National Defence Committee on March 21st, 2022

[LGen (Ret'd) Walter Semianiw]

Victoria-class submarines are not effective in the Arctic. I don't know how effective they are outside of the Arctic, but at the end of the day, I don't know if the military has a plan.

It's always a great debate in the Canadian Armed Forces whether or not we need submarines that can move under the ice, because it brings up this issue of nuclear, which I think frightens a number of people across Canada. My understanding is that you need to have nuclear submarines to be able to stay under the ice long enough to do what you need to do to counter threats and to guard your sovereignty, but I have not heard of any type of replacement programs for the Victoria-class submarines.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you for your service.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

Mr. Spengemann, you have six minutes.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Chair, thank you very much.

Thank you to our witnesses for being with us this afternoon.

I have three categories of questions, and the substance of each of them would very quickly outstrip the time available, so I'm just looking for some opening thoughts to guide the committee as we potentially dive more deeply into any of these three areas.

My first area, Mr. Chair, is the issue of alliance formation and burden sharing. Professor Kimball has written extensively on this over the last decade and a half, I believe, so I'm going to ask questions of Professor Kimball to start.

Professor Kimball, in light of recent events surrounding Ukraine—the crisis, the military intervention and all that—what is your view with respect to the political component of alliance formation around NATO? If you observed changes in the last few weeks, how radical are they?

[Dr. Anessa Kimball]

Of course, NATO, as I mentioned, is an extremely important commitment that Canada [Technical difficulty—Editor] has sunk substantial costs into. Right now we're hearing lots of questions about whether we should let Ukraine join NATO or join the EU. What about Finland and Sweden? Should they join NATO?

One thing that is clear is that 2% is clearly a political target. Two percent does not come from any sort of quantitative analysis. It doesn't come from any sort of strategic analysis or anything like that, and I can say that relatively confidently because, in doing my NATO research, I've looked at over 200 pieces of research published on NATO burden sharing—policy papers, books, articles and all of that. The first thing I can say is that 2% is something that politicians created, which defence budgets had to very much react to and try to attain afterwards.

I think there's another thing we should point out. Two percent, as some of my other colleagues have said, doesn't really say very much about what you're actually doing. My burden sharing research is bringing me more towards other institutions that NATO uses to share the burden, like the partnership for peace [Technical difficulty—Editor]. You may recall that Canada is hosting its first centre of excellence in the next several years on climate security and NATO, so this is one very important way in which states share the burden that essentially is not talked about when we look at central budgeting or when we look at civilian budgeting.

Also, I would add that the idea of expanding the alliance in an overnight-type way [Technical difficulty—Editor]. We have heard even Zelenskyy himself talk about this.

I published research in European Politics and Society in 2020, showing that it is not as easy as simply making a request. It's a process that can take from 10 to 15 years.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I wonder if I can stop you there. Thank you very much for that; it's helpful.

My second theme has not been broached this afternoon, but obviously people are thinking about it. What is the state of global nuclear disarmament efforts, before and now, through this crisis? Do you have any thoughts on the status quo? Is it shifting? Could it shift? Is it really more firmly entrenched than ever?

If I can get 30 seconds from you, and also from the general on that, that would be helpful.

[Dr. Anessa Kimball]

I would point out that almost all of our strategic arms controls, and everything like that, are basically focused on Russia. We have the entry of China in the game in a somewhat credible manner. Most of our architectural thinking about these risks is essentially just looking at Russia. If anything, there needs to be a reflection about how we can bring China into this, and how we can have more transparency.

I would note, in terms of what's going on in Ukraine, that we are seeing the use of missiles there now. We're seeing that there are issues with them, and this is raising the risks.

I'll pass it to my colleague.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

General Semianiw, I was going to invite you to comment for 30 seconds. I have a third question, and, time permitting, I'll bring that in as well.

[LGen (Ret'd) Walter Semianiw]

I would throw out to the committee, with what we're seeing in Ukraine—and I'm Ukrainian; I have friends in Ukraine right now, but I'm not here to talk about Ukraine—is that a failure of détente? That's a great question. The short answer is no, but at the end of the day, we probably could have done a lot more.

The Canadian Armed Forces were focused, in the last 15 to 20 years, on something different, like Afghanistan. Quickly, our view and our focus changed, as it did with many governments from this nuclear issue. To be fair, it never really [Technical difficulty—Editor]

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I'm going to ask the general to repeat the last sentence or two. It froze on us.

[LGen (Ret'd) Walter Semianiw]

Over the last number of years, the nuclear discussion—the focus, the attention on what could happen around the world from a nuclear arms perspective—may have lost its focus. Yes, we watched what was going on in northern [Technical difficulty—Editor] but when that all happened, there was a lot more going on that perhaps we didn't pay attention to.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Chair, I have 30 seconds, with your indulgence.

Canada's obligations in the area of UN peace operations.... How do you see them connected to strategic threat assessments? Are these multilateral obligations that are independent of a threat assessment, or are they directly connected to threat assessments globally?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I'm sure this will be an interesting answer.

[Dr. Anessa Kimball]

For at least the last several years, the UN has increasingly delegated to the European Union and to NATO when it comes to those types of activities. If you look at the peacekeeping activities that the UN is currently doing, we're into about a dozen remaining peacekeeping activities. Some of them, of course, are quite dated, from the Cold War.

There are calls in terms of the blue helmets in Ukraine. That is also a fundamental misunderstanding about Russia's role in the UN, and how it and China would work together to block any sort of UN action, so I'm on the skeptic side.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, we're going to have to stop there.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thanks very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Madame Normandin, you have six minutes, please.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

I want to start with you, Professor Kimball. You spoke briefly about the role of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, but also about Canada's role in the missile defence shield, for example.

I want to hear your comments on the structure of NORAD. Your colleagues have expressed different views on the matter. In your opinion, should this structure be much more integrated, and should Canada, in some situations, be doing a little better?

I want to hear your thoughts on this.

[Dr. Anessa Kimball]

Canada must decide how much it wants to participate in the missile defence shield.

Right now, given the amendment to NORAD in 2004, Canada still has the right to be consulted. However, when a strong response is needed, the Americans make the decision. It's more or less the same in Europe. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR, controls all aspects of the response.

We can say that Canada is placing a great deal of its good faith in the Americans. It should also be noted that, in terms of intercepting ballistic missiles, we rely heavily on the fact that we'll intercept them from [Technical difficulty—Editor]. We're increasingly able to see and calculate [Technical difficulty—Editor].

In Europe, the territories are so close together that the response time is short. It's actually two minutes. Again, we should be wondering whether, in two minutes, we can share the information, make an informed decision and still have a discussion between Washington and Ottawa.

I think that we're very idealistic.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

When it comes to the challenges associated with anything hypersonic, there are three areas of action: detection, deterrence and defence.

Should we focus on one area given the current situation, where everything is moving very quickly?

[Dr. Anessa Kimball]

Certainly, detection is the first step. NORAD already has that mandate [Technical difficulty—Editor]. Canada would be better protected if it invested more in certain aspects of NORAD, such as in occupying forces or mobile forces. Right now, Canada is acquiring outdated equipment. This equipment has exceeded its expected life span. If Canada wants to remain a major partner in NORAD, it must make more investments.

I know that this is a sensitive issue for Canadians. However, I think that, in 2022, we should have a deeper discussion on the reliability of American promises. We experienced the Trump years. As I often say, I think that Canada benefited from the fact that the United States almost re‑elected someone who is quite [Technical difficulty—Editor]. With Trump, we saw what can happen when an American leader [Technical difficulty—Editor] democratic allies.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

[LGen (Ret'd) Walter Semianiw]

If I can, very quickly, there was a time when Canada's geography was an element of our defence. Because we were so far away from everything, it really didn't matter.

This changed.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

This brings me to my next question, which I would like to ask you both.

Lieutenant‑General, you referred to the importance of occupying territory and having military personnel on the ground to respond to a threat. We're also hearing a great deal about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

Does the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic require a political position or an effective occupation of the area?

Do these two components go together, or should they be separate, one before the other?