National Defence Committee on March 1st, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Good morning.

I'd like to welcome everyone to the defence committee this morning. Gentlemen, welcome.

This morning we have Major-General Al Meinzinger, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff; Major-General Derek Joyce, Director General, International Security Policy; and Major-General William Seymour, Chief of Staff Operations, Canadian Joint Operations Command. Thank you very much for coming.

General Meinzinger, I believe you have opening remarks. I'll pass the floor to you.

Sir, you have the floor.

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence]

Good morning, members of the Standing Committee on National Defence. It's really a delight to be back with you after your visit to NATO headquarters, to Latvia, and to the Ukraine.

Right up front, I certainly wanted to thank the committee for their interest, obviously, in the NATO mission. More importantly, we'd like to thank you for having engaged our troops abroad. I know my last opportunity to speak to the committee on this subject was in June. As I mentioned then, I was quite confident that the troops deployed would very much enjoy the engagement and enjoy having what their doing recognized by this committee, so I thank you very much.

On behalf of the department, it is an honour for me to provide you with opening comments this morning with respect to the Canadian Armed Forces' involvement in NATO. My role is Director of Staff within the National Defence Headquarters. My team plays an important role in the planning of operations on behalf of the chief of the defence staff. Of course we do this important work in very close collaboration with our whole-of-government partners, and internally with our team within the policy group and within the Canadian Joint Operations Command. For that reason, today, as the chair has indicated, I have my colleagues and good friends, Major-General Derek Joyce and Major-General Bill Seymour.

Today our appearance will cover Canada's support and contribution to NATO, including mention of several of our NATO military operations.

Canada is deeply engaged with NATO, which we see as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security, and the importance of the alliance to Canada is reflected in Strong, Secure, Engaged, our new defence policy. Canada's national delegation to NATO is headed by Ambassador Buck, and Canada's military representative is Lieutenant-General Hainse, both of whom appeared before you at this committee on February 6.

In addition to Canada's national delegation to NATO headquarters, approximately 245 Canadian Armed Forces personnel are posted to NATO billets globally. This number does not include personnel deployed to NATO operations or staff working within various NATO agencies.

As the committee is aware, we are also fortunate to have Lieutenant-General Christine Whitecross serving as the commandant of the NATO Defense College in Rome. Additionally, Lieutenant-General Christian Juneau is currently serving as the deputy commander of the Joint Forces Command Naples.

Canada's priority for NATO is to ensure the alliance remains modern, flexible, agile, and able to deter the threats of today and those arising in the future. As highlighted in “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, Canada will pursue leadership roles where able, and will prioritize interoperability in its planning and capability development to ensure seamless co-operation with allies and partners, particularly those within NATO.

Militarily, NATO is a key enabler for the Canadian Armed Forces' interoperability with allies, and it is apparent that for any major operation, the Canadian Armed Forces will continue to deploy as part of an alliance or coalition, often with little warning. The goal is therefore to have forces be interoperable from the moment they deploy on training or on operations. This, of course, will reduce work-up time required for forces to be truly employable, regardless of the operational environment. Interoperability, which is the ability to act together coherently, is in our parlance a force multiplier in improving the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the force.

Canada also leverages our participation in NATO to maximize our information-sharing opportunities and more generally, to strengthen our bilateral relations with our allies. There exist many collaborative programs, committees, and processes that underpin NATO's focus on interoperability as a cornerstone of the alliance. For example, there are standards and doctrine development, as well as training events such as Exercise Steadfast Cobalt, a NATO command and control interoperability exercise, just to point out one.

Additionally, the CAF participates. I look forward to discussing a number of high-level NATO joint training exercises, for example, Exercise Trident Juncture 2018, which will take place this fall. Again, this further enhances NATO interoperability and our readiness to respond to crises.

Allow me to take a few minutes to underline and update you on our ongoing operational contributions to NATO.

The Canadian Armed Forces prides itself on delivering operational success and excellence within those NATO missions assigned by government. We do so with purpose and in a manner that is reflective of Canada's solid reputation as a reliable ally.

In 2014, following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Canada committed at the earliest stages to participate in NATO assurance measures to promote regional security and stability. At the Warsaw summit in 2016, as the NATO alliance adjusted to new security concerns in Ukraine, the Middle East, and North Africa, Canada announced that it would renew its commitment under Operation REASSURANCE, as part of its contribution to NATO's deterrence posture.

As a consequence of these decisions, Canada is now leading, as you know, a robust multinational battle group in Latvia as one of the four lead framework nations under NATO's enhanced forward presence in eastern Europe. The other lead nations, of course, are the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. They lead these battle groups in Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, respectively.

Canada's enhanced forward presence in Latvia is the most multinational of the battle groups. Our battle group includes contributing forces, as you know, from Albania, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain, and we look forward to the Czech Republic and Slovakia joining us later in 2018. Certainly there is great interest in the work that's being done there.

Following a series of preparatory and confirmation exercises, our first battle group was declared fully operational on September 6, 2017, and we have just recently rotated out our battle group, since your visit, on January 15.

The Canadian Armed Forces is certainly proud to serve as the lead framework nation in Latvia. Not only are our personnel playing a key role within EFP, but I think they're demonstrating outstanding leadership and true commitment to the mission.

Our land force includes up to 450 Canadian Armed Forces personnel and forms Canada's largest sustained military presence in Europe since the early 1990s. The task force includes a headquarters element, an infantry company, a combat service support element, and vehicles and equipment based at Camp Adazi, which you would have seen with your own eyes.

Our battle group is currently under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sean French from the 2nd Royal Canadian Regiment, and I would offer up to the committee that we were extremely proud of our first battle group commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Wade Rutland, whose leadership of the battle group and significant contributions to promoting in-country security and defence resulted in his being awarded the Order of Viesturs by the President of Latvia. I recently had the opportunity to meet the Minister of Defence from Latvia, and he spoke quite fondly and poetically with respect to what Wade had achieved during his time in the country, so we're very proud of that.

In addition to our EFP battle group, the Canadian Armed Forces is also contributing, on a rotational basis, an air task force from the RCAF, comprising up to six CF-18 fighter aircraft as well as flight crew, command staff, and key support personnel to NATO air policing duties. Our fighter force completed a very successful mission in Romania—their second, of course—which ended in January of this year. During the mission the crews were not only there to achieve the end states for NATO, but they certainly increased their interoperability with the Romanian air force and other regional partners. We've committed to continue that great work and will resume air policing duties in Romania later this calendar year.

Lastly, the Royal Canadian Navy continues to force generate a frigate and a ship's company, on a persistent rotational basis, to be employed for exercises and operational duties within NATO's maritime command's area of responsibility. At this very moment Commander Gord Noseworthy, the ship's skipper, is commanding HMCS St. John's, which is currently in the North Sea. By the end of the current commitment, the CAF will have sustained a frigate consistently in the standing NATO maritime forces for five consecutive years, demonstrating our support to NATO's maritime posture.

Operation KOBOLD is Canada's contribution to the Kosovo Force, or KFOR for short. KFOR is a NATO-led peace-support operation with the objective of maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. Canada's current commitment to KFOR began in 2008.

There are currently five Canadian Armed Forces members deployed in KFOR, including the chief of the NATO Joint Logistics Operation Center. Although it is relatively modest, Canada's contribution is recognized and appreciated by our allies.

Although it's not a NATO mission, it's well known to our allies that Ukraine remains an important Canadian foreign and defence policy priority. Operation Unifier, initially announced in April 2015, as you know, has been extended to March 2019 and encompasses Canada's training and capacity-building efforts.

As you know based on your visit, we have up to 200 proud CAF personnel deployed on this key mission, and their focus is clearly on the tactical soldier training, including training in explosive ordnance disposal, military policing, medical training, logistics training, and professional development courses writ large.

By participating in this training mission, the Canadian Armed Forces is helping to develop the professionalism of the Ukrainian armed forces and to modernize and build capacity within their forces, effectively supporting Ukraine's aspirations to achieve NATO interoperability by 2020.

In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, from our long presence in Germany and the patrols of the North Atlantic during the Cold War, to the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya, and now to deterrence and efforts projecting stability, the Canadian Armed Forces has consistently demonstrated our commitment to the alliance and will continue to provide those robust capabilities and deploy highly trained and competent members, obviously in line with our government's direction.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your opening remarks.

We had an opportunity to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Wade Rutland when we were over there. He was very impressive. I understand that the roto ones are particularly difficult because there are a lot of unknowns. It was a challenge. It's really nice to hear that he was appropriately recognized. That's good news.

Mr. Robillard, you have seven minutes for the questions and responses.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.

Is Canada’s role in NATO likely to evolve further as a result of the country’s enhanced engagement in Europe through NATO’s enhanced presence in Eastern Europe? If so, what types of contributions to NATO should Canada make in the coming years, and why?

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

Thank you for the question, sir.

Regarding our current mission, it's important to note that we now have a battle group in Latvia. We also have a ship and fighter jets contributing to NATO's air policing mission. We're definitely going to continue with that activity. We now have a few people working at the headquarters in Romania, so that gives us some influence there. We are always ready to respond to threats, activities, or other missions that NATO wants to monitor.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Have recent developments in North Korea changed NATO’s threat assessment regarding the missile threat to NATO countries?

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

If I understand your question correctly, you want to know if NATO has changed its view with regard to missions in North Korea. Do I have that right?

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Yes.

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

I know this committee has been addressed with respect to that particular issue. Like Canada, Europe in general would be concerned about the continued development of that nuclear missile program. In terms of distinct declarations of concern or warning, I'm not aware of any statements beyond the general statements that we've heard with respect to the international community writ large indicating that concern with respect to the continued non-compliance with the United Nations resolution.

To be clear, like Canada, certainly, we watch very closely the activities of North Korea. I know that this committee has been addressed with respect to that particular issue. Like Canada, Europe in general would be concerned about the continued development of that nuclear missile program. In terms of distinct declarations of concern or warning, I'm not aware of any statements beyond the general statements that we've heard with respect to the international community writ large indicating that concern with respect to the continued non-compliance with United Nations resolutions.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you.

How does hybrid warfare affect the global security environment? To what extent is NATO prepared to address the threat posed by hybrid warfare?

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

I'll start that one.

I think it's a great question. One of the benefits that I have while working within the strategic staff is that I have a small team run by an EX-level civil servant. His team is mandated to constantly be thinking about the future. One of the areas they've looked at is this challenge with regard to how the nature of threats has morphed. We talk often about the hybrid threat panoply of concerns. We talk about the grey zone. I think when we talk about that, we often attribute that strategy to Russia and their ability to use non-conventional means or tactics to have an effect on an adversary.

I would suggest to you that we certainly consider that daily in the work that we do. In the context of cyber and our requirements to ensure we have resilient forces when we deploy out of country, we always look at threats specific to our region. That takes into consideration the broad types of threats we would find within that hybrid envelope.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you.

In your opinion, recognizing that some NATO countries include different types of expenditures when calculating their defence spending, should there be a shared NATO understanding or official guidelines regarding the expenditures that NATO countries should include when calculating and comparing their defence spending?

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

I think Ambassador Kerry Buck spoke on that topic.

I know that leading up to our defence policy review internal to DND working then with NATO we did a bit of stock taking on how we have attributed defence spending in relation to the process. I suppose the standards and norms that exist within NATO proper and compared our approach to those of our allies. I think what we found in the analysis was that we were under-reporting in a few areas. As an example, some of the

Some costs related to information management and information technology, for example.

key concerns IMIT. Some of the cost that we would have paid for had been outsourced to SSC, and we were not rolling that up in defence spending. I think NATO does have an approach as to how they calculate defence spending within the 2% regime. I would be more than willing to discuss how I believe other considerations should be brought to the table when we talk about the true contributions that we make to NATO.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I think MGen Joyce wanted to weigh in.

We still have a minute, so if you wanted the opportunity to jump in there, I'll give you a minute.

[Major-General Derek Joyce, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Coming back to the hybrid warfare question, I want to pass on that within NATO there has very much been a focus on hybrid warfare, particularly in light of the increasing threat that we're seeing from Russia. To give you a sense, they have developed a new hybrid strategy to counter hybrid threats. This includes the establishment of a new intelligence division, which focuses on, among others, the area of hybrid threats. This includes training and exercises in the hybrid area, which had not been done before. We have an intelligence officer within that intelligence division in the hybrid area that we're committing to that headquarters. We as an alliance are working to actively counter the propaganda, which is obviously a part of the hybrid warfare area, through exercises and NATO coordination with other organizations, such as the European Union. I wanted to expand the response on that point.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Mr. Yurdiga, the floor is yours.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank our guests for coming early this morning, and thank you for your service to our great nation. Major-General Meinzinger, you mentioned how important interoperability is and it's sort of like the core of NATO, but as we see, or are aware that Turkey has purchased the S-400 missile defence system which I think doesn't mesh very well. Now there's rumours that they will be purchasing the SU-57 fighter jet from Russia over the F-35. How is this going to work with Turkey systems not really meshing with ours? I mean this is a new reality. How is NATO going to respond to this reality?

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

Thanks very much for the question. In line with my remarks I do agree 100% that what we get from the NATO alliance is first and foremost an ability to kind of come together when we need to come together. As an example we on a rotational cycle participate in a very sizeable joint exercise routine with NATO. In 2015 during joint tecs we deployed 1,500 Canadian Armed Forces members to Spain and Italy into a high intensity war fighting scenario that involved 25,000 NATO troops. We led that effort by running a computer-related exercise before our troops deployed. The benefits that are accrued by training together, sharing together whether that be at committees, whether that be at tables of doctrine and the like I think it's really the bedrock of the alliance is our ability to come together on a moment's notice. You point out examples and I'm not an expert in the radar system that you're referring to. I would say what matters most is our solidarity as an alliance. Individual countries have the prerogative to purchase equipment of their choice and I think we would acknowledge that. I would offer those up as some comments.

[MGen Derek Joyce]

If I may just add to that. Obviously Turkey is a longstanding ally and friend to Canada and we're part of the alliance and will continue to be part of the alliance. With respect to interoperability it's more than just equipment. We have a vast array of fighter type aircraft ships etc. and we work towards a common NATO standard with respect to areas that are of key concern for interoperability, and we work through those through the exercises and operations that General Meinzinger was talking about. There's going to be a challenge there's no doubt about it, but the point is that NATO equipment is not homogeneous. There's some U.S. equipment, there's European equipment, but we make it work, and we make it work through working hard in operations and through those developmental exercises as well so we'll be able to overcome what's expected.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

I was more getting at the possibility to reduce your ability to participate in a theatre of war. I mean obviously with the fighter jet scenario obviously we have to communicate, accidents do happen. When you reduce communications the ability to communicate and share information that creates a problem for our troops on the ground. Would this possibly say “okay you can't participate in this event because of these issues”? It seems to me that trick should be put on the back burner only participate on certain things, but not others. Is this a correct analogy?

[MGen Derek Joyce]

It is possible that could be the way that any kind of operation would evolve. I would just highlight right now in fact that we already have Russian equipment being used by NATO allies. Some of the eastern European nations actually use Russian equipment at this point and they do participate in our exercises and operations.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

Thank you. Regarding cyber-attacks, we talk about fake news propaganda and everything else and a recent poll suggests that two-thirds of Turks see the U.S. as their biggest threat. Pro-government media hammers home the message on a regular basis. One recent editorial screams that the U.S. is Turkey's new enemy. Do you believe this is a result of Russian fake news and media influence to destabilize NATO and its members?

[MGen Derek Joyce]

That's a great question. I'm not familiar with the example that you're using, sir. What I would comment on is the fact that we're aware that Russia is using hybrid warfare. They're using hybrid warfare, not in just certain countries, they're using hybrid warfare across the alliance and in fact, across the world where it suits their purposed. While I can't necessarily comment on that, I certainly wouldn't dispute the fact that there's certain forms of propaganda being used within the Turkish population.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

I'm more concerned about what are we doing, as NATO, to combat this sort of thing, whether it's in Turkey or wherever it may be, it doesn't make a difference. Fake news and propaganda is what it is. What are we doing, as Canadians, and as NATO members, to contradict or have a front, saying this is not true. Are we using the media to our advantage? Are we putting the message out there that this is fake news? Do we have a plan in place or are we, right now, just sitting back and monitoring the situation?

[MGen A. D. Meinzinger]

I can start. This is a great...