National Defence Committee on Oct. 16th, 2012

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I think it's more of a political commitment that one has to reach. I am a believer in procedures and not relying solely on political commitments. I think you would have to build in the expectation that you would provide those kinds of resources, and you may have to do it by mission as opposed to theoretically. Therefore, you create some peer pressure if you have committed in advance to providing that capability for the alliance in the field.

At the moment what we have is only political commitment, and we know where that has gotten us. We would have to build in, probably by mission, some commitments in advance to provide those sorts of resources.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

I presume it's a bit of a tricky thing to rely on missions to build up that practice.

In a different study of readiness, a number of military folks talked to us in terms of domestic defence as a kind of no-fail mission. When we're talking about multilateral missions, which from Canada's geography we usually perceive as being somewhere else in the world, do you see any kind of conflict between domestic defence requirements here in Canada versus participation in multilateral missions?

What I'm getting at is knowing where threats are coming from. I don't know whether you do any kind of threat analysis for Canada. How should Canada respond to what I think most of us generally perceive as two different issues of national domestic defence versus participation in multilateral missions?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I think there is more of a conflict between the two if you take a very narrow conception of the national interest as being about direct threats to your security and prosperity on Canadian soil, if you will. Then it becomes much more of a direct conflict to say that what we're doing internationally is essentially discretion; it isn't essential. Anything we do overseas or abroad is something for us to choose.

If you take a more expanded conception of the national interest and you see instability and failure in states as having a potential impact on things that Canadians value, then to me there is less of a conflict. Then we come back to the question of whether our mission globally is only about the protection of our narrow national interest or whether we also want to stand up for certain values. That involves preventing mass atrocities against civilians, wherever they happen to reside.

I can't answer that question without referencing one's perspective on that fundamental issue of whether you have an expanded conception of the Canadian national interest or you have a very narrow one. If you have an expanded one, there isn't a conflict, because you believe you need to be investing in both kinds of operations.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Time has expired.

Mr. Chisu, it's your turn.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much to the guests who are appearing before the committee.

I have a question for Professor Welsh. Something that you mentioned that is also discussed in great detail with the strategic concept is the need for NATO to have new membership and to establish a stronger partnership with countries or regions that are not members of the alliance.

You mentioned Georgia and you mentioned that you are not necessarily in favour of the expansion of NATO, despite the fact that NATO has had a crucial role in avoiding conflicts in Europe. Together with the European Union, which recently received the Nobel Prize, and NATO, of which most of the European countries are members, the NATO role was a positive one in avoiding war in Europe.

When you speak about Georgia or other countries, automatically we are going to have a relation with Russia, because they are threatened by the expansion of NATO. In your opinion, how important is it for NATO to continue to build strong relations and partnerships with other nations and, in the meantime, to mitigate the relations with Russia, or to alleviate the syndrome of cornering Russia?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

My statement referred to caution about expansion. It wasn't to suggest that NATO should never include Georgia. I think much depends on what we see in the coming decade. Actually, we just went through a very, very important political transition which demonstrated something vital about that society.

My point was about caution, given the letter of article 5, and also about recognizing that the war that occurred between Russia and Georgia in 2008 had multiple causes. I think there's concern from the record and analysis of that about some of the behaviour of the Georgians, despite what I would not want to suggest was good behaviour on the part of the Russians. It was just a note of caution about expansion; it was not to say they should never be part of the alliance.

I do think NATO, very much like the European Union, is an incredible magnet for change, and that's how it should use the power that it has. Absolutely, engagement with these countries is essential, as the French recognized throughout that crisis. In order to have any leverage at all in situations that become dangerous, as happened in 2008, you have to have been engaging well before. However, I just wanted to reiterate that we need to be very cautious about expanding membership today.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

I have another question, and maybe both of you can answer. Some of the 28 NATO member states see Russia as a partner and others see it as a threat. To what extent do these divergent views impact NATO's ability to agree on a nuclear posture? How will NATO's plan to modernize the U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe affect NATO-Russia relations?

[Paul Ingram]

Maybe I will answer first.

The differences you refer to are at the heart of the challenge within the nuclear posture. As I said, we have a consensus document, but it's papering over the cracks. I don't perceive the Germans, the Dutch, and the Belgians to be hosting B61 bombs in 10 or 15 years' time, because they don't perceive Russia to be a threat. This is a problem, because the Baltic states in particular see NATO's nuclear posture as crucial to the article 5 commitment, and nuclear weapons here are symptoms rather than the ultimate cause of the problem.

Similarly, in response to your second question, when it comes to Russian perceptions, I personally don't think the Russians lie in their beds worrying at night about the B61 bomb in Europe. It doesn't have the range and therefore isn't a particular threat to the Russians, but they see it as a very useful way of ensuring that the alliance is not as cohesive as it might be.

Now, that's the case today. If we go through with a modernization process as proposed, the B61 Mod.12, which is the modernization of the current B61—which the Americans are now estimating will cost them somewhere in the region of $10 billion—will be putting tail fins on those bombs and making them far more capable. Putting them on the F-35 stealth planes could well change the Russian dynamic and perspective, and I think they will be perceiving this as symbolic, yet again, of the American and NATO's allies prioritizing their own capabilities over the relationship and over a more cooperative future relationship.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Time has expired.

I would suggest to both our witnesses that if you wanted to respond to questions today but never got a chance because of time limitations, I would encourage both of you to put them in writing and send them along to our analysts through our clerk so that we can see your written responses and use them in our deliberations.

We're going to keep moving along.

Mr. Brahmi, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both of you for appearing before this committee.

My first question will be directed to Professor Welsh. I noted that at the beginning of your presentation you very rapidly mentioned cybersecurity. I know it's a very vast domain and a separate threat to NATO allies, but perhaps you could summarize your views on this topic.

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

It is a vast topic, and it's not an area of expertise for me per se, so I want to put that caveat on it.

Coming back to the comments I made in response to Mr. Alexander, I think the aspect of cybersecurity that is important for NATO is the difficulty of determining what constitutes an attack and also determining the origin of that attack.

I'm not suggesting for a moment that we can't surmount both of those difficulties, but they are difficulties, in terms of agreeing on what actually constitutes an attack. There's a lot of rhetoric that surrounds the activity on cyberspace and a lot of accusations are made, but we would need to think very carefully about agreeing on protocols for how that is defined if you have an alliance with a clause like article 5.

More broadly, there are some fascinating ethical issues here as well about the possible effects of cyberattack. Here we're talking about implications for civilians, which could be very widespread. NATO worried about this with respect to nuclear weapons—the ultimate indiscriminate weapon, in some respects—but cyberattacks are very similar if you think about the havoc they can wreak on domestic infrastructure.

Here we are dealing with a technology and a possible threat that will not be restricted to soldiers in uniform but could have devastating effects for civilians. That is the aspect of it that I think NATO will need to grapple with, because there is a view on the part of some that it's a lesser-evil technology, that using cyberattacks is better than using conventional armies. However, that's not the case if you take the view of the impact it might have on civilians.

There was a fascinating moment in the Libya campaign with respect to cybersecurity that I don't know if you've discussed or noted. That was the decision the Obama administration faced very early on as to whether it should take out Gadhafi's air defence systems with a cyberattack or with bombs. It chose the latter, even though that posed a greater risk to the United States. From what I've been able to learn, the reason for that decision was the fear of the precedent the attack would set and a fear of demonstrating the capability the U.S. had in that domain, particularly with respect to countries like China and Russia.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

I have another question for Mr. Ingram. You mentioned many different countries that are potential threats from the nuclear point of view. You didn't mention North Korea.

What is the reason for that? Is there a regime change you see that will lead to less threat from that source?

[Paul Ingram]

It's a much less informed reason. It's largely because it's not an area that I cover, but I would comment that North Korea is a significant potential threat. I wouldn't say it's a significant threat at the moment to North America, but of course if it continues along its current trajectory, there could well be at least a capability, though I would question the intention to be able to attack North America. I would question that intention because North Korea is very much focused upon its own regime survival rather than having some sort of strategic conflict in a more conventional way.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

The time has expired.

We'll go over to Mr. Norlock. You have the floor.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you to the witnesses, thank you for appearing before us today. This has been lots of food for thought, but I'm going to shift some of the questioning now. I'll start my first question with Ms. Welsh.

The Arctic and in particular the Canadian Arctic is increasingly attracting a fair amount of international attention vis-à-vis natural resources, the melting of the ice, etc., and there are, of course, other Arctic nations who would wish to share in some of this in the region.

What role, if any, do you think there is for NATO in the high north, whether in establishing a base or in conducting training exercises? Could we have perhaps a minute and a half of discussion around those kinds of strategies?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

At present, I take the view that there's not a large role for NATO with respect to the Arctic. That's not because I don't think the Arctic is vitally important—I do—but I think there are enormous governance challenges in the Arctic, and that is the primary issue we need to be investing in.

Whether the institutions and arrangements that we have are fit for the purpose, Canada is about to become the chair of the Arctic Council. At the moment, in particular, and I don't want to insinuate this was behind your question, there is an idea that we have opponents who threaten us in the Arctic, i.e., Russia. We need to be very careful about that, because I think Russia can still be a collaborator with us in thinking about solutions to governing the Arctic.

Therefore, at present I don't see this as a priority for NATO. It certainly is for the Canadian government, and thinking about its defence forces with respect to the Arctic is obviously a priority. I don't know if Mr. Ingram has other thoughts, but I wouldn't see it as a priority for NATO at this time.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you.

If we can now shift even more, this would be a question you could perhaps share, and I don't think it's going to require a lengthy answer.

There have been many reports indicating there's a shift in U.S. policy away from the North Atlantic to the Asia Pacific. In your opinion, how will this impact the future for the alliance? Is it actually a change in focus or just a balancing of priorities?

Perhaps Mr. Ingram, and then Ms. Welsh, can answer.

[Paul Ingram]

I perceive it to be a changing list of priorities for the United States. I think nevertheless that the United States still perceive its NATO allies as critical to what they used to call “pivot”, until they changed that name, because they still, as they did with a number of interventions up to now, see their NATO allies as essential for that refocus on other parts of the world. Nevertheless, I think the alliance has been slow, and continues to be slow, in changing its nature. You still have a number of allies who see the purpose of the alliance as largely to lock the Americans into Europe, and you're now in a situation in which there's real tension with that model as those allies are still try to keep and grasp the Americans. That creates a tension that I don't think is conducive to a fully functioning, proper relationship.

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I think I would agree that it's not just rebalancing. I do think there is a shift in priorities and emphasis, particularly in how assets are going to be deployed. I would agree that this will create issues with respect to the relationship between the United States and France, the U.K., and Germany, in particular, about the U.S.'s commitment to Europe, but I think we have to have a little bit of a historical perspective here. The level of commitment of the U.S. to Europe has always been a concern of the Europeans. It's an ongoing challenge.

We think back to the Vietnam war, we think about periods where the United States was engaged elsewhere. That doesn't mean that NATO is irrelevant, but, yes, it means it is harder than it was, for example, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, to make the case that NATO is the pinnacle of U.S. defence and security concerns.

It definitely needs to be managed politically, but we mustn't forget the degree to which the U.S. still sees NATO as a hugely valuable tool of its own foreign policy and a mechanism for exerting its influence in meeting its objectives.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, very much.

I think your time is up, Mr. Norlock.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant, you have the floor.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To both of our witnesses, what should NATO's role in energy security be?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Ingram, do you want to go first?

[Paul Ingram]

Okay, I'll go first.

NATO's role in energy security clearly is about the relationship with Russia, by and large, and the Middle East. I think it does need to take energy security into account, but I think we're going to have to be cautious about using an alliance that is based upon the military in order to deal with energy security. It's far more important to be dealing with sources of energy from a diplomatic perspective than to be using a military alliance. The trouble is, if you are a military alliance, you see military threats far more quickly than you see opportunities for cooperation.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Let's go back to cybersecurity, then.

Did you have something to say?