions and activities with the Afghan National Police and other elements of the ANSF. This is real progress.
Additionally, the manning levels within all the Kandahar Kandaks have improved, with effective strengths now quite near our established benchmarks. Similar to our other efforts, this too is getting better.
It is not, however, all good news. There is still significant progress to be made as concerns the Afghan National Police. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, it cannot be forgotten that the ANP are at the « coal face » when it comes to fighting the insurgency. It is they who suffer being the focus of insurgent activity within Kandahar province. Indeed, this past year alone, they suffered over 230 officers killed in Kandahar province, as compared to 51 of their ANA colleagues. As well, given their relative newness as a force, particularly when compared to the Afghan National Army, it is reasonable to expect that they will be at a lower state.
Work continues to be done, and both our military police and members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as various officers from Canadian municipal police forces, are working exceptionally hard to train, equip and ready the ANP for the tasks they face.
We continue to support infrastructure projects, training and equipping of this vital element in the development of the safe and secure Kandahar. The effects of our efforts here were perhaps most dramatically shown by a widely reported ANP foiling of a suicide attack on the Governor's palace, where over 400 kilograms of explosives were found before they could be used.
This incident also shows the partnership between the Canadian Forces and the Afghan Forces, as once the ANP had found the explosives, it was Canadian explosives experts who defused them. Indeed, the former ROCK has stated that of all the initiatives undertaken during her tenure, she was most proud of the work that had been done with the Afghan National Police and security forces.
As I said earlier, the intent here is to talk about the security situation and how our actions in the security realm enable success in other elements of the mission. The Canadian Forces are integral members of the whole-of-government team and work to support other partners to the maximum extent possible.
Last week there was a question concerning the recent IED strike in the Arghandab and whether or not possible linkages existed with the Canadian signature project at the Dahla Dam. At this time we have no evidence that such a linkage exists. In the case of the Dahla Dam, I'm confident that the security arrangements that exist will enable the completion of the project in accordance with anticipated timelines. In fact, this one example is an apt demonstration of the nature of our mission, for in this case we have local security being provided to our Canadian contractor by Afghan National Security Forces. This is then backed up by Canadian Forces members, ready and willing to respond should the situation require it.
As you well know, the RoCK leads the Canadian civilian governance and development efforts within Kandahar province, working hand in hand with the commander of JTF Afghanistan to achieve our government's stated priorities.
The tasks undertaken by our forces to support governance initiatives may be broadly described as following under two distinct fields. First is protection that our forces provide directly to our whole-of-government partners, such as when we move the RoCK within Kandahar province. Second is the establishment of the secure environment itself. However, there are other initiatives being undertaken by the Canadian Forces that also assist in this regard. They include the conduct of border flag meetings with Pakistan and support to CSTC-A and the justice support system, to name a few.
In the future, one of the most obvious manifestations of CF support to governance initiatives is the role that will be played by Joint Task Force Afghanistan in ensuring the safe conduct of upcoming presidential elections. This important and extremely complex event is critical to ensuring the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and our role will be significant.
Our operational mentor liaison teams, known as OMLT, are already at work training the Afghan National Security Forces, enabling them to take the lead when it comes to the provision of security at polling stations and vital points. Second, we will be ready and able to respond in the event of crisis or attacks that might jeopardize the conduct of the election and the ability of Afghans to carry out their democratic rights.
Third, the recent force enhancements and abilities we have deployed--our helicopters, UAVs, and counter-IED assets--will all be put to good use to ensure that the general security environment continues to be stable enough for this event to go ahead. Our success in facilitating the conduct of voter registration activities bodes well for the upcoming elections.
Development is another area where our forces continue to play a role in support of our Whole of Government partners and the Canadian International Development Agency in particular. The most obvious demonstration of this is our provincial reconstruction team, which has been working hard within the city of Kandahar since 2005. However, there are other obvious and tangible signs of Canadian Forces work in this regard. Canada's work on building Route Fosters and supporting the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system are perhaps the most visible. Between these two activities, over 500 Afghans are gainfully employed, largely because of Canadian funding. The Canadian Forces played a critical role in facilitating this type of work. In the case of Route Fosters, it is our men and women who provide the security which enables this movement corridor to be completed. As for the Dahla Dam, Canadian Forces members have played an active role in ensuring that supplies and personnel are able to move to the job site without interference from the insurgents.
Additionally, our military engineers continue to assist and play a role wherever and whenever possible. Activities have been broad in their scope and reflect the wide range of skill sets that our soldiers bring to the team. Our construction management teams have been active in helping to orchestrate road construction and low-level irrigation projects. Others have assisted with local road construction and begun planning for the building of Afghan National Police observation posts. As well, our Civil Military CooperationTeams continue to execute low-level development tasks (like building wells) which support the military mission.
As should by now be evident, our provision of a secure environment continues to play a significant part in the ongoing work to improve the situation in Kandahar, in all realms.
Before I close, I would like to cover a few areas in which this committee has shown continued interest. The first is to briefly touch upon our efforts with regard to neutralizing the threat posed by IEDs. This has been the most devastating weapon used by our enemies. The majority of our soldiers killed in action, 70, have not been killed in direct combat with the enemy; rather, they have died as a result of this insidious tactic. But we cannot make one mistake in dealing with IEDs. Insurgents only need to be successful once to have a dramatic strategic-level impact.
To combat this, we are taking several steps and implementing solutions as they can be found. Some of these include introducing new specific technological solutions, using our newly introduced air wing to minimize the threat experienced by our soldiers in transit, while also using our UAVs to help find these IEDs on the ground. Just as important, we will continue our efforts at educating Afghans as to the threat that IEDs pose and encourage the continued reporting on them to us. This has a second order effect, in that it builds trust between us and the local population while concurrently helping to mitigate the threat these devices pose.
Further, we have a professional lessons learned organization that analyzes each incident and garners any lessons that can be drawn from it in order to minimize the chance of a similar attack having the same consequences. We also continue to sustain and use our fleet of vehicles devoted to countering this threat, specifically the enhanced route-clearing capability that was brought into service over the past two years, and we will continue to improve our force protection to the maximum extent possible while still being able to carry out the mission we have been given.
Lastly, we will continue our efforts to disrupt the cells that manufacture IEDs and to take on the leadership that oversees procurement of materials as well as the construction and emplacement of these devices.
As I said before, our current strike-to-find ratio is quite high, at one strike for every 2.9 IEDs that are found. We are working to make this higher and are encouraged by the success we have had at this point. Sadly, this is not a weapon that we can remove from the battlefield nor a threat that we can eliminate completely. This is all too well shown by the deaths of our four soldiers this last week.
The next area that I would like to touch on is what the Canadian Forces will be doing in 2011 and beyond.
Clearly, our mandate will change in accordance with the parliamentary motion of last year. This has directed that we cease our military operations as of July 2011, and that all Canadian Forces personnel are out of Afghanistan by December of that year. This has numerous and obvious implications, and we have now begun strategic level planning to make that motion reality.
As far as what we will be doing after the pullout is completed, I cannot say. Clearly we take our orders from the Government of Canada, and we will faithfully carry out whatever duty, at home or abroad, is asked of us. What I can tell you is that during 2011, there will be significant activity taking place to ensure that we meet the timelines and marching orders that we have been given.
Another area that has received some attention since this committee last met is the question of political reconciliation with the Taliban. To be completely frank, this is not really an issue for myself as a soldier to deal with. As stated in the most recent quarterly report, it is actually the Afghan government's responsibility to lead national reconciliation efforts. I know and recognize that our other whole-of-government partners do play a role in supporting this effort. However, the Canadian Forces have not had a role in this realm thus far.
Moving on, it was determined last week by the Independent Elections Commission in Afghanistan that their presidential election would be held on the August, 20 of this year. Recognizing that there are issues which remain to be worked out, the Canadian Forces are prepared to play their own supporting role, following the lead of the ANSF who have primarily responsibility for the safe conduct of this event. We anticipate that we will be assisting our ANSF partners in ensuring the safety and security of this event. At this time, the Afghan forces have the lead in the provision of security for this extremely important activity, which we will be ready to support with quick reaction forces and our full suite of equipment and manpower.
It should not be a surprise to any of you that the biggest thing we can do to ensure that election occurs as planned is to keep training our ANSF partners using our Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, and to keep working for the safe and secure environment which will minimize the risk of insurgent activity. Obviously, I believe that we have a strong team on the ground in Regional Command South, and with our recent force enhancements, including additional troops and aircraft, we are confident that security can be maintained for this important national event.
Ladies and gentlemen, I suspect I may have taken a little more time than you preferred. My intent was to give you as accurate a picture as possible of the existing security situation within Kandahar province and to touch upon areas where I know you have some concerns.
I thank you for your time and look forward to addressing any of your questions.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Maxime Bernier
Thank you very much, Brigadier-General Champagne, for this presentation.
I will now give the floor to Mr. Coderre, from the Liberal Party of Canada, for seven minutes.
4:10 p.m.
Liberal
Denis Coderre Liberal Bourassa, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Brigadier-General Champagne, thank you very much for coming here. I think it is only right to send a message of solidarity to our troops. I know that this is a difficult time. We lost four soldiers last week. Our soldiers are our companions and it is only right, not only for their families and friends, that we send them this message of solidarity.
4:10 p.m.
Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence
Thank you very much, Mr. Coderre.
4:10 p.m.
Liberal
Denis Coderre Liberal Bourassa, QC
Brigadier-General Champagne, we are hearing all kinds of things, things that are all over the map. I do not want to focus solely on Kandahar. I would like you to talk to us a little bit about Kabul. You will understand why in a moment.
As you know, last June the Sarposa prison came under attack and the prison was emptied out completely. Many prisoners, insurgents and Taliban, who had been transferred by the Canadian troops, had been imprisoned there. Have we recaptured these insurgents? Did our troops conduct any operations to help the Afghans recapture these escaped insurgents?
4:10 p.m.
Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence
You will understand, Mr. Coderre, that when these insurgents escaped, they did not necessarily all remain in Kandahar.
4:10 p.m.
Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence
They did not wait. So it would be extremely difficult for me to tell you what percentage of these people have been recaptured. Depending on the province they went to, they may have been recaptured. We are not following up on the matter.
