National Defence Committee on Sept. 14th, 2017

[MGen William Seymour, Chief of Staff Operations, Canadian Joint Operations Command, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair, honourable members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before the Standing Committee on National Defence to address the committee's concerns about North Korea and the readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces.

As LGen St-Amand mentioned, North Korea's increasing number of ballistic missile tests is a significant concern for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Similarly, North Korea's recent tests and the overall development of the nuclear weapons and missiles program are a significant concern for the Canadian Armed Forces.

As is often stated and reiterated in Canada's new defence policy—strong, secure, engaged—the home game, the defence of Canada and contributing to the defence of North America, is the Canadian Armed Forces' number one mission. We realize, furthermore, that Canada's geography no longer insulates us from threats, as it once did, and our military stands ready to detect, prepare for, and respond to threats as they arise.

Under detection, the Canadian Armed Forces maintains an all-domain awareness at home through Operation Limpid. As well, the Canadian Space Operations Centre is manned 24-7 to provide continuous monitoring of missile warning data through its primary-display-system modified systems, which rely on U.S. overhead persistent infrared space-based sensors to detect any missile launch. The Space Operations Centre is also in frequent contact with the U.S. intelligence community to receive additional indications and warnings of possible upcoming ballistic missile launches. Together with the United States through our binational partnership in NORAD, we track air and aerospace threats to Canada and the continent.

Lastly, through our partnership with allied nations, predominantly the U.S., we have access to intelligence and space-based capabilities in order to detect threats to Canadian territory. In the event of a North Korean ballistic missile attack against Canada or another nation where Canadians are present, the Canadian Armed Forces has a well-established communication plan to notify the highest levels of Canadian leadership.

The numerous intelligence-sharing partnerships of which Canada is a member, such as the Five Eyes community made up of Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, and networks comprised of NATO member countries facilitate our access to information to better assess potential threats.

With respect to preparation and adaptation, while detection is paramount, the Canadian Armed Forces remains vigilant to prepare for any and all scenarios in order to mitigate threats and to rapidly respond to developing situations.

From a planning perspective, our military maintains numerous contingency plans to deal with all eventualities related to the defence of the Canadian territory to full-spectrum operations. One such contingency plan is called CONPLAN ANGLE, which is the Canadian Armed Forces' global contingency plan for non-combatant evacuation operations. This contingency plan is facilitated by 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, our high-readiness deployable headquarters.

In order to ensure adequate readiness, this contingency plan is maintained through numerous joint and combined exercises such as Exercise Uichie Freedom Guardian, an annual South Korea and U.S.-led exercise that includes non-combatant evacuation operations aspects, and was in fact just concluded a few days ago. We will continue to work with our allies to refine our plans and support the evacuation of Canadian citizens from the Korean peninsula and the region, should that be required.

With respect to response or action, complementing our focus to detect and prepare is the Canadian Armed Forces' primary role of efficiently and rapidly responding to developing threats. Many developing incidents are time sensitive, and we maintain a number of units on rapid notice to move.

The Royal Canadian Navy has ready duty ships on Canada's east and west coasts that are on eight-hour notice to move, while the Canadian Army has four 350-person immediate response units with components on eight, 12, and 24 hours' notice to move.

The Royal Canadian Air Force maintains CF-18 fighter aircraft at high readiness as part of our NORAD commitments, and we also maintain one C-17 on a high-readiness posture of 24 hours to move, in order to provide a strategic lift capability.

Additionally, the Canadian Armed Forces rotates units from all three services through a tiered readiness program to ensure that a number of units are at high readiness for rapid deployment.

The Canadian Armed Forces has a total of six members deployed to the United Nations Command, five in South Korea and one in Japan, at headquarters located in South Korea and authorized to conduct military operations in support of that country. The command's mandate is to monitor the 1953 armistice, to be prepared to assist in the defence of South Korea, and to integrate any forces sent by other countries in the defence of South Korea.

In closing, the Canadian Armed Forces continuously maintains a high readiness posture in order to quickly react to all developing security situations, including in response to the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles. We maintain plans in support of this readiness and are routinely working to update them with our allies and our partners, while exercising these plans to maintain that readiness.

Moreover, we rely on access to intelligence networks and to space-based capabilities to detect threats to Canada and North America and work closely with the U.S. and other key allies to ensure comprehensive detection and response to threats.

Thank you for your time today. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your comments.

Ms. Alleslev, you have the floor for seven minutes.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

Thank you for that comprehensive overview of just where our defence is on this topic.

The purpose of our investigation today is to determine Canada's abilities to defend itself and its allies in the event of an attack from North Korea; and there's no question that Canadians are concerned from what they see in the news. Even if North Korea is not directly threatening us, of course, we're concerned that our close proximity does not make us immune.

While we're not actually engaged in the ballistic missile defence, could you give us some idea—break it down for us—of what would happen if a missile were launched: how Canada would respond, how perhaps our NORAD partner would respond, and how we would ensure that Canada was in a position to defend itself in that scenario?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

I will start by giving the NORAD perspective, because I think we would first be engaging in the detection of a ballistic missile launch. This is under our aerospace warning mission, which long predates ballistic missile defence, by the way.

As I described in my opening remarks, we have Canadians manning consoles alongside our U.S. partners at our operations centre, fully participant and with full view and full situational awareness of what's happening and what's coming our way. We'd have this warning. While the warning's being worked within the staff in the NORAD headquarters, this warning would also be shared with our partners here in Canada through a CFIC organization. CJOC is also in on those conferences, and will be tracking the same activity we will be tracking. The Canadian government, through the CDS, will be informed very quickly of something that's coming our way, coming toward North America.

The next phase will be an assessment, again under our aerospace warning mission, where we will be making a determination of whether or not this missile is an attack or something else. It could be a research and development shot. It could be something that in fact is not an attack. That's a fairly important assessment, because the chain of events that follows will be determined by that assessment.

At that point, Canadians in the NORAD enterprise will go back into watch mode for further shots, for something else coming in. We never quit. We are always at the station. At this point, in terms of the engagement, it will be totally and entirely a U.S. decision to engage that missile or not. We are not a part of that discussion. We are in the room, however. We are sitting side by side. For example, as deputy commander of NORAD, I have an equal status to the deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command. We'll be sitting side by side to understand exactly what's happening. It's kind of a complementary mission, if you want.

From that point of view, we will have the warning, we will know where it's going, and then the U.S. will decide whether they defend against that missile or not.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

We know that this is now an emerging threat, more so than it has been in the past. We've just gone through a defence policy review. We've made a very strong commitment to the “secure” in North America aspect of our defence policy of strong, secure, and engaged. Part of that, of course, is our relationship with NORAD.

While we have USNORTHCOM, which is responsible for the ballistic missile defence aspect, and we in NORAD not so much, as part of NORAD modernization, is it possible that we might consider how that emerging threat is changing and perhaps look at our new warning systems and engagement model possibly falling into NORAD modernization? Could you speak to that a bit?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

Yes. Under our aerospace warning mission, we always discuss emerging threats because we have to warn against it. We participate in the characterization of new capabilities. We seek to understand what's happening. We seek to understand the geopolitical situation that surrounds events. This is something we do every single day, because we do detect ballistic missile launches globally.

From that point of view, we are in discussions, because we're part of this segment that is aerospace warning. That's a long-standing mission we've had for many years. It predates, once again, BMD. Having participated fully in the characterization of that new threat, that analysis then will go to a standstill until we see something else. We're always monitoring. We are concerned about emerging threats. We do everything we can to make sure we maintain the greatest situational awareness possible.

That's alongside our intelligence partners, by the way. When I say that “NORAD” does this, it is in concert with intelligence, it is in concert with planning and strategy, and it is in concert with other components of the headquarters.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

What are some of the elements of the NORAD modernization? What are some of the things we need to focus on next to really ensure that we have that capability?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

What is NORAD modernization? It's in the category of prudent planning, essentially. It is not advice to the government, because that's not what we do. It is an analysis by the commanders who are responsible together for the defence of the continent—namely, the tri-command of NORAD, Northern Command, and CJOC—under the tri-command framework. We talk about how best to organize, correctly and efficiently, to provide a defence against all perils and all threats to the continent.

It is a very large initiative. The scope of work is fairly large. We have been talking about this now for two years. It is internal to the commands. We have come to no solutions yet, because we're still very much in the problem definition phases. We're approaching the project by domains—air, maritime, cyber, aerospace, and space in the future possibly—but this is going very deliberately.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Mr. Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank our generals for appearing today and giving us an update.

I want to start off with General St-Amand, talking about NORAD.

You were talking about NORAD's role if there were an incoming intercontinental ballistic missile, and then as an observer. As you said when you were here last, in 2016, you become a silent observer. How does that affect the relationship between Canada and the U.S. within NORAD operations? Would you say that's being a responsible ally, to be just a silent partner? Is it responsible vis-à-vis the protection of Canada if we're just going to be a silent partner?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

Because we've been doing this for so many years, the machine is smooth. When it comes to that decision to engage or not, it is up to the U.S. only, but we're in the room again. I think, through the development of our standard operating procedures, the way that we spread the duties around the various general officers and flag officers who would have certain duties and authorities when it comes to assessment or weapons release authority on the U.S. side, we have learned to work together. In terms of the effect on the relationship between the U.S. and Canada in Colorado Springs, it is complementary and it is smooth. It's going well. I have no concerns whatsoever. Certainly I don't hear any concerns from the United States or my colleagues when we do in fact engage in that type of activity.

As far as being a responsible ally or whether it is just something that we should do goes, unfortunately, I have to declare that that is out of my league. As a force employer, we execute policy, and then we do what we're told. At this point, I will be limiting my comments to that.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

If there were an attack and a missile were coming over, I think a lot of Canadians just assume the United States would shoot it down, and they take comfort in that. Maybe it's a false comfort. I think Canadians have more confidence now in the capability of DND, but they're under the assumption that the United States would protect Canada. If a missile's coming in, and they don't know if it's going to hit Vancouver or Seattle, it'll come down. Do you feel that if we're not part of this program, and with our relationship in NORAD, USNORTHCOM would make the decision to protect Canada?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

We're being told in Colorado Springs that the extant U.S. policy is not to defend Canada. That's the policy that's stated to us, so that's the fact that I can bring to the table.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

I want to move on to the growing threats and capabilities of North Korea. All the media coverage of course is on the intercontinental ballistic missiles. We heard earlier about EMP, the electromagnetic pulse capability, and how that would affect all of continental North America, not just the United States but Canada as well. Are we seeing also, through the proliferation of the North Korean submarine program, any activity in the Atlantic Ocean that could threaten...? If they were going to have a multilateral attack, using multiple platforms, do they have the capabilities on their submarines to launch short-range missiles into North America?

[MGen William Seymour]

Sir, part of the answer to that is that I think there is some information there that's classified.

It's very clear, as you're probably reading in the open media, that the North Koreans are developing a capability—they've long had submarines, and we certainly saw the attack on the South Koreans years ago that sunk one of their warships—and that they've been developing the capacity for a submarine-launched ballistic missile, which I would characterize as nascent to this stage. It's not proven, and is certainly limited to their home territorial waters. We certainly watch it with a great deal of concern, because, as we've seen with their other missiles, it's a capability that they're growing and are able to refine and develop further. However, at this point I would suggest that as Canadians, we shouldn't be concerned. That is probably the single most watched submarine in the entire world, and frankly, I would be surprised if in times of conflict it went too far beyond Korean territorial waters.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I appreciate that.

Continuing on down the CJOC path, in your Canadian Joint Operations Command, where are we in discussions on preparedness and readiness, not just in terms of the Canadian Armed Forces but in our work with our allies, particularly the United States, Japan, and South Korea?

[MGen William Seymour]

Sir, that's an area that's a great news story. CJOC and the entire Canadian Forces are fully plugged in, both with the United States and with our allies in the Asia-Pacific. As you know, I spent three years working at the United States Pacific Command and I learned a great deal about U.S. and allied operations while there. Canada, of course, is a Pacific nation, and has been for a very long time. There are a great many things we do within the region.

In fact, last week the chief of the defence staff hosted, for the first time, the PACOM CHODs, which see all of the chiefs of defence from the Asia-Pacific region converge in a meeting—in this case in Victoria—in which they discuss a range of things relating to Asia-Pacific security.

We also concluded, in co-operation with our allies in South Korea, Exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian—I mentioned that in my opening comments—in which we worked together for the defence of South Korea and those kinds of things.

We're also very closely linked with Japan. Japan and other countries in the Asia-Pacific are partners in Exercise RIMPAC. RIMPAC occurs every two years. It last occurred in 2016. We're working up again for RIMPAC in 2018, the largest-scale maritime exercise on the globe. We have been participants from the outset in RIMPAC and will continue to be. It's a great exercise to work through a variety of capabilities, including ASWs, which touches on the previous question that you asked.

Certainly our involvement in the Asia-Pacific extends very broadly beyond that. We have defence attachés throughout the entire region. We continue to have a general officer in the United States Pacific Command. We work very closely with our allies in Australia, and I could certainly offer more should you be curious.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I have just a final question before I run out of time here, Mr. Chair. You talked about being prepared and ready, about the threat, and about how you have a number of assets in certain locations, that are ready to be deployed both from a troop standpoint and from an equipment standpoint. In the worst-case scenario—and I know that you guys are always prepared to deal with a worst-case scenario—if there is an attack and there's fallout, how are the Canadian Armed Forces dealing with our other intergovernmental agencies to deal with the aftermath of an attack?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Unfortunately, we're going to have to come back to that, because we are out of time.

I'm going to yield the floor to Mr. Garrison.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will give the witnesses a chance to answer that if they'd like to.

[MGen William Seymour]

Are you specifically asking about a nuclear attack on North America?

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Yes. If there is an ICBM that happens to land or an EMP that does impact Canada, how are the Canadian Armed Forces working with other government agencies to make sure we are there to clean up the aftermath?

[MGen William Seymour]

Sir, that's a great question, and it links into what General St-Amand talked about, the warning problem. From very early on in the process, Canada is made aware that there's a potential issue, in this case a missile that could strike North America. Right from the get-go the senior levels of government are made aware, and notification is made both in the Canadian Forces and across all levels of government in Canada. The response to that is something the Canadian Forces work on in concert with the Government of Canada and with our provinces and municipalities. We have contingency plans that cover a number of possibilities, including the possibility of a nuclear attack, either by terrorists or by other states that would seek to do us harm.

Those contingency plans have been exercised as recently as last spring, in the Maritimes, where we walked through a nuclear scenario in concert with our allies, the United States. In this scenario, a bomb went off on the east coast of the United States and also in Canada. We worked collaboratively to deal with that.

All aspects of government were involved in that exercise, and that's an ongoing process to exercise those contingency plans and continue to refine them. Of course, they span other areas, which I'd be happy to answer questions about.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thanks very much for that answer. Thanks for being here this morning.

From what I've heard from your testimony this morning, my opinion that Canada's best defence here is to advance our diplomacy has been reaffirmed. The NDP, of course, is always opposed to participating in ballistic missile defence, on the grounds that since it's always easier to build more offensive weapons cheaply and easily, doing so will contribute to an arms race. There are questions about the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defence, especially with regard to the issue of decoys. To me it doesn't seem to be a solution for us to try to join something that's unproven, that's very expensive, and that will probably lead to an arms race.

I think what you said just a few moments ago, General St-Amand, is extremely important, which is that current U.S. policy is not to defend Canada in the case of a ballistic missile launch. If the scenario we're talking about is that North Korea had bad aim and shot a missile toward North America, are you saying that if that missile was directed toward Canada, current U.S. policy would be not to respond to that?