National Defence Committee on Oct. 16th, 2012

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I was just going to say that I think it very much depends on how widely you want to define energy and whether you want to consider water as part of energy and really want expand the remit. If you take seriously some of the claims about energy scarcity and its link to conflict, and if NATO were serious about prevention and about where the conflicts of the future might be, then obviously thinking about energy, the distribution of energy, and the likelihood of scarcity is not unimportant.

However, I would agree with Mr. Ingram in that I would be nervous as well about using an alliance with respect to the most immediate issues of energy security. I think NATO needs to be thinking about where the conflicts of the future might be and what the root causes of conflict around the world might be.

It comes back to something I said in my opening remarks about cynicism about prevention. I've seen many strategic concepts and policy documents talking about prevention of conflict, but very few organizations have really taken it seriously. If you were looking at energy security, to me that would be taking prevention seriously if you were to play out those scenarios and really think about what they might entail.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

This committee has been told that cybersecurity is the domain of the homeland security or public safety and that military cyberdefence applies to threats on military assets or communications.

In terms of NATO and its core commitments, how do you see cyberdefence developing? You mentioned protocols earlier. Should the cyberdefence be left to cooperation between civilian agencies within or outside NATO?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I think I can understand why at present we are making the distinctions that homeland security should deal with these aspects and that NATO or our defence institutions should deal with attacks on military infrastructure. However, as we move further down the line, it will be much harder to maintain those distinctions, so it would not be remiss, in my view, for NATO to think slightly more broadly about the types of threats that cyberattacks and activity in cyberspace might lead to, and what, as I mentioned before, the very notion of an attack might mean.

I think it's because we are so early in the game of thinking about how to manage cyberthreats and potential cyberattacks that we're making these bureaucratic divisions. As we move forward, I think it will be harder and harder to maintain them, although I can understand that there are real turf issues here, and also issues about civilian control.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Given that a cyberattack on government infrastructure may be the precursor to a physical assault, at what point would it be appropriate to consider invoking article 5?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Is there any response?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I don't know; I really don't know. I've been thinking about this quite a lot, and I can see different scenarios, but I don't have a clear answer. I think it will involve a political judgment about whether we've moved from this stage of just infrastructure to an attack on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It's very difficult for me to answer that in a definitive way. In a way, this is analogous to some of the debates that we used to have about pre-emption. What can you take to be action with a hostile intent? As in the debate over pre-emption, my worry is that we may indulge in worst-case-scenario thinking and assume that a full frontal assault is about to hit us. Then we might act pre-emptively in a way that could be questionable from a legitimacy and legality point of view. The answer to your question is one that NATO strategists should be putting a lot of time into thinking through. I'm sorry that I don't have a better answer for you today.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Go ahead, Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I have a question about Russia and Syria. There is a lot of finger pointing going on about Russia and what they are doing or not doing. Is there any evidence of constructive engagement with Russia about a course of action in Syria? We all know Russia has interests in Syria. Is anybody telling them what we'd like them to cooperate on? Is there any evidence of that happening, or is it just rhetorical finger-wagging?

[Paul Ingram]

I think it's more complex than just Russian interests. The Russians I've talked to about this issue believe that the west is not coming up with any solutions either. They too see a lot of human rights abuses and challenges, and they don't dispute that there are many innocents being slaughtered, but they don't think the solutions the west is coming up with are effective. It's not just a disagreement about interests; it's a disagreement about how to go about dealing with the problem.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Go ahead, Professor Welsh.

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I was just going to add that there was engagement with Russia. The U.S. and Europe believed, up until this past summer, that Russia had leverage with the Syrians, so for quite a long time there was some constructive engagement. The last vetoed Security Council resolution in July ended the belief that the Russians had leverage, and the engagement has been much less constructive since then.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. McKay is next.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Professor Welsh, you were critical of NATO's accountability to the UN during and after the Libya mission. What do you think NATO could have done better? How could it mitigate some of the negative fallout that has resulted in the UN from this absence of accountability?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

I don't think this was all NATO's fault. What I was trying to suggest was that there weren't accountability mechanisms there. I was reading the testimony of General Bouchard to your committee; he said that we did what we do in NATO—that is, we did weekly briefings to the North Atlantic Council.

But then, what's the relationship between the North Atlantic Council and the Security Council? It is a question of demand and supply. There have to be procedures built into the Security Council mandates and the North Atlantic Council. The generals who are trying to fight the war need to be providing information about how the mission is evolving.

I would perhaps fault the individual states in the alliance in their public comments about their objectives in Libya, but it's not solely the fault of the alliance. I think it was also the UN itself that needed to find ways of demanding that kind of information.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

For the Conservatives, Mr. Alexander, go ahead, please.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thanks.

My question is about ballistic missile defence. It's part of the emerging doctrine at NATO. It relates to both strategic deterrence and the aspiration of many new members to have that hard security umbrella because they're neighbours of Russia or they're near Russia.

Canada so far, since the 1980s, has remained outside of these sorts of negotiations and these sorts of discussions. Is that sustainable for Canada? Do you think we should join the NATO-led BMD or not?

[Paul Ingram]

Just to follow up on my earlier comments, I would say quite categorically that the alliance BMD is not so much directed towards Russia as it is directed towards Iran and other emerging nuclear states. The NATO umbrella will never be capable of tackling the sorts of capabilities that the Russians have, at least not for decades to come.

One has to ask whether Canada is really threatened by Iran. Is Canada really threatened by North Korea? If the answer, particularly to that second question, is yes, then you need to start thinking about whether missile defence contributes to your protection.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Professor Welsh, do you want to respond?

[Prof. Jennifer Welsh]

No, thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you very much.

I think we got around everyone quite well today. The technology seemed to work, and we always appreciate it when it does.

We definitely appreciate that both Professor Welsh and Mr. Ingram took time out of their busy schedules in the U.K. to join us by video conference and provide their expertise to help guide us in our deliberations on NATO's strategic concept and our role in international defence cooperation.

There are a lot of exciting things happening in the world, and a lot of concerning things, and definitely we have a lot to think about as we go forward in the preparation of a report for the House of Commons.

With that, I'm going to entertain a motion to adjourn so that we can get to the House. The bells are ringing.

[An hon. member]

So moved.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

The meeting is adjourned.