Evidence of meeting #6 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
9:30 a.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are directed to Professor Sloan.
Notwithstanding that our military does not see any state actors as threats to Canada, what is the best defence against cruise missiles?
9:30 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
A cruise missile requires both detection and interception. The detection side is classified, and I don't have access to the information. I know this because I've asked the question and have not had access to the information. But I believe that around North America the detection of cruise missiles would be done by the airborne warning and control craft, which the United States owns but which Canada helps man. They're based in Oklahoma.
I believe the north warning system also has a very limited ability to detect against cruise missiles, but it is certainly optimized for that function. The north warning system along the 70th parallel was set up to detect ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are much harder to detect, because they fly low to the ground.
9:30 a.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
Would ground-based interceptors and detectors in Canada augment the integrity of protection against cruise missiles?
9:35 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Yes, a ground-based detection system would help. It's a matter of where you locate them. We have in the past had air defence systems located on the east and west coasts. I believe they have been de-commissioned. Ground-based systems based in northern parts of Canada in specific locations would help.
9:35 a.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
You mentioned the new cruise missile that the Russians have. There was reportedly a launch over Iran towards Syria, and there were reports that the trajectory fell short and it hit Iran.
There are reports of Russian nuclear subs in the Arctic, and you mentioned that cruise missiles could be launched from ships—or submarines, for that matter. I'm not sure you said submarines, but you said marine. Should there be measures put in place to detect and intercept them, and overall should more military assets be placed in the Arctic to be able to patrol and detect these at an earlier point in time?
9:35 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Yes, the Arctic would be a good location.
You mentioned the action against Iran and Syria. The thing about the new long-range cruise missile that surprised the international community was that it was not necessary for Russia to use that cruise missile against Syria, because it was designed to evade air defences in a much more powerful country. It was, then, almost a demonstration for effect; it was perhaps a demonstration to show that it has a long-range precision cruise missile that could be launched from Russian waters, from submarines, from bombers, and also from ships.
To defend against that, you would need to have a detection capability, which could involve AWACS, could involve the F-35, which I believe has a detection capability against cruise missiles, and could involve land-based sensors. The problem with any aircraft designed to detect against cruise missiles is that you have to have it flying all the time, so it's not really a long-term solution.
Potentially, the RADARSAT Constellation could look down and detect cruise missiles. RADARSAT Constellation is designed to detect ships and so is much more powerful than a satellite higher up; thus it could potentially detect cruise missiles. Also, unmanned aerial vehicles.... I think I mentioned the Global Hawk, which is basically the U-2 replacement—you'll remember the U-2 from the Cold War—which can detect cruise missiles.
If you are looking for persistent surveillance, then you're looking at satellites, high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, or a land-based system. Of course, if there's a lot of land, it's hard to decide where to put it.
9:35 a.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
Okay. The more immediate threat, we are told, is an attack from jihadist organizations. How realistic do you see a threat from their commissioning a state actor to launch a missile toward North America? In other words, could ISIL, al Shabaab, or al Qaeda have the means to pay, for example, North Korea to do a launch toward us? Right now, there isn't the feeling that they are much of an enemy, that there is any realistic....
9:35 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Do you mean, in terms of cruise missiles?
9:35 a.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
I would say cruise or ballistic, because they presently don't have either capability.
9:35 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
At this stage, my assessment is that you have to have a state actor and that that scenario is quite unlikely.
9:35 a.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
You mentioned fighter jets. We know that there is going to be a delay. First of all, do you foresee them becoming obsolete with the development of more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles? I ask the question because the current government has delayed the decision to replace the F-18s during this term in office, and we see that delayed procurements can have negative, and latent negative, effects. Just today it was revealed that a 2009 Griffon crash in Afghanistan was in part due to the overloading of the chopper. We didn't have the lift capability of the helicopter.
As it turned out, the 1993 cancellation of the EH-101 contract—totally an electoral ploy—cost almost $1 billion after cancellation fees, and that the government ultimately returned to the EH-101 aircraft for SAR. Many Canadians were needlessly killed as a consequence of the decision to cancel that contract, and other misplaced spending priorities.
My question is, should a decision be made earlier, rather than delaying at least four years on going forward with some sort of replacement for the F-18s?
9:40 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
No, I think a decision should go ahead right away. My hope is that the statement of requirements is being drafted. I am sure it has been drafted or is in process because it has been six months since the election. I think, absolutely, sooner rather than later. My understanding is that the F-18s will fly to about 2025. That's a new number. The old number used to be 2017, the absolute latest date. The reason the number has changed is that if you fly the aircraft less then it can last longer. The tradeoff has been readiness in terms of the aircraft. In order to have an aircraft in place by 2025, you need to start very, very soon.
9:40 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
Thank you very much.
Mr. Garrison, you have the floor for seven minutes.
9:40 a.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all our witnesses for appearing today.
I am just going to continue with Professor Sloan for a moment. You used the term “notable gap” in your presentation on aerial surveillance, which implies that there are other gaps. I would be interested in that.
One of our concerns has been the reprofiling of procurement. You just mentioned that. We had the Conservatives put off $6.5 billion in spending. The Liberals have now put off another $3.7 billion. We have some $10 billion in spending that has been “reprofiled” till after 2019. I would like to go back to what you were just talking about. Are we facing some real gaps in capacity with fighter planes, with refuelling, and with our surveillance aircraft? Is that what you are talking about when you are referring to notable gaps in one place?
9:40 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
I see, I see. Yes.
The cruise missile one is just one that has stood out for years, and it's a tough one to tackle. That's why it stood out.
The other component may be on the ballistic missile side. The United States is looking to increase its detection capabilities against North Korea, and that could possibly be a gap. Indeed, I haven't talked about Iran at all, but it could be missiles from the other side as well.
On the fighter aircraft side, I think that one is absolutely critical. Although we're not in a new Cold War, we're in a situation like a Cold War in terms of the threat. What we need today and over the next few years would be similar, logically speaking, in terms of fighter aircraft to what we needed during the Cold War. I mention that because during the Cold War we had 120 F-18s. That was reduced to 80 at some point, when they were upgraded. I could probably be corrected on this. Now we've said that we're going to buy 65 fighter aircraft. I think there absolutely needs to be an assessment of just how many fighter aircraft you need to effectively defend Canada, considering that the threat today is starting to look an awful lot like the threat of the mid- to late 1980s just before Gorbachev called off the bomber patrols.
9:40 a.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Professor Braun, you mentioned the commitment to 2% of defence spending and the fact that not only is Canada at 1% but we appear to be heading in the wrong direction on this. Given the current budget projecting increases in spending for defence below the rate of inflation and below the rate of GDP growth, we're actually going to sink even further below 1%.
I was very interested in what you had to say about this in terms of there being no substitute to actually spending on the equipment we need. Can you expand somewhat on those comments?
9:45 a.m.
Professor, University of Toronto, As an Individual
As an academic, obviously my preference would be that we spend money on universities and hospitals, and not on weapons. But the reality is that we live in an international system where there are significant threats.
Russia has been prodding and probing, and it has enjoyed tactical successes, at a great cost to its domestic economy. Misperception and miscalculation are often what lead to conflict. So I do not think there's a plan on the part of Russia to enter into a conflict with the western countries, but weakness can be provocative, as they say.
The danger is that Canada, just as other members of an alliance, cannot just cherry-pick. When we talk about what the dangers are of not participating, technologies have been developed now. BDM has moved tremendously. The capacity of x-band radars has expanded. There are things that can be done against cruise missiles, but you do need to spend the money. You need to have the willpower, and you have to demonstrate that you are doing that.
Deterrence is crucial. To defend against cruise missiles, it's not just what you deploy on the ground but also the perception of what you're willing to do, what the message is that you convey. Deterrence involves a psychological relationship. If you consistently underspend, if you have a situation with the Germans, for example, now realizing that much of their fighter air power is just not usable.... Something like 42% of their Tornado airplanes just can't get up in the air. So you have all of these problems.
In the case of Canada, we have to think very hard about what we can do, even with the limited dollars we have. We can't match Russia, let's say, in terms of quantity. We need to try, therefore, to use quality. That has been the traditional strength western countries have had.
What would quality be? Quality would be using the latest technology. The latest technology is not about an airplane; it is about a system. Do you go for fourth generation, or four and a half? We really need to go for fifth generation and spend the money. There are no really inexpensive ways of getting around it. And there is an obligation to be part of that alliance. It is essential to demonstrate.
We need to also understand that patience is beginning to wear thin in the case of the entire political spectrum in the United States. It is not just Donald Trump who's ranting and raving about free riders, but you see this in the campaign of Bernie Sanders. You see it with Hillary Clinton. You see it in the criticism that President Obama has levelled at France and Britain.
If we are to take sovereignty protection seriously, if we are to take our alliances seriously, then the risk is of alliance management, the risk is of actual defence. The risk is also of depriving our industry of technology that we could share, that we could build on. When we calculate a risk, we have to calculate that risk across the entire political, economic, and psychological spectrum.
9:45 a.m.
NDP
9:45 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
It appears that's seven minutes right on the nose.
I'm going to move on to the next question to keep us on time.
Mr. Spengemann, you have the floor, for seven minutes.
9:45 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all three experts here today. We really appreciate your views and your expertise.
I'd like to start with a question for Professor Sloan.
I'd like to switch lenses a little bit and move away from the state-to-state paradigm and suggest that in addition to threats emanating from Russia and Korea as state entities, one of the most worrisome threats today is the risk of domestic terrorism. To the extent that's the case, that threat would be centred around major urban centres.
My question for you is about the location of current and future western fighter assets in Canada. The United States Air Force is now currently conducting a fairly sizeable number of directed landings on Canadian soil. In light of that, I'm wondering if our current western fighter assets are actually strategically well deployed in Cold Lake or in Bagotville, or if it might make more sense to move them over to the west coast towards Vancouver, potentially to a location such as Comox. I'm wondering what your views are on that.
9:50 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Our fighter bases are located based on the Cold War threat. I agree that it can be very difficult for our aircraft to get to our major cities in time to address a threat. So the United States would have to address that threat and go over our border. So, yes, it probably would make sense to relocate that base closer to the urban centre.
9:50 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
I'm not even suggesting that the base needs to be relocated, but that the air assets be deployed strategically in—
9:50 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
The air assets don't stay at the base at all times. For instance, we have F-18s sometimes at Uplands airport here in Ottawa; they deploy to different locations around Canada. It's a matter of making sure they're on location when a threat arises or when it's thought that there might be a potential threat. For example, during the Vancouver Olympics, I don't know for sure, but my guess is that the F-18s were deployed closer to all the activities.
9:50 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
Okay.
Professor Braun, is that something you would agree with as well?