National Defence Committee on May 15th, 2012

[George Petrolekas]

There are a couple of parts to that. I think there's absolutely a belief that we can better things. I recall one time walking outside of Bagram and watching a farmer trying to rebuild his farm. I thought, this is something really worth backing. The guy is sweating, working in the heat of the sun, building his mud bricks, and slowly, brick by brick, rebuilding his farmhouse. I thought that type of work, that type of ethic, that type of desire to improve should get our backing.

We're not defending the trends that are happening; we're just observing that because of fiscal constraint, because of other interests rising in other areas...we're not precluding doing things in Africa and we're not precluding doing things in the Middle East. We're looking at the long term and trying to describe to you the context in which all of this is landing. It is landing in a—

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Here's my point in pushing you a little bit on this. I'm not disagreeing with you with respect to the farmer or the beggar. There are those who say, “Well, that's just soft stuff”, and I hear the background chatter saying, “Well, we're not going to do values any longer. We're not going to project western values. All we're going to do is look after ourselves and let the rest take care of itself.” Between those two polarities, there seems to be a shift going on. Are you observing that shift, I guess is the question. I'd be interested in your observations.

[George Petrolekas]

Sorry, the shift—

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

The shift to economic hard-core interests versus—

[George Petrolekas]

I think that's exactly one of the things that we've described as things that we are seeing as a symptom of global financial crises. It is very hard, for example, if you're the Greek MOD at this moment to justify your 130-person Role 3 hospital in Kabul when people in your own streets are going through garbage cans.

Again, I'm not here to defend that or to justify it. I'm just suggesting to you that this is exactly what is going on around us and you need to anticipate that.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Your time has expired.

[Paul Chapin]

Can I just add a quick thought?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Yes, quickly.

[Paul Chapin]

We're not proposing that Canada abandon good works. What we're saying is, let's divide up the labour—because we're diffusing a lot of effort, and there are other people who can spend more time, maybe more effectively, doing certain kinds of things—but also let's know what the business is. It's not necessarily doing good; it's achieving good effects. That's where we think a great deal more intellectual attention is required. How do you actually fix problems rather than work heroically at them?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant, you have the floor.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Through you, to our witnesses, there are some, like my colleagues across the way, who question the utility of maintaining our partnership in an organization such as NATO, given that there are no conventional military threats to Canadian sovereignty or security. However, that line of thinking is somewhat naive, given the fact that those who would seek to do Canada harm are using new methods of attack, like cyber-attacks, terrorism, or other non-conventional threats.

In your opinion, what threats currently face members of NATO, and does the strategic concept paper address these threats to some extent?

[George Petrolekas]

You articulated some of the threats. You mentioned cyber, and that is one domain that has not been developed, either from a policy standpoint or an understanding of what that actually means. When you think that the New York Stock Exchange can fluctuate in value close to 7% in one day, based on strictly automated trading algorithms, with no human intervention, what does an attack on that do? When the national electrical grid and its switching is totally controlled by computer systems, what happens to those when they're attacked? Those cross-border...they're not limited to one particular country.

From an economic standpoint, one can foresee disruption to the oil supply, for whatever reason. Then question the ripple effect of what occurs. Jeff Rubin has talked about it from one aspect of the long-term effect of triple-digit oil, but what happens if oil automatically spikes because of something that destabilizes the global commons? Is there a collective responsibility to ensure the freedom of the global commons, wherever it may lie?

So $150, $160, $170 oil is going to push countries like Greece and Spain and Italy, or even companies in our country, over the brink. I recall Air Canada's recent quarterly reports. It announced a loss for the first time in several years, driven by fluctuations in the fuel price. How many companies in Canada now become affected because an action or event crosses the global commons and affects shipment and trade and so forth?

Absolutely, there are a host of threats much better addressed collectively than by individual nations.

I hope that answers your question.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

The doctrine for the Canadian Forces, as found in the Canada First defence strategy, places an emphasis on our Arctic. Are there currently any plans or initiatives for future joint training for NATO in the Arctic and the north? What role is there for NATO in the Arctic?

[George Petrolekas]

I think for the most part successive Canadian governments have treated the Arctic as Canadian inland waters and have not necessarily welcomed NATO involvement specifically in the Arctic, as we ourselves try to wade through a number of issues.

I'll give you an example from a question of smart defence. As you all know, Canada did pull out of the alliance ground surveillance system this year. These were the drones that NATO was going to purchase, and they became difficult to justify. We thought it was difficult for Canadians to justify contributions to smart defence when that entire capability that could be useful in terms of surveillance—surveillance over shores, surveillance of the Arctic from NATO—might have a mission set that would be applied here.

In the 60-odd years of NATO, I think the sum total of NATO common funded investment in Canada is a navy pier at Halifax, and only once have NATO assets made it over to North America: post-9/11 when the AWACS were brought over, and a very minor contribution after Hurricane Katrina. So there is a sense that we're not necessarily getting the return on investment, and part of that is driven by the fact that, yes, we do have needs like other alliance members and we should be beneficiaries of some of those programs that we fund on our own shores. We just don't see that occurring.

Again, it's trying to push NATO into recognizing that its boundaries don't end at the Bay of Biscay; they end in Juan de Fuca.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

I forgot to mention that we are into the five-minute rounds, so time has expired.

Ms. Moore, you have the floor.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like some clarification regarding the Afghan mission and the role of NATO.

I see a difference between having troops on the ground in Afghanistan and continuing to grant funding and advisory services from outside the country.

In your opinion, could it be possible that no troops from any NATO country will remain in Afghanistan after 2014? If we contribute advisory and financial support, will the Afghans be in a position to take over?

[Paul Chapin]

We work at two levels in Afghanistan.

First, we train Afghan forces so that they will be able to ensure their own security. At the other level, we try to promote more generally the country's development. NATO's strategy is to ensure—

focus on training the Afghan forces over the next two and half years, so that by the end of 2014 they can look after their own security. Assuming a fair measure of success, at that point there is a question: are they capable of handling their own security? How much continued military support is going to be required beyond 2014? It's a big question mark, and I don't think any NATO country has officially declared that it is willing even to think about that issue just yet.

On the other hand, a NATO strategy was approved at the Lisbon summit, which will be revisited at the Chicago summit next weekend, about continued support for Afghanistan over the long term in finance, economics, social development, education, and so on. There, there seems to be a good deal more willingness to stay involved in Afghanistan, but the question will be how much can people afford, and how much do they want to do in Afghanistan, given their own economic weaknesses?

[George Petrolekas]

There was a symptoms analysis.

I'll add that a member of your committee knows more about Afghanistan than anyone else in Canada. It's the former ambassador, Mr. Alexander.

Allow me to add a few comments. It's obvious that the Afghan state needs financial help, but beyond that, it still needs support in various areas of training, for example in the military and economic domains.

Even before the Chicago summit, I think the UK announced, a couple of weeks ago, that it was considering granting some $100 million to the Afghan state after 2014, to further NATO's efforts in Afghanistan. However, if the last numbers I saw are right, to be adequately supported the Afghan military would need almost $6 billion. Right now, therefore, there is a lack of willingness and support.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you.

I quite appreciated your answer, but my time is running out and I would like a short and clear answer.

After 2014, will a military presence still be necessary in Afghanistan? Will the situation have sufficiently evolved to allow for another type of support?

[George Petrolekas]

According to our Canadian, British, and U.S. partners, as well as other NATO countries, the short answer is yes. Yes, judging from what we have seen, the Afghan army will still need military support.

[Paul Chapin]

Is it to fight insurgents or stay back and train Afghans to fight insurgents? I think there's almost no appetite for forces to fight insurgents after 2014.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Merci beaucoup.

Mr. Chisu, you have the floor.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for your participation and for appearing as witnesses in front of our committee.

Professor Chapin, you expressed some skepticism about NATO from some NATO countries, certainly not former Warsaw Pact countries, because they are very much interested in NATO, and still they see NATO as an umbrella organization that is defending against Russia.

At the start of NATO, Canada had a permanent role and participated. It was one of the founding members of NATO. Somehow this role faded over the years. How is our voice heard today in NATO, and what will our future contribution be to NATO's transformation?

If I have time I will put a question about the information sharing between NATO members, and finally about NATO-Russia relations, in the way we have the enclave of Kaliningrad, which you need to....

[Paul Chapin]

I think a simple way of thinking about NATO is that three functions are performed under the title of NATO.

The first function basically is as a permanent diplomatic conference in Washington and around the North Atlantic Council table. All the governments are represented there by their ambassadors. They are essentially in permanent session. They have their staff to make sure they're connected with their capitals, their headquarters, and their foreign and defence ministries.

Canada has a voice around that table, and it is a highly respected voice. It's probably not as loud and heard as much, because NATO started out with 12 members and it now has 28 members.

The second element of NATO is the permanent international staff of military and civilian people who serve this permanent conference. There are dozens and dozens of Canadians, and I think hundreds of Canadian military officers, serving in both the civilian and military support systems for NATO. This is in Europe or in the various regional commands.

The third level is when NATO goes to war someplace, whether it's anti-piracy, Afghanistan, or Libya. Canada may or may not be involved a lot or little in those operations.

So Canada's influence and Canada's voice is at the diplomatic level permanently, in the staff work where Canadian expertise.... We knock our bureaucrats a lot in this town, but Canadian bureaucratic skills are very highly regarded in places like NATO.

Third is our role in operations.

Did you want me to say something about...?

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Yes, I would like if you could say something about the information sharing between the NATO member countries. I was in Afghanistan, and I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so I know a little bit about....