Thank you for inviting me to testify to the committee. It's an honour to be with you today.
My expertise is in post-war reconstruction, and I'm often called upon by the Canadian Forces to work with them on the identity and cultural dimensions of security, in essence how to manage the people problems that arise in conflict and post-conflict environments, especially when planning goes awry, and how to better measure the successes of our interventions.
Last week I was part of a panel presentation with my U.S. colleagues on redefining the instruments of power related to reconstruction and stabilization, an operational capability that Canada's armed forces have been involved with for many decades, in particular through our NATO commitments. From these two perspectives, I will approach this briefing to you.
Today I want to offer three topics for your consideration. The first is the benefit Canada derives from its involvement in NATO. The second is the way that Canada measures this benefit, and the third is how a certain secure future is built on this involvement.
To begin, I will orient us to what we know about Canada's commitment to defence and security. We know that Canada is part of a collective security web in which we commit our defence capabilities so that we can work shoulder to shoulder with our allies in insecure environments around the world, but also to protect our national sovereignty and the security of Canadians. We know the international security environment in which interventions and the entire spectrum of armed operations are occurring is no longer recognizable. The suffering of civilians happens in an ugly, dirty, violent, and heart-wrenching reality that the world shares through digital media, and in which our militaries are deployed.
First, what benefit does Canada derive from its involvement in NATO? It's no surprise to you that in Canada we have the luxury afforded by our geography. We do not have the world's downtrodden at our doorstep, breaking down the door to get in, which produces the security dynamics in most, if not all, NATO countries. We do not have our own eastern front to defend.
Instead, Canada has an identity born out of our distant and vast geography, which affords us time to consider our defence and security decisions, our policies, and our strategic outlook. Canada is not in a threatened state—putting cyber-threats aside—and experiences something called ontological security of the state. Ontological security is the preservation of self, so the ability of a state and an individual to preserve its sense of self. In the same way that individuals experience threat to their very being, so too can a state.
Individuals and states fear uncertainty as an identity threat and suppress that fear through routines to which they become attached. These routines can come in many forms such as Canada's involvement in NATO. Changes to this involvement, such as budgetary, political will, or even uncertainty regarding the U.S. administration, can really undermine these routines. This results in a lack of consistency, and when routines change, relationships change too between Canada and our allies.
The people who represent Canada at NATO headquarters and throughout the NATO system are deeply affected by these inconsistencies because they are known to undermine the meaningful relationships among our people and those representing our allies. Undermining routines and relationships contributes to ontological insecurity of a state, and therefore, affects a sense of a certain future. This logic, again, applies to individuals and the state. In other words, consistency creates a certain future. Certainty allows states to interact with one another. The interactions inform behaviours and cause something called routinization. Routinization forms meaningful relationships, and these things underscore the level of security that a state can experience.
NATO is no more than the security and defence practices that its members, including Canada, have agreed to engage in, which means that its continuation depends on the constant reproduction of those practices. Individual and group-level routines at the strategic, operational, tactical levels in headquarters, and when forces are deployed at NATO missions, thus constitute NATO, which in turn stabilizes the state's sense of self, including Canada's.
Empirical research in various areas of social psychology confirms that uncertainty generates identity insecurity, which is really resolved through routines. Canada's involvement in NATO reinforces its security of self because it's involved in the routines that express our membership there.
The second point is how Canada can measure this benefit. The international community has become preoccupied with measuring the effectiveness of its activities in complex emergencies, marked by the very expensive U.S. invasion and subsequent reconstruction of Iraq in the early 2000s. This focus on measuring effectiveness is partially motivated by a need to calculate the costs of our interventions, because many of our activities have a huge price tag, yet levels of success are not commensurate and can rarely be justified. At one point, Canada was very interested in measuring the effectiveness of its work in places like Afghanistan, because we witnessed the realities in the field, which compelled us to make the goals, plans, and systems of our interventions more effective.
From this, I want us to consider measuring the benefit we derive from our involvement in NATO, rather than our performance at NATO. Although this is not the typical way of framing measures of effectiveness, it serves as a useful activity in better understanding the level at which we seek to be involved and how this involvement reinforces our own sense of Canadian state security.
Measuring derived benefits comes from our routines and relationships. Canada is already a part of some NATO routines, and it becomes important to the activity of measuring benefit by participating in activities that align Canadian interests and values within the alliance. These could include developing a few Canadian Armed Forces-focused capabilities that neatly fit into the collective security web woven by the alliance, the OSCE, the EU, the UN, and NORAD; increasing our support for NATO deployments in deployable resources, personnel, and financial support; developing a visible representation of Canada's commitment to UN resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security in our future alliance contributions for at least the next 10 years, which means deploying more women on NATO missions, serving in headquarters, and participating at all the different levels; and increasing active involvement, shoulder to shoulder, in multinational training and live exercises to improve our in-theatre relationships, which is a self-serving involvement that ensures that when our forces deploy with our allies, we are protected through a logical chain of command, reliable comms, and logistics in the field, as well as the necessary combat support when deployed to non-permissive theatres of operation.
This alignment of routines and the corresponding relationships that are formed confirm Canada's Warsaw summit commitments and strengthen the web of collective security that Canada has invested in for more than 70 years. If we do them well, and with the right level of political will, Canada can move effectively within the alliance by providing focused capabilities that serve the wider spectrum of NATO operations. These focused capabilities are ones that we already have, such as humanitarian aid and disaster response operations. They just need to be made ready and available when NATO begins to require its members to manage crises within the wider spectrum of operations, from air strikes all the way to aiding in humanitarian emergencies.
My third topic is Canada's certain future. What we know is that Canada reinforces its ontological security by participating in collective security and the meaningful relationships that result from a long and positive history with the alliance. From sociological theory, we also know that consistency creates a certain future. This level of certainty allows states to interact with each other. Canada should think of its continued involvement in NATO as a way to create a certain and secure future.
Let me describe this. NATO is made up of member states, and these are represented by people. These people practice routines of membership and, over time, build meaningful iterative relationships, relationships that can be repeated. I have noted that routines and relationships are the keystone of ontological security—the security of state—which is equally powerful at the state level and the individual level.
Last, I urge us to consider investing in iterative, repeating relationships at headquarters, at all levels, and on NATO missions; doing away with questioning how or why to be involved in NATO; and contributing to a certain and secure future for Canada by committing to the NATO systems and routinized structures, which reinforce patterns that already exist. This means putting more effort, including some funds, into what is working already, and doing that for 10 years.
I urge us to also consider refocusing on the benefit of the relationships to Canada's ontological security, rather than focusing on the amount of recognition that Canada gets from specific efforts within the alliance, and last, measuring the effectiveness of Canada's involvement in NATO by asking the right questions, first, about the effectiveness of our iterative relationships within the alliance, and second, about the value of the decades-old routines, practices, systems, and patterns that contribute to Canada's sense of a certain future.
By connecting the three topics I've described for your consideration, we have a useful perspective to derive benefit from Canada's involvement in NATO, we can more easily measure the benefit we derive, and we can establish a more certain and secure future for Canada.
Thank you.