Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Honourable members of the committee, let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this important bill. I'd also like to thank you on behalf of all members of the Canadian Forces for your continuing interest and support for the men and women who wear the uniform for our country. Your ongoing commitment to a modern and relevant military is most appreciated.
I hope that my appearance today, both on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff and in my own role as vice-chief, will be beneficial to this important study. With me today are Colonel Alain Gauthier, the director general of the Canadian Forces Grievance Authority, and Colonel Tim Grubb, the Canadian Forces provost marshal, or head policeman.
In a healthy democracy, an effective military should both reflect the society and the values that it is designed to protect, as well as maintain the necessary discipline, efficiency and morale to be operationally effective in delivering that protection.
The changes proposed by Bill C-41 are necessary to succeed in both aspects of this challenge. Specifically, the proposed updates seek to address the three main subject areas of the Lamer report: the military justice system; the position of Canadian Forces provost marshal and the related military police complaints process; and the Canadian Forces grievance process.
Both the minister and the Judge Advocate General have already spoken to the provisions of the bill that are aimed at updating the military justice system. On these matters I really must defer to the expertise of the Judge Advocate General, who has statutory responsibility under the National Defence Act for military justice. However, the other two topics, the Canadian Forces provost marshal and the Canadian Forces grievance system, are indeed part of my responsibilities as Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. Today I'd like to focus my remarks on these topics.
With regard to the Canadian Forces provost marshal, the Lamer report recommended that the responsibilities and command relationships of this position be clearly defined in the National Defence Act. This is exactly what Bill C-41 proposes. The bill sets out the responsibilities of the provost marshal, specifies the minimum rank to be held by the provost marshal, and clearly defines the conditions of tenure for the position. The bill would also increase transparency by requiring the provost marshal to submit an annual report to the Chief of the Defence Staff.
I understand that some concerns have been expressed regarding Bill C-41's potential impact on the investigative independence of the provost marshal, and this afternoon I'd like to address those concerns.
It is important to note that the military police in general, and the provost marshal in particular, are unique amongst police in Canada. They perform military duties in addition to investigative duties and often conduct investigations in active theatres of operation such as Afghanistan.
Certain command relationships must exist to recognize this reality. Clause 4 of the bill provides that the provost marshal acts under the general supervision of the vice-chief of the defence staff in respect of the provost marshal's statutory duties. The clause authorizes the vice-chief of the defence staff to issue general instructions in writing regarding these responsibilities, and it requires the provost marshal to ensure that these instructions are made available to the public. I believe that this is generally well understood.
However, I understand that the section proposing that the vice-chief may issue instructions or guidelines in writing in respect of a particular investigation has been the subject of some concern. This authority, which would only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, reflects the necessity for a transparent mechanism to convey direction to the provost marshal when operational imperatives must take priority over or be weighed against the investigative obligations of the military police.
For example, given the unique requirement to conduct investigations in zones of armed conflict, this authority might be exercised in a situation the provost marshal is investigating under circumstances in which its continuation may for logistical reasons or because of high risk to CF personnel directly impact upon the potential success of an ongoing operation.
The VCDS is the appropriate authority to balance the commander's concerns for mission success and the provost marshal's need to advance an investigation. To protect against a potential abuse of this authority, Bill C-41provides transparency safeguards. It would require the provost marshal to make any instructions or guidelines from the VCDS regarding the specific investigation available to the public, unless the provost marshal himself or herself considers that making it public would not be in the best interests of the administration of justice.
In addition, existing sections of the National Defence Act would allow the provost marshal to make an interference complaint to the Military Police Complaints Commission if he or she suspected the VCDS of improperly interfering in an investigation. This is an area in which there are competing principles, requiring a balance between two legitimate and fundamental concerns: the investigative independence of the provost marshal and the responsibility of the chain of command for the accomplishment of operational objectives.
I believe that Bill C-41 proposes a viable and appropriate balance between these two imperatives. I also understand that in his report, Chief Justice Lamer concluded that independence was protectable through transparency and accountability, exactly what is proposed in this bill. Furthermore, on April 1, 2011, the Canadian Forces provost marshal will be assuming full command of all Canadian Forces military police directly involved in policing duties. The changes to the military police command and control structure are a continuation of the recommendations made in various reports to strengthen the independence, authority, and efficiency of the provost marshal in the exercise of his or her policing mandate.
I'd now like to turn to the subject of the Canadian Forces grievance process. Let me underscore that dealing effectively with grievances in the Canadian Forces is not a simple corporate management issue. It is a key leadership responsibility that the Chief of the Defence Staff, I, and all leaders take very seriously.
An effective grievance system is crucial to ensuring the welfare of the men and women of the Canadian Forces and to maintaining the very discipline, morale and operational effectiveness that I mentioned earlier. The bill would rename the Canadian Forces Grievance Board, which has done excellent work since 2000, as the Military Grievances External Review Committee. Renaming the organization would help reinforce the fact that the board, like the military police complaints commission, is an independent review body and not part of the Canadian Forces.
The bill would also make the entire grievance process more efficient by allowing the Chief of the Defence Staff to delegate his power as the final authority in the grievance process to other senior officers directly responsible to him. I must emphasize that the CDS would remain ultimately responsible and accountable for these decisions. It is not, as some have suggested before this committee, an abdication of the CDS's responsibility for the welfare of the men and women of the CF. Rather, it is a reflection of the reality recognized by Chief Justice Lamer that it is impractical and unreasonable to expect the CDS to personally decide every grievance in an organization of the size and complexity of the Canadian Forces. Both of these measures are endorsed by the grievance board.
Last spring, the Canadian Forces conducted a ten-year review of the grievance system and we remain committed to its constant improvement. This improvement involves many non-statutory changes that are already underway, many of which address some of the concerns presented by the grievance board. Several initiatives, such as the digitization of the grievance file, the creation of a central registry and the adjustment of timelines, are underway to reduce the time it takes to staff a grievance.
A key initiative is the trial of the principled approach, which allows the grievance board to review a larger number of files in order to increase transparency and fairness. Currently, the grievance board provides findings and recommendations on only four types of files: reversion of rank and release from the CF; conflict of interest and harassment; pay and financial benefits; and entitlements to medical and dental care.
I'm confident that these new initiatives will give us the ability to reduce the staffing of grievances to 12 months while increasing the transparency and the fairness of our complaint resolution system. Of note, the Lamer report recommended that the Chief of the Defence Staff be given statutory authority to approve financial compensation in resolving a grievance. While we agree with this recommendation and we are committed to its implementation, there are a number of complex authority issues that must be resolved before we can move forward.
When I took over as Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff last summer, my goal was to resolve this issue immediately, but I must admit that I have yet to find a mechanism that is legally, administratively, and practically acceptable. We are currently reviewing options that range from legislative amendments to ex gratia authority. This is one of my top priorities, and I will closely monitor the working group that has been tasked to find a solution.
Mr. Chair, let me conclude by re-emphasizing how important I believe it is that the provisions of Bill C-41 be adopted as soon as possible. In that vein, I would be pleased to assist you in your consideration of the bill by providing any additional background information or explanation that you might require.
I would like to once again thank you for your time. I welcome any questions you might have.
