National Defence Committee on Nov. 20th, 2017

[Dr. Mark Sedra]

I am not an expert on this issue, but I do share the concern of some of the civil society organizations that are advocating a prohibition of fully autonomous weapons systems. These are weapons systems where no human is at the joystick. These are targeting people based on algorithms.

I think there are too many risks right now. We don't fully understand the implications and the potential risk factors of this technology. The barriers for entry to access technology like drones, and so on, not fully autonomous drones but drones that are controlled by humans, have been lowered. You see that all sorts of non-state actors can deploy drones. Still, you don't see the ability for many groups to access this type of very sophisticated technology. We saw this also, though, with the ban on land mines. This is very challenging, but I don't think it means we shouldn't try to go down this route.

I'm very concerned about where we're going on the issue of autonomous weapons systems. I think NATO as an alliance can be a powerful voice in saying this is not in the interest of the planet, and can try to galvanize support to develop a consensus among different states on the issue. Certainly each member state will have to have this discussion internally and look at their own interests.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Within time AI is going to become more and more relatively accessible. What timeline should we be looking at to have a decision on this? The belligerents certainly are working on this. Should we not be taking some sort of action, decision-making at the very least?

[Dr. Mark Sedra]

Yes, and I think we have to. Just as we have with nuclear weapons, with chemical weapons, where we've had very successful control regimes, we should be looking at setting up a global treaty system, a control regime to manage this type of thing. It's going to take co-operation not only among major states but also industry. Industry is going to have to come forward and work with states to look at this issue. Part of it is that I don't think we fully understand the implications of these types of technologies yet, the risk factors and so on.

You're absolutely right. We're going to have autonomous vehicles on the road within the next two years here in Canada, so this is coming. I think there has to be some urgency in how we address this.

When it comes to cybersecurity, I think this is an area, of course, where we are further down the path. We see the threat is burgeoning. It's multiplying. I think we are behind in developing our capacity. There's no other way to say it.

One of the challenges is that you always have to be one step ahead of the aggressors. I think we have to invest more resources, and I know NATO is taking it seriously. There is movement in NATO to develop cyber-capabilities and to coordinate different member states, but there is still a lot of room where more action can be taken.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

That was the lead-in to my next question.

It took a lot of pushing for NATO to even recognize that we should be looking at cyber as another domain of defence. Even now they're saying you have to get your own doctrine in order before we can have a collective one.

Overall, can you see how NATO should function in cybersecurity? Should it just be protecting the military assets, or should it somehow be intertwined with civilian networks as well?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'm going to have to hold it there. We've run over five minutes.

I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Rioux.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Meharg, first, your recognition of the professionalism of the men and women in the Armed Forces is appreciated. I have often heard it at conferences, and I think it's a real asset for NATO.

You talked about reconstruction. I am going to ask you both the same question, but I will sort of set aside the reconstruction of the countries in which we were involved, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Let's talk about Russia. Right now, the primary response is to impose sanctions on Russia. Would it be possible to take a different approach toward Russia, whose economy is in big trouble, as we know? In response to the Zapad exercise, would Mr. Putin not be tempted to declare war to try to restore Russia's autonomy and to hold on to power? Would it be possible to develop more reconstruction mechanisms rather than to impose sanctions? That suggestion was raised at the Halifax Forum last weekend.

[Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg]

I really appreciate the nature of your question because it gets at the issue, which is that we are dealing with people. We are dealing with people when it comes to intervening in the affairs of other states. This is what NATO does. We do this with our involvement in the UN, and we do it in our own remit with the Canadian Forces. We are intervening in the affairs of states, and we greatly affect the long-term futures of the people who are receiving our intervention. I have never been a fan of economic sanctions, because the people who get hurt by sanctions are the women, the children, and the men—the belligerents, a little, and the megalomaniac leaders, never.

When we are looking at Russia, we have a situation where more of the people will be affected rather than the leadership, because of the systems that are in place, which they can go around and move above and under. When we look at reconstruction and stabilization methods, one of the better ways to work with a country like Russia is to do anything in our power to advocate building relationships, at many levels but mostly with the executive leadership. If there are opportunities that arise for Canada to be at a table, to be part of a conference or some type of economic arrangement, take the opportunity. History has shown that this creates more positive outcomes than economic sanctions and war.

Thank you.

[Dr. Mark Sedra]

I agree with Sarah. I think it's absolutely critical to try to keep avenues for dialogue open with Russia. We see, obviously, a very tense situation—pressure is being ratcheted up on both sides to escalate—so I think it's absolutely important to keep talking.

At the same time, we have a responsibility to stand by our allies, and that's one of the things we are doing with Operation Reassurance. With our partner in Ukraine, it is important to show solidarity and to support Ukraine, because international law has been violated and we have to stand up for those principles. At the same time, closing all doors to contact serves no one.

In terms of economic reconstruction, that would be a challenging thing to sell to some of our partners. In terms of the modalities of how we would do that at this stage, you could argue that there was a time when we could have had a more effective role in terms of economic reconstruction after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and so on. I think that would be challenging.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Is that it?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's it.

Mr. Bezan, go ahead.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I was just enjoying the conversation until this last round. I have a completely different idea on sanctions, as a sponsor in the House of the Magnitsky legislation. I think that targeted sanctions against individuals who are creating all the corruption and human rights abuses have been very effective. If you look at the recent list of 52 people—I'll give the government credit on this—you see that the number one name on that list is President Maduro from Venezuela. We are going after some of the leaders.

In respect to what Professor Sedra just said, we want to have a dialogue with Russia. That is why you don't see President Putin or Lavrov on that list, so that there can still be those discussions, but the senior kleptocrats around the regime in the Kremlin are definitely getting sanctioned and getting targeted. I hope to see that expand, because I think that's the only way we can actually change the individual attitudes of making these decisions, versus.... I agree. That's why we are not doing broad-based sectoral sanctions on commodities or resources, because of the impact that would have on the people. That's whom we want to win over to our side, versus what we are seeing happening in Russia.

Last week, there was a development over in Europe. Twenty-three members of the European Union signed on to a new defence security agreement called PESCO, the permanent structured co-operation arrangement. Do you see that as being in competition with NATO? How would that impact the north Atlantic security that we have in place through NATO?

I'll let both of you answer that question.

[Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg]

Again, I would just take Mark's previous words. I'm not an expert in this area. The Europeans have to manage their own security, in a sense. They don't fully rely on NATO for those outcomes. They're a parallel security apparatus that has evolved in parallel with the NATO apparatus.

My European colleagues have said that in some respects they feel very threatened right now, because they can't rely on what they consider to be a U.S.-guaranteed security in their future. Maybe this is an example of that, just a more effective and efficient signing of an arrangement that can produce some more guaranteed security results within those core countries.

[Dr. Mark Sedra]

Yes. There's no question that.... There's a long history in Europe of trying to create their own collective security mechanisms, and it has largely failed and is not very successful over the long term, while NATO, of course, has been a more enduring force. Obviously, I think there is some concern that there has been a major shift in the United States. It has been the glue and one of the key actors to keep NATO together. In the absence of U.S. leadership, do they have to look at other options? I think we're going to see more of these types of moves going forward. I think that's why it's especially important to recommit to NATO to try to galvanize resources to ensure the long-term relevance of NATO.

Let me take a step back about Magnitsky. I'm very supportive of dialogue, but I do differ slightly in that I do think there is a role for sanctions. I think what we've see in terms of the Magnitsky Act.... Look at the United States. We've seen that Russia has reacted perhaps most vociferously against the Magnitsky sanctions, whether that's in the United States or even here, so I think there is potential—

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Why is that so? Because it hurts the corrupt government that they have...?

[Dr. Mark Sedra]

Yes. Although I'm not an expert on sanctions either, and it is a very complicated arena, I think there is some evidence that some smart sanctions, so to speak, can have some impact.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I think they are smart sanctions. I think they keep Canada from being used as a safe haven for the illicit wealth and the families of those corrupt individuals.

I'll close with this one question for you, Professor Meharg. You've developed a theory of conflict identicide. I suppose you've looked backwards at things such as Rwanda, Bosnia, and other genocides that have taken place. Just recently, we went through the Yazidi genocide at Mount Sinjar. Looking forward, what about what's happening in Crimea right now with the Tatars?

[Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg]

Thank you so much for your question.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'll let you continue, but briefly, please.

[Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg]

The theory of identicide was created because of the phenomenon of the Yugoslav conflict and the intentional targeting and destruction of places—specifically, cultural heritage—that was intended to rid an area of the people who subscribed to those places, that cultural heritage. When you bomb their places, people end up moving out, and they never return because there's no connection to their places. It was used as a strategy of warfare in Bosnia.

When we talk about Crimea and identicide, we talk about genocide by talking about it as a “potential genocide” or a “possible genocide”. Those are the frameworks we're given when we're looking at what's happening in Crimea and some of the other examples you gave. We can't really call something a “genocide” until after the fact. This is one of the problems with the international convention on genocide; you can't call something a genocide while it's occurring. “Identicide” is a good term to name what's happening, so that we can get to the possible outcomes and try to stop them.

I would suggest that, yes, there's definitely identicide occurring in that area of the world. Our Canadian Forces have mechanisms to recognize these things. We've worked very closely with the U.S. armed forces in recognizing mass atrocities while they're occurring, mass movements of people, and the trigger events. We can really cull that expertise and start to make a real difference in some of these areas before it gets to a point where the international community actually can call it a genocide.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Mr. Fisher.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, folks. I've really enjoyed the conversation.

Our study is about Canada's involvement in NATO and whether NATO is relevant. I think that it may be because of the rhetoric of Mr. Trump during and after the election about NATO and its value to the world. I think I got defensive about NATO and started thinking about what we have to offer. Many times around here we've used the term “punching above our weight class”.

Mark, I think you even used it today.

I kept seeing this study from the view of what we have to offer the world and what we have to offer through NATO, so I was really interested, Sarah, when you talked about Canada's benefit from our involvement in NATO. It kind of spun the table around for some reason. You said that you came at your testimony today at an angle that was a little different because you've already read all the testimony. I appreciate your looking for a different angle. That's given me a chance to focus on that other side.

You said that it's easier for Canada to contribute to NATO. Is that our alignment? Is that our ideology? You really never did expand on that. I have one other question, but do you want to give me a comment on what your thought process is there?

[Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg]

Yes. It's based on the empirical evidence that Canada has supported NATO interoperability for at least 35 years, knowing that our Canadian Armed Forces use systems that are interoperable with those of the other actors. We don't necessarily do that in the same way with the UN. When we deploy into a NATO mission, we are mostly speaking the same language and using the same systems and ways of doing operations.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Okay. Got it.

The Arctic sea ice is melting due to climate change and there's a fear that the area may destabilize because of the Russian posturing. I don't necessarily agree with Mark's comment that NATO needs to be less Russo-centric, and I know this question is going in that direction anyway. Should NATO play a strong role in this? How could that evolve, that posturing for the Arctic, and what role can or should Canada play, because it's in our attic?

[Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg]

The Arctic as a place means something to Canada. It means something to Russia, and it has a different modality for people in Scandinavian countries and Iceland. There's a different way of thinking about the Arctic from all of those different perspectives. In fact, there are multiple perspectives within Canada. The statistic that I understand is that at any one time at least 25% to 55% of the people populating the Arctic at this point in time on Canadian Arctic territory are non-indigenous peoples. There's a huge number of industrial representatives in our north.

I need to think through your question. What I'd like to say about our perspective on our Arctic, Canada's Arctic, is that we like to be part of the circumpolar countries, the council of the Arctic. The way that we contribute on the dialogue of the north on that platform is different from what it could be through NATO. NATO is a defence organization. For the circumpolar states and how we interact on that other platform, it is not a defensive or offensive perspective. I think it's important to use all the platforms available to us to make sure that we're using or sharing the north such that it contributes to everybody's win in the Arctic. I know that sounds a bit broad, and I'd love to get into this further.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

We're not going to have time to do it.