The sections that are there, specific sections would be examined sometimes seven years from whenever this comes into law. That's a long time for this to take place. We've heard significant constitutional arguments before this committee on certain provisions, such as clause 75, and we haven't finished that yet, but also concerns about the grievance procedure and how the grievance procedure is inadequate. We've heard concerns about the whole structure of military courts and the necessity of examining them in connection with the worldwide trend in western countries of further civilianization of the act.
I think implicitly in these comments, one would suggest that the independent reviews that we've had, in particular the last one, wasn't supported by the kind of resources that one might need to have a thoroughly independent review such as you might have, and Mr. Justice Létourneau's previous experience with the Law Reform Commission having adequate resources to do that.
We don't think that this is adequate at all. We think that there ought to be a significant independent review, not just of particular sections, some of which may be being amended now, but that there, in fact, be a thorough and fundamental review of the entire National Defence Act.
If I may quote from Mr. Justice Létourneau's evidence before this committee, he said:
As a proud member of the Canadian society, a society devoted to the promotion of equality of all before the law, I would like to close by reiterating some of the proposals found in the book that I filed with you today. Foremost, I urge this committee to study the international trends towards the civilianization of military tribunals to promote equality of all before the law, which can be achieved only by conducting a fundamental structural and organizational revamping of the National Defence Act in order to enhance its access, consultation, and legibility as well as its structure, internal arrangement, and form; and on a substantive level, to correct the flaws in the National Defence Act resulting from an imperfect duplication of the Criminal Code provisions, by taking into consideration the charter and military needs and by reviewing the provisions that attract constitutional criticism.
That's a very broad statement, but it requires in order to follow it a broader review than one that suggested that might take place some seven or eight years from now.
It's not clear from looking here, and maybe Colonel Gibson can enlighten us.... It says “seven years after the day on which this section comes into force”. When that might be, I don't know. The bill has to go back to the House. It has to go to the Senate. It has to be promulgated in force by some act of the Governor in Council. So, some seven years from that date, whenever it is, we will see another supposedly independent review of the provisions that are specified here.
I don't mean that in a flippant way when I say an independent review of the nature that Mr. Justice Létourneau was talking about, one that is fully resourced and fundamental in nature as opposed to a review of a particular section.
We don't support clause 101. We think it's inadequate and that it, in fact, prolongs the possibility of reform to this legislation, prolongs the possibility of fundamentally re-examining this. As we've seen already we didn't, and couldn't, attempt to re-write the National Defence Act by making amendments to this particular bill. Even some of the very modest recommendations that we had were deemed to be outside the scope of the legislation, and we accept that. That's the nature of dealing with an amending act. It is not a full act and you can't re-write an entire act in committee; you can only make amendments within the scope of the act. Therein lies some of the problems.
We've only gone so far as, in this case, the government was willing to go. Based on the criticisms that we've seen, based on the recommendations of Mr. Justice Létourneau and Colonel Drapeau and others who appeared before the committee, we think there are some substantial flaws in the scheme of the act, in the scheme of military justice, in the over-militarization of even matters such as grievance procedures, the failure to adequately address the concerns that have been raised about the inadequacy of grievance, and all sorts of things that are consequential upon that, and the failure to examine the international trends that see greater civilianization of the military justice system in other countries such as the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and other countries that have been mentioned.