Thank you.
I'm willing to acknowledge that there are substantial reforms proposed in this bill, which I accept. To show you how it's sometimes hard to understand why they stop at that, for example, if you take the civilian court, the judge who gets an offender in front of him can decide to suspend a sentence for two years and allow a monitoring of his behaviour. If at the end of the two years he's been of good behaviour, he can grant an absolute discharge or conditional discharge, which means he has no criminal record.
We don't get that here in the military. They can suspend the execution of the sentence, but the sentence is passed. What I'm talking about here is the suspension of the passing of the sentence to monitor.
Unless I've missed something because I was still sitting on the court, I see that there is an absolute discharge mechanism in Bill C-15, but there's nothing about conditional discharge. Conditional discharge ends up with the same result, except that you have the sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the guy: if he's of good behaviour, then everything is wiped out, but if he fails, then he gets a sentence.
Why do we stop at that? I don't know. If you look at the bill as a whole, there are a number of provisions like that.
I'll give you another example. There's a provision dealing with the power to arrest. If you go back to the bill, you'll see that the police have the power to arrest, but a duty not to arrest if it's a less serious offence and you know the identity of the person and there's no likelihood that the offence will carry on, and so on. This is borrowed from the Criminal Code, no doubt about it, except that they have not borrowed the code entirely.
If you go back to sections 495 and 496 in the code, you will see that this duty not to arrest applies to less serious offences and to hybrid offences. What's a hybrid offence? A hybrid offence, like sexual assault, is an offence that can be prosecuted summarily—we have summary trials in civilian courts—or as an indictable offence. If the person is arrested for sexual assault, because it is a hybrid offence there is a duty not to arrest unless the conditions of the code are fulfilled. What we are importing here is a duty on the military police officer that is less stringent than what we have on the civilian police. I'm not sure this is constitutional, and I'll tell you why.
In the Gauthier case in 1998, the Court Martial Appeal Court was facing an abuse of police power to arrest. The unanimous Court Martial Appeal Court ruled that the guarantees found in the Criminal Code were imported by the charter into the National Defence Act and found that the arrest was unlawful because there was a duty not to arrest.
In the Du-Lude case about six or seven years later, the Federal Court of Appeal gave $10,000 to a soldier who had been unlawfully arrested when there was a duty not to arrest, as a result of the Court Martial Appeal Court decision in the Gauthier case, on the basis of a violation of his constitutional rights.
However, here we have a provision that gives less than the Gauthier and the Du-Lude cases have been giving to a solider.
I'm sorry if I took too much time.