Evidence of meeting #11 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Unfortunately, we have to leave it there. I'm sorry.
Mr. Fisher, you have six minutes.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of our panellists today for sharing their high level of expertise.
I'll start with Dr. Fergusson and, if there's time, go to Dr. Huebert.
Last year, the U.S. and Canada issued a joint statement on NORAD modernization and outlined four priority areas for investment: situational awareness, modernized command and control systems, capabilities to deter and defeat evolving aerospace threats to North America, and research and development.
I asked this question at a previous incarnation of the defence committee: In terms of capability, what are the most important investments that we could make today for our future, in light of what's going on today?
I'll start with Dr. Fergusson and then go to Dr. Huebert.
3:55 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
The most important investment, at the moment, is in [Technical difficulties—Editor]. It's not, as I said, simply the North Warning System or replacing it with another series of ground-based radar systems. The current discussions are potentially focused on over-the-horizon—
3:55 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Yes.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
You said, “the most important investment is” and then you cut out, and everyone went, “What did he just say?”
Could you please repeat yourself?
3:55 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
The most important and pressing requirement right now is sensor systems, and not simply in terms of replacing the ground-based North Warning System. The current preference is for over-the-horizon backscatter radars. Integrating both ground-based replacements as well as air-based.... Whether you think in terms of the possible acquisition of AWAC systems, the use of possibly high-altitude tethered balloons and space-based systems, and not just for the northern Arctic part of the threat assessment, but also for the 360 degrees.... That's where the priority has to be applied.
I recognize that this has been a slow process and that some of the technologies that have been looked at are still in the R and D stage. That's a key thing, because if you can't detect it, you can't identify it, you can't track it, and you can't vector interceptor capabilities to the target, then all of the interceptors in the world are going to do you no good.
4 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Jim's absolutely right in terms of the sensors, but I would like to add two things that Canada will have to be facing. It goes back to the issue about the Chinese tests as well.
We are, of course, talking of the modernization of NORAD in terms of the North Warning System. That becomes part of it. The over-the-horizon radars are another part. We are also going to have to be looking at space-based assets for determination, particularly given the speeds and the stealth capabilities of some of the Russian cruise missiles, particularly the Kinzhal missile.
We are also going to have to look at the role that NORAD took on in 2005 and 2006, which is, of course, the underwater detection site. Just prior to the resumption of the Ukrainian war, the Russians demonstrated that they do, in fact, have the capability of cutting undersea cables. We saw these being cut between Svalbard and mainland Norway.
They have new weapon systems, such as the Poseidon weapon system, for example, and other autonomous underwater vehicles, that have the capability of coming closer to Canadian soil, or North American soil for that matter, which goes back to Jim's point of the 360º threat. Given the type of cruise missile technology they have, this will present a growing threat to Canadian territory.
Going back to the question on the Northwest Passage, the approach of these new submarine systems is really going to be the technical aspect of the threat as it grows going into the future.
4 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
Thank you.
How does the nature of a given U.S. presidential administration influence Canada's decisions on continental defence?
I will stick with you, Professor Huebert. Historically, has there been more or less co-operation under certain circumstances?
4 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
This is part of the saving grace, when we look historically at that relationship, because of the strength that has been developed among those below the political level. There tends to be a political acceptability that North America has to be defended as a unit, but what has been the true strength of the NORAD agreement and North American co-operation overall is that it has created this very deep web of co-operation among the Canadian and American military decision-makers. Generally speaking, you will see that level of co-operation going on.
The problem is whether or not you have an understanding in the context of what type of funds and what type of necessity have to come in. That's where we start seeing a bit of a differential. Once again, there is a unity, in my assessment, between both Democratic and Republican presidents in terms of what they see as necessary.
The Americans lost a bit of attention on North American defence when they were engaged in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. As we saw from a series of policies and strategies on a northern strategy released by every single branch of the American forces personnel, I think they get it in terms of how they need to co-operate with Canada.
4 p.m.
Liberal
4 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My first question is mainly about procurement.
Mr. Huebert and Mr. Fergusson, I'll give a tangible example of the procurement issue. The Canadian Armed Forces are currently unable to provide boots to soldiers. Soldiers are asked to buy the boots themselves and then receive reimbursement. We can imagine that this approach is much less economical and efficient than group purchasing.
The minister is about to announce an increase in the defence budget. We may exceed the 2% committed to NATO.
Is a budget increase the only solution?
Should the question mainly be “how much” or shouldn't it also be “how”?
4:05 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Shall I go first?
4:05 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Go ahead, Jim. Age before beauty.
4:05 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
It's not really a question of increasing the defence budget per se. The question is, how much, over what period of time and, particularly, dedicated to what acquisitions independent of operations and maintenance, and independent, as Professor Saideman has pointed out, of the problems of recruitment.
If you want to punch this money into or funnel it into expanding the Canadian Armed Forces, recruitment and retention are a big problem, and you're probably in a real difficulty.
If it's going to go into certain capital investments—new ones outside of what was committed in 2017 and 2018—we don't know where they would go. Certainly, in 2017, with “Strong, Secure, Engaged” and North American defence modernization, NORAD modernization is emphasized, but specifically on what that entails in terms of thinking not just about sensors, shooters or interceptors, but about command and control arrangements and infrastructure, this is a really big picture. It's hard to know what we should do.
It's easy to...and I believe the German [Technical difficulty—Editor] increased their defence budget over some period of time by $110 billion U.S. That's great, and that's vitally needed, both for Germany and, in our case, for how much the government needs to invest and says it's going to invest. However, unless we know where they're going to invest, that becomes a different problem. It raises the question, which this government doesn't want to do—no governments want to do it once they do defence once—about the need for a defence review.
It's very clear in my mind that what was committed to in 2017, in the absence of any funding commitment to NORAD modernization and North American defence modernization, is the key area where you want to go or where we should go. Whether that's the case, I think it's important that the government make this clear. That means that something in the policy world has to be done before we simply say that there's money.
Remember that National Defence, over the past many years—I think in every year I can remember—continues to give back money to the central agency. I might be wrong about the number, but I think last year it was $1.1 billion that was returned. Well, that's a problem. You can commit money, but the question is, where do you spend it [Technical difficulty—Editor] for what ends? That's an open question to this day in Canada.
4:05 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Let's recognize that the 2% increase, when it was created by NATO, is a political target. Once again, what we're really talking about is, what is the need for the effect of the Canadian Forces going into this new environment? It really comes down to the ability to deter growing aggressor states and fight in a collective security environment should that deterrence break down.
When we went into the immediate post-Cold War period, we of course went through what many democratic countries saw as the ability to save money on defence, because there wasn't a fear that we had to deter anyone and we weren't going to be called upon to fight. That has obviously changed since at least 2014—I would argue 2008.
The question is, okay, 2% sounds good in terms of making a commitment, but it's really getting to that capability: parts of the stuff that Dr. Fergusson was talking about in terms of having the types of forces that you will be able to recruit and bring in to actually give effect to it.
It really gets to the heart of what you're asking, and that is that we need to have an ability to go beyond just simply saying, okay, 2% or 1.9%. Those are numbers. They don't mean anything, but if you have a strategic knowledge within the ongoing ability at the highest levels to understand the types of threats that we are responding to and are able to respond nimbly, that in many ways actually goes further than just setting artificial numbers in terms of what you're going [Technical difficulty—Editor].
The one aspect that we haven't talked about and that we need to bring in is, of course, that Canada also has to incorporate this giving and increase its ability to have intelligence beyond sensors, beyond detecting the weapons systems. We see that with the types of warfare that both China and Russia are increasingly relying on—cyber warfare, hybrid warfare and the fears that the Russians were involved in Brexit, in the U.S. election and in the Spanish secessionist movement. It means that has to be incorporated in terms of any of our responses. It may seem to be relatively smaller amounts, but it's something that we probably haven't given enough.... It makes that overall picture of how we respond, think and react, and then, of course, you figure out the money flow from that basis.
4:10 p.m.
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
I would just jump in here and say that we also have to think a little more about how we do our procurement, because it's often seen as a jobs program for electoral political benefit, as opposed to what is best for what we need.
For instance, we're seeing in Ukraine a variety of defence systems that are working really well, but we [Technical difficulty—Editor]. Should we build our own anti-tank weapons when there are very good ones out there? Should we build our own anti-aircraft weapons when there are very good ones out there?
We need to be a little more realistic about what our own defence industry can do and what it should do, and this leads to a challenge that we've had in our country. We feel that once we start building up a defence industry, it must be kept busy with a variety of projects: “Well, we need to sell LAVs to Saudi Arabia.”
If we think about our defence industry for a minute, we need to think about whether it makes sense for us to have domestic producers of all the stuff, because it puts us in the difficult position of trying to find ways to keep them busy in between our own major projects. We need to think a little more about buying from other folks.
4:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Unfortunately we have to leave it there.
I'm sure Ms. Mathyssen has some idea about selling LAVs to Saudi Arabia.
Six minutes please.
March 21st, 2022 / 4:10 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Saideman, first of all, you said in your opening that you are an Arctic skeptic. You used the example of the military failure we have seen in Ukraine by Russia. Can you elaborate on that a bit, and on what challenges you would see Russia facing in an Arctic invasion?
4:10 p.m.
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
I've had experts who work in the military and elsewhere tell me that the problem with Russia seizing a few of our islands would not be so much that we would have to reclaim those islands as it would that the Russians who are there would have to be rescued. With the distances they would have to go and the weather they would have to go through to sustain forces up there, I think, as the two professors have identified, the real threat to the Arctic is these missiles. It's not the random Chinese intelligence ship. That's not a real threat to their seizing territory.
We must remember that most of the Russian investment is in protecting their Arctic rather than jumping across to our side of the Arctic.
It's just a very expensive place. There's a reason we haven't spent as much as we would like to in the north—once we get started on thinking about these things, they become very expensive very quickly. As expensive as it is for us, it's also expensive for the Russians.
They are worried about having this back door, which has long been secure but is now more open thanks to climate change. They're worried about protecting that more than they are about poaching our side of the Arctic. They talk a good game about it, but that's not really a major threat to us.
We've learned that their procurement systems are highly corrupt. They can't maintain tires for their truck system. One bit of speculation about why they are not using their air force as much as we thought they would in this war is that the logistics of supplying the planes with parts may be bad. They may not have been flying as many training sessions because, as they say, the second currency of the Russian military is fuel, and they are using fuel that they get, which is supposed to be used for training and operations, to buy other things or to enrich themselves, and therefore they're not really that capable of jumping across the Arctic and sustaining that for any length or period of time.
The missile threat is real but the conventional threat is not so much.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
In terms of that large expenditure in the Arctic, there have been a lot of conversations about just plain infrastructure and the investments in terms of infrastructure in the Arctic. I've heard different phrases used. Military folks are talking about partnerships with indigenous folks. We've also heard about the difference between that and indigenous-led projects.
Could you expand maybe on some of the problems we see going forward with respect to what the government would need to do in terms of that infrastructure investment, and how we could do that together in an indigenous-led way?
4:10 p.m.
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
That's a terrific question and I don't really have the expertise to answer it. I think you should call Whitney Lackenbauer to talk about that. He has a much better understanding of the work between the Canadian Armed Forces and the people of the north [Technical difficulty—Editor]. I think we definitely do need investor infrastructure up there. Again, it's incredibly expensive, so the choices we make are going to be really long-term, careful ones, and we should definitely involve the people of the north.
Whether they lead or we partner is a distinction I'm not really that well equipped to address.
4:15 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
If I might add to that, you may be aware that roughly a month ago the Government of Canada's Department of National Defence agreed to a contract with the Inuit Development Corporation by which they will now sustain and maintain not only the North Warning System until it's replaced, but also the forward operating locations.
Clearly, with the extension of the Canadian air defence identification zone, in terms of replacement of a ground-based radar net as well as potentially forward operating locations, there are going to be significant opportunities to partner with Inuit and indigenous companies in the north and Arctic. This will be an important, key decision if we think in terms of the procurement world that will drive how this plays itself out, so there are increasing opportunities.
If I can remember exactly, I recall—this would go back to 2014—an interesting quote from an Inuit leader who talked about the valuable role they have and the importance they see in co-operating with National Defence and the Canadian Forces in terms of the Arctic.
Remember, when we talk about [Technical difficulty—Editor] interests, NORAD modernization is not simply military and defence; it spills over into civilian infrastructure and development, and that's an important dual benefit, if you will, for what's going on.
The Canadian government—and this is something of a concern in my mind—tends to stovepipe these things. Defence does this; Transport does that; Health does this, but when you think particularly about communications issues, expanding better airfields, etc., it's going to be important these are all done in the context of co-operation with the Inuit communities and their business ventures in the north.