National Defence Committee on Sept. 14th, 2017

[Colin Robertson]

There may be some if we make an investment.... Then again, these are decisions the government would make. If we were to decide to go into it, there may be technology that we would get access to, but that would all be part of the negotiation process.

What is fundamental here is this: is there a greater threat to Canadians than there was 10 years ago? I believe there is. Therefore, I think we should re-examine and ask the tough questions. How much does it cost? How much participation are we going to have in it? I'm not troubled by the fact that it's an American-made system. We use American-made systems all the time, but we use them for Canadian reasons to protect Canadians. That's what's important.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Can I ask you to respond, Mr. Lam?

[Danny Lam]

I'll make two points.

First of all, the threat is different. The explosion on September 3 was 250 kilotons. This is not a toy. That determination has changed U.S. policy from “we could live with it and put up with it for a little longer” to “we have to do something about it now”.

In this discussion of BMD, you talk about joining and you talk about costs...? Excuse me. That is going to take months and years. We have a problem today.

Now, the other point on defence is that missile defence doesn't work incrementally. The first increment of defence you build changes everything, because then you're no longer the easiest target. They may be able to defeat your missile defence, but they have uncertainty. You have upset their calculation. My argument is that fielding something quickly, even if it's only one desultory anti-ballistic missile, has value. We could actually do it today if it's forward defence, okay? We can do it quickly and cheap.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Huebert.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I just have to weigh in. We've talked about diplomacy. Diplomacy also comes from strength. You talk about the economic factors and all of these. It's not about economics. It's about how we have Canadian security.

We also seem to be fixated on this one scenario that is just about the North Koreans firing a missile at North America before anything else happens. I think we have to be really careful about getting so fixated on that, because the more realistic probability is a quick invasion from the North Koreans into South Korea and a war erupts. At that point, we want to make sure that we are participating fully with the Americans when the heat of battle means that all the planning we had beforehand goes out the window.

Therefore, in answer to your very good question—what is the cost if we're not involved?—it's that in that scenario where North Korea invades South Korea, the war breaks out, things get hot, and then at that point they fire, we want to be ready in some form, even if it's as a junior participant that we're there. To say that somehow we have security by not participating I think is totally based on false premises, to be honest.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

The last couple of minutes for this panel will go to Mr. Bezan.

James, you have the floor.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I was wondering if we'd get any balance here. We've had 19 minutes of Liberal questions versus only seven so far for the Conservatives.

I want to thank all you gentlemen for being here today, and I do want to talk about this whole path of what avenues we can explore from a deterrence factor. I do believe, as Professor Huebert just said, that diplomacy is through strength. I think we see that Kim Jong-un is provoked by weakness. It's the same thing we see with Putin.

How can we take a stronger role in developing that strength through deterrence and through supporting our allies like South Korea and Japan? Of course, we can talk about our arch-enemy potentially being North Korea, but we also have our arch-ally, which is the United States, so how do we strengthen that relationship? You guys have all touched on it briefly, but maybe we can dive down just quickly into what the priority areas are in which we can strengthen that relationship.

I'll start with Professor Huebert and then Colin, and then see if we have time left to come back to Danny.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

In the interests of time, first of all, from the military security perspective, we go for ABM, we look at how we can in fact improve the satellite surveillance systems we're talking about for the modernization of NORAD, and we consider the possibility for the next surface combatants. In other words, it's something real. It's something to show that in fact we will defend.

From a diplomatic perspective, remember that it was Canada that was able to get the ball rolling on NATO. I'm not suggesting that we get into some form of a NATO-like relationship with the Japanese, South Koreans, Americans, and the Aussies, but we can do a lot more than what we've been doing in the context of trying to facilitate that security-political relationship with those four states. I really think that we need to be pushing somehow. If you want to be investing in diplomatic efforts, I think that's where to go. I think the Japanese and the South Koreans would jump at it.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Mr. Robertson.

[Colin Robertson]

In the broad sense, I think it's recognition or changing the current policy toward North Korea to at least be at the table. That's on the diplomatic front.

On the defence front, I'd endorse what Professor Huebert just said. I also think, in the broad sense, that following through with what we committed to in the defence program review, which is very much in alignment with what the Harper government had come up with in terms of improving our capacity with our new fighter jets and warships and improving on our ground side, is important, because that then feeds into the alliance in meeting the targets that we have agreed to. It would be stronger if it were all-partisan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Professor Lam.

[Danny Lam]

I would say, first of all, let's revisit NORAD and update the agreement to include missile defence. Second, do whatever it takes to make a deal with the U.S. to get one or two ground-based missile interceptors in Alaska that are dedicated for Canada only. Cut a cheque and pay them. Third, with our allies—Japan and South Korea—we must have a relationship for our forward defence.

On the diplomatic side, I completely agree.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your time today. I'm going to suspend the meeting to bring in our last panel of academics.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I would like to welcome everyone back to our discussion about North Korea as it relates to Canada.

We have our last panel of academics. First off, we have James Fergusson from the University of Manitoba, here with us in Ottawa; Andrea Charron from Manitoba via VTC; and Andrea Berger via video conference from London, England. I believe that will also be the order of the speakers.

My apologies, Ms. Mason. I missed your name, which was listed on the back page.

We also have with us Peggy Mason as a witness.

To our academics, please restrict your comments to five minutes each. If we run over, it gives our MPs little time to ask questions, and I know they're very interested in asking you your opinions on various aspects of this discussion.

Having said that, Mr. Fergusson, you have the floor.

[Dr. James Fergusson, Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you.

I believe all the members of the committee have the overhead hard copy of the threat fans. They are a copy of a threat fan from North Korea and where a ballistic missile trajectory would go to be able to cover all of North America.

Let me get right to the point and deal with the three issues at hand, beginning with the threat assessment.

First, it's clear that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles up to the intercontinental range. How many warheads and how many missiles, particularly at the ICBM level, is unknown.

Whether North Korea has to date been able to neutralize and marry nuclear weapons to its fleet of ballistic missiles remains open for debate. We have not seen evidence, and the only real evidence we could get would be if North Korea launched a demonstration test somewhere over the North Pacific, where it would detonate a nuclear device just to make sure everyone knows it can do it. Right now, at the minimum, we have to plan for an uncertain future, where they eventually do get the technology.

Third, although North Korea has done many military parades of solid-fuel ballistic missiles on mobile launchers, it's unclear whether it has mastered this very difficult and complicated technology. As it stands, notwithstanding the future, most of these missiles are liquid fuelled, which provides ample warning and preparation before a strike. An ICBM has to be fuelled roughly 24 hours before it can be launched, so you get this warning. That's an important thing to consider.

Also unclear is the extent to which North Korea has mastered guidance systems—the ability to launch a missile, fire and forget it, and where it's going to go where they want it to go—and whether that really matters to them, notwithstanding other factors, particularly when you cut through orbital space and the debris up there that might alter its course. We certainly don't know how well they are doing there. They have demonstrated or are showing the beginnings of submarine launch capability, but that, I would suggest, given the empirical evidence of how long China has taken to get to that point, is probably a decade or more off.

The North Koreans, despite what the so-called experts say, do not—and will not for a long time—possess decoys or penetration aids for their systems. This is extremely complicated technology. I refer you to the costs of the Chevaline system that the Brits undertook in the 1970s with Polaris to be able to penetrate the Soviet ABM system around Moscow. In addition, it follows that they do not have a multiple warhead capability. These are one-shot warheads.

The conditions under which the North Koreans would attack North America are extremely difficult to know. I could develop a series of scenarios of how this could happen, but by and large the rhetoric that cuts through all the nonsense is that the North Koreans portray this as a deterrent against the imperialist threat. Whether or not the probability of a bolt from the blue or a pre-emptive attack is low, it cannot be assumed to be zero. It is a possibility that has to be considered.

From general views in the west, as we interpret this through our own lens of deterrence thinking and on our past behaviour, we are looking at an escalatory process in which nuclear attacks, missile attacks, will be directed first against South Korea. In particular, they will be directed against American bases in South Korea, then to its four bases, in Guam and Okinawa, then subsequently Hawaii, then finally the continental United States. This thinking reflects the natural development process of North Korean missile tests, going from short range up the ladder until you get to three-stage ICBMs.

Having heard this issue about how we are not a threat, and we're not identified as a threat, I'll put it aside for the moment, but I'd be happy to talk to you in the question period about the lack of definition and this long-standing, misguided belief that somehow Canada is perceived as different from our core ally in the United States in terms of target sets. Nonetheless, from a basic perspective Canada faces two direct threats.

The first is Canada as accidental target. In an attempt to hit the continental United States, for a variety of guidance reasons—problems with fuelling, etc., or various factors—the warhead doesn't get there. As you look at the overhead, you get an idea of where it might drop if it goes short.

Second, as was pointed out—I think correctly—Canada can be a demonstration target to indicate North Korean resolve and capability in the context of a crisis or war, especially if North Korea is at war and is on the verge of defeat and destruction. One might expect the demonstration would then take place over the North Pacific as a way to signal the west, led by the United States, to stop whatever they're doing, but it may also be the case that they will look at Canada and say that they can fire at Canada undefended, along a path that would demonstrate their ability to hit Washington, D.C.

I will go to the end of this. Let me go clear to “Is Canada Defended?” The rest I'll pick up later and you can read it.

The straightforward and honest answer is no, we are not defended. The belief that the United States will defend us is morally reprehensible and politically irresponsible. It is morally reprehensible because we place the United States and the officers who by oath are there to defend the United States—not Canada—in a difficult moral dilemma which to me is unacceptable. As well, it is irresponsible because we have not negotiated any form of arrangement with the United States to deal with the problem of the defence of Canada.

The United States has three options in a potential attack scenario: a pre-emptive strike to eliminate North Korean capabilities; a second layer of forward-deployed naval systems, which may work against an ICBM; and, of course, a third ground-based layer.

Whether on functional terms the United States would defend Canada is based on four considerations: the size of the North Korean arsenal relative to intercept probabilities and numbers; second, the ability to identify the specific target here; third, the location of the Canadian target relative to American targets; and finally, will the things actually go where they're supposed to go? I'll leave it there for now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your testimony.

I would ask other academics to please restrict yourself to five minutes.

Ms. Mason, you have the floor.

[Peggy Mason, President, Rideau Institute on International Affairs]

Thank you very much. Just by way of interesting comment, I'm a lawyer, a former ambassador, and president of a very small independent think tank, but I am not an academic. I'm a practitioner.

In my written submission, I made the following arguments. I'll list them because of course there's no time to go into them in detail, and the submission has been circulated.

One, North Korea seeks nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.

Two, there is no effective military means to denuclearize North Korea.

Three, dialogue with North Korea without preconditions has not yet been tried.

Four, there is a role for Canada in promoting a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

Five, which I spoke at length on the last time the committee looked into this issue in May of 2016, American strategic ballistic missile defence does not work, undermines strategic stability, puts at risk civilian satellites and, indeed, the peaceful uses of outer space, and is exorbitantly expensive, all of that notwithstanding one—in quotes—“successful” test in May of 2017 in highly artificial circumstances.

My sixth point is not a point I made last time basically because of the timing; I was concerned about the official possibly being identified. Given the toxic history in Canada-U.S. relations of potential Canadian participation in American strategic ballistic missile defence, it is not only futile but risky to raise it again. As I said in my written submission, the word “toxic” is the description of the history of Canadian participation by a senior American official.

Time is short and I wish now to focus in my oral comments mainly on the prospects for a diplomatic approach—given my background, this won't be a surprise—as the only effective way forward.

Dialogue with North Korea without preconditions has not yet been tried. We've heard a lot on the news in particular and in statements not so much from the President of the United States, but certainly from the U.S. Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, who have voiced their openness to dialogue and diplomacy on more than one occasion. What we haven't heard on the media is that so has North Korea, over and over again.

Former senior American official and now visiting professor Robert Carlin recently catalogued... Of course, we're all dependent on translations. If the media doesn't give it to us, most of us can't go and read read the original North Korean statement, but that's why this is such a great service: a real American expert, as I said, a former senior official, has catalogued recent North Korean offers to negotiate. He's gone through a whole series of them throughout this period of crisis, essentially, through the various tests of missiles and the nuclear tests.

Here is how the formulation typically goes. This is the translation from the North Korean statement:

We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table. Neither shall we flinch even an inch from the road to bolstering up the nuclear forces chosen by ourselves—

That's the part we hear over and over. The part we don't hear is the rest of the statement, which is as follows:

—unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the D.P.R.K. are fundamentally eliminated.

As I said, troublingly, we hear the first part reported, but often not the second part.

Also less well known is the fact that the U.S.A. has yet to offer dialogue that is not conditional on North Korea first renouncing nuclear weapons before the talks can begin, clearly a non-starter insofar as North Korea is concerned. That is why Senator Dianne Feinstein, a senior senator and Democrat from California, vice-chair of the Senate intelligence committee, issued a statement on August 8—it took a while before it started getting attention—urging the United States government “to quickly engage North Korea in a high-level dialogue without any preconditions”.

To put this another way, this is incredibly optimistic, because it means that diplomacy, far from having failed, in fact has not been given a meaningful chance to work.

Sorry. You're giving me a....

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I gave you a 30-second warning 20 seconds ago.

[Peggy Mason]

Thirty seconds? Wow. Gee.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Time goes by fast.

[Peggy Mason]

Yes, it does.

In my written statement I outline two different proposals. I outline a proposal for a comprehensive solution, which would see North Korea renouncing nuclear weapons—sadly, I think the time for that has passed—and then a much more recent proposal by the Chinese and the Russians, which they call a “double-freeze”: a missile and nuclear freeze by the DPRK and a freeze on large-scale joint exercises by the U.S. and the Republic of Korea on the other side.

All of which is to say there are some really good proposals on the table, and Angela Merkel has indicated that Germany would play the same role they did in the highly successful negotiations with Iran. The UN Secretary-General has offered his good offices. It's time that Canada put its weight behind a diplomatic initiative.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

I'm going to turn it over to you, Professor Charron.

[Dr. Andrea Charron, Assistant Professor, Political Studies, Director of the Centre for Security Intelligence, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for the invitation.

I think testimony is starting to repeat. I've sent in my written statement, so I think what I will do is just try to summarize and unpack the three perennial objections to joining ballistic missile defence.

By that, I'm assuming that we're talking about the ground-based midcourse defense mission, or GMD, in which, of course, NORAD's role, were North Korea to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile at the continental U.S. or Canada, is to just warn of the attack. NORAD does not have a role of defeating ballistic missiles. That mission belongs to USNORTHCOM. The current GMD architecture is a system of systems involving several U.S. combatant commands, in which Canada has no decision-making standing or authority, although we will contribute to the warning information and intelligence.

Overall, the three perennial Canadian objections to BMD have been these. First, does it work? Second, what's the cost? Third, what effect might Canada joining have on global stability and international security?

First, on whether or not it works, the current U.S. GMD system, of course, has never been tested for real, thank goodness. Yes, there are Patriot, THAAD and Aegis systems that have been tested, but those really are intended for theatre ballistic missiles. That's very different from the ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency would suggest that test results of the GBI of course are mixed, but they would also say that certainly today's interceptors are much better than those first deployed in 2005. Of course, the full details of the reliability of the system are not likely to be revealed unless Canada signs on.

Second, to go to the cost, GMD is expensive. The U.S. is estimated to spend at least $40 billion U.S. on this. By comparison, often it's quoted that Canada hopes to spend only $32 billion Canadian by the end of the next decade. Of course, then, people suggest that we have to make some tough choices between things like Canadian surface combatants or the new fighter aircraft, but still, it might be money that we need to spend if we think that defence against ballistic missiles, especially from North Korea, is going to be an ongoing concern, and that the BMD system will be able to adapt and change not only to different threats but also to different adversaries.

As many have argued, is it wise for Canada to continue to expect the U.S. to pay the lion's share of the expenses to defend North America? Perhaps there are ways in which Canada can contribute, such as through research and development, which would also benefit Canadian companies and universities. This doesn't necessarily entail a fifty-fifty split, which, I might point out, the U.S. has never expected. It might also be that as a sending state party to the United Nations Command in South Korea, there's more of a role we could play there.

Third, to global stability, Canada's decision to join or not join will have absolutely no effect on Kim Jong-un and his singular focus to achieve nuclear proliferation, but it may on his choice of targets. Ultimately, regardless of the position Canada takes, there are going to be what-ifs.

If Canada doesn't join the BMD and there's an attack on Canada, Canadians are going to ask why we didn't do anything, and certainly allies will ask why they aren't protected. If we say yes to ballistic missile defence—and of course we have some questions about the U.S. accepting our yes, and what the conditions are—but nothing happens, Canadians will want to know why we joined? If we say no and nothing happens, Canadians will conclude that it was the right decision, but if we continue to say no and the U.S. is attacked, then certainly the U.S. public will want to know where Canada was.

I think that at the end of the day this is a perennial problem, a stalemate that's been created, and I don't see it changing with such a politically charged issue with many unknowns.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your testimony.

Our last witness today is Ms. Berger.

[Andrea Berger, Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, As an Individual]

Thank you. I'm really looking forward to having a discussion with you today about the North Korean issue, which is one that I've worked on very closely over the years.

Let me start by saying that the obvious observation we have at this time is that North Korea has been rapidly advancing in demonstrating its nuclear missile capabilities, and I use the word “demonstrating” there because they've actually been developing those capabilities for quite some time. The change we're seeing now is that, especially since February but particularly since Kim Jong-un came to the leadership in North Korea, North Korea has been conducting tests, which, one after another, are designed to show us that they are making new technical advancements, from solid-fuel missile systems to new engines and to the ability to conduct H-bomb tests.

This rapid progress is in my view invalidating some of the assumptions that have underpinned multilateral policy towards North Korea for some time, but particularly policy in the United States. By that, I mean the idea that we can prevent North Korea from achieving the ability to strike North America with a nuclear weapon no longer seems to hold. Indeed, I believe we've passed that point already. In addition to that, the idea that we might get North Korea to denuclearize any time in the medium-term future seems to be very unlikely now and, as a basis for policy, seems to be imprudent.

I also believe that we have at this moment a crisis in assurance, especially with the U.S. and its allies and amongst those allies. This has been particularly acute in the last few months as North Korea has been conducting many of the provocations that we're concerned about, and I believe it's an issue that is worth everyone's attention.

As a result of all of these dynamics, I believe we also have a major challenge in communications. That challenge in communications relates not only to assurance but also to communicating deterrence and trying to establish the basis for crisis management when crises begin to arise. Furthermore, we have an issue of outlining how we believe we are going to start to meet reasonable objectives as that relates to North Korea. I hope that we can have further discussion over what some of those strategies and policies might look like and what end Canada and others should be jointly working towards.

Thank you.