National Defence Committee on Dec. 10th, 2013

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

When exactly did the Philippines ask for assistance? Your original statement was that you were deploying it and you were considering it immediately after the typhoon struck, and that in fact, the plane had left the day before. I don't understand how this actually happened here.

The reason I'm asking, of course, is that, as Mr. Norlock said, this is not just used internationally. It will be used locally as well. How ready are we to go, and all of that? What you also say here is that it wasn't until November 24 that the team declared full operational capacity in the Philippines. I'm just wondering about that timeline as well.

[MGen Michael Hood]

With respect to the contingency plan for the deployment of the DART, the first element that would go out would be ISST, which is led by Foreign Affairs, as I pointed out, supported by the leadership team of the DART. They deploy in CF aircraft on the recommendation of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in this case, and set the groundwork to enable, through reconnaissance, liaison with the Government of the Philippines, the rest of the deployment of the team.

Concurrently to that deployment of the ISST and the coordination that was going on by government, we were able to posture the rest of the DART resources at a higher level so that when we were given that authority, we were able to go quickly into theatre.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That was the next day. On the 10th, according to you, the ISST group left, and on the 11th, the announcement was made, and within an hour there were other people leaving.

[MGen Michael Hood]

The ISST left on the 10th. We can deploy the ISST and do a reconnaissance that would suggest that the capabilities of the DART are not appropriate to the task. It's important to have those first eyes on it to understand that the deployment of the rest of that DART team is postured correctly. It is not always the right capability, depending on the capacity of non-governmental organizations, or the country itself.

That ISST then makes a recommendation that yes, we should deploy all of these elements of the DART in scalable...we may not need helicopters, we may not need engineers, we may not need the ROPUs that I spoke about. Once that recommendation comes in from the ISST, we are then given authority by the government to deploy the rest of the DART, which is that 300-person team that flows in over a number of days. When we talk about FOC, full operation capability, which I talked about, they were operating the day after they arrived there, and as more forces arrived in the coming days, it took that period to get up to full operational capability. They were operating immediately upon arrival.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

There is a buildup. I guess we understand that, but the full capability wasn't in place until the 24th, which is essentially two weeks.

[MGen Michael Hood]

In this case, yes, it's all a time in space equation of how quickly we could get it there as well as the capacity to support that deployment. In some cases, you wouldn't actually have the infrastructure and operating airport so that it would not be able to deploy all of these capacities. It depends on the situation once the ISST has had a chance to do that reconnaissance.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Again, I'm not denigrating the efforts of our troops and our people. I'm very happy to see that we've been there. There was one criticism that showed up in a Globe and Mail report on November 17, questioning why we were in the Roxas City area when the real impact had been in some other islands where the other nations, the United States, Australia, the Philippines, were themselves operating. How did we get to Roxas City, where it was suggested that most of the devastation was really the effect of ongoing poverty and terrible circumstances?

[MGen Michael Hood]

That's an excellent question. I think in this case it's important to recognize that we went precisely where the Philippine government asked us to go. I think if you would have seen the path of the storm and the devastation involved in the area that we were operating in, it would be hard to draw the conclusion that we were sent somewhere where we weren't required. In fact, it was quite the opposite. We went precisely where the Philippine government asked the Canadian government to send us.

I could offer colleagues from Foreign Affairs to perhaps expand on that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

That has to be expanded on in a subsequent answer because time is up, Mr. Harris.

Mr. Allen, please.

[Mike Allen, Conservative, Tobique—Mactaquac, NB]

I'm going to be splitting my time with Mr. Williamson.

I have just one question.

You talked a little bit about cooperation. I find it fascinating the number of countries you're working with, plus the number of groups on the ground in the Philippines.

What are some of the lessons learned over the past number of years about the coordination required in reaction to these kinds of situations? What are some of the key challenges and overlap issues you face when you go into a place like the Philippines?

[MGen Michael Hood]

Thank you for that question.

In fact, I'll do a quick description of the military thought on that, and then I'll pass it to colleagues from DFATD.

One thing we have done quite well is we have learned from previous deployments of the DART. At each deployment we'll take stock of how we responded to the crisis, what were our strengths, what were our weaknesses, and then Steve's team will take that and refresh the contingency plan so that we're much better prepared for the next occurrence.

For instance, there was a time when helicopters weren't integral to the deployment of the DART. With lessons learned from many locations, including most recently in Haiti, and now that we have the capacity to fly them there, in fact, it is a lesson learned that's been brought forward. While it's premature to understand lessons learned from the Philippines, I guarantee that we will learn those from a military perspective and regenerate our next capability to make it much more effective.

Leslie, if you'd like to speak....

[Mike Allen, Conservative, Tobique—Mactaquac, NB]

Yes, if you could, and, Mr. Shore, if you could talk about the lead, who has the [inaudible—Editor]....

[Andrew Shore, Director, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Perhaps I could just add to what the general has said.

Foreign Affairs coordinates this for exactly the reason that you've mentioned. There's an awful lot to be coordinated and there have been a lot of very good lessons learned over the years with the deployment of the DART.

I think the deployment of the ISST, which has been mentioned, is the first thing. It doesn't automatically lead to the deployment of the DART, but it does lead to a recommendation on what would be an appropriate type of support.

Therefore, we have set up an interdepartmental task force. It met for the first time on November 10, and it's chaired by my division. Basically, we bring all the key people to the table. Our embassy in the Philippines is on the line as are many other people from around town. This is where we try to figure out, as everyone is rushing to try to make the right assessment, what the coordination should be so that airports don't get overloaded, so that people don't bring the wrong type of assistance and so on.

My colleague, Leslie, could add a bit more detail on that.

[Leslie Norton, Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Briefly, from the field perspective, in 2005 the United Nations undertook an important reform process. Essentially, it created the cluster system, which is made up of sectors. You might have a water and sanitation cluster, for instance. They set up these clusters for each and every sector across a response. It pulls together every actor, whether it's the United Nations, an NGO, or the Red Cross movement, so that they work together in a much more coordinated fashion to ensure they address all gaps and any duplication. It's often co-chaired by the government as well as by the United Nations.

What we have learned also over the years is that it's very important to embed civilian and political officers within the DART team to ensure that the full coordination taken from headquarters also reaches deep into the field, and then comes back to headquarters.

[Mike Allen, Conservative, Tobique—Mactaquac, NB]

Mr. Williamson.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Go ahead.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for coming today.

I want to go back to some questions Mr. Harris was asking, but whereas he seems to see PR campaigns and demons, I want to talk about the coordination.

I assume your group does not wait until the government calls and says to send the DART over, but in fact, as soon as you see a disaster like this, you spring into operation and begin to prepare so you can deploy when the government calls on you. In this way, we're not having a lag of days where you're getting geared up after the government has called.

Can you talk about the measures you take when you see storms or devastation like this happening to an ally a world away? How do things roll out so you're actually ready to go when called?

[MGen Michael Hood]

Thank you for that question.

We've talked about the notice to move in this case, and the posture of the DART. As I've said, certainly the commander of CJOC has the ability to posture those forces to respond even quicker if the likelihood of that deployment is going to take place. In the case of the Philippines, the storm hit on Friday, and on Saturday we were in phone calls with colleagues. The first meeting of that interdepartmental team was early on Sunday morning and by Sunday evening the Challenger had departed. A lot of that action was undertaken by individuals in various departments executing their responsibilities to the greatest extent possible.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

First of all, to clarify, it's no surprise that your group, like the rest of them, operates under civilian control. Forces don't move unless the elected government of the day calls upon them. That's a simple question. I just want to get that on the record clearly.

[MGen Michael Hood]

In fact, the use of defence forces is a crown prerogative that extends from government decisions and direction to the Minister of National Defence and then to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Thank you.

You talked about the coordination between NGOs, how it was a model. What are some of the examples? Why did it work so well that you were commended by the United Nations?

[MGen Michael Hood]

I think our colleagues are probably best placed to answer that since they lead most of that coordination on our behalf.

[Andrew Shore]

There's also coordination with the Philippine authorities. This was part of the initial assessment for our embassy, even before we had people on the ground to report back on what they were being told by the local officials.

One thing in the Philippines that was different from the crisis in Haiti was that the capital wasn't affected, so the government continued to operate. We had a very effective partner there. After all, they have a lot of expertise in handling crises like this. This was a massive typhoon, but they are relatively well prepared for these.

With regard to the question of collaborating with NGOs, civil society, and multilateral agencies, it's been a factor in training for years with the DART. My team and Leslie's team and DND work on this on an ongoing basis. We were pleased to hear about Baroness Amos when she was visiting Panay Island. We were able to have the Challenger fly her around so that she could see the situation on the ground. She said that as far as she was concerned, this was the best example of civilian-military partnership she had seen. But it does take a lot of work. That's basically what I was saying.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Mr. Shore.

Ms. Murray.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Thank you very much for your presentation, for the success, for all of the activities that were undertaken, and for all of the help that was provided.

Where does the budget come from for the DART activities?