Good morning, Mr. Chair, and thank you for this opportunity to discuss the security of Canada's Arctic, the threats we face and the actions that we're taking to address those threats.
With me this morning, we have Major-General Peter Scott, chief of staff of Canadian joint operations command; Major-General Michael Wright, commander of Canadian Forces intelligence command; and Mr. Jonathan Quinn, who is our director general for continental defence in the department.
In this meeting's second hour, you will hear from Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, commander, Royal Canadian Navy, Lieutenant-General Eric Kenny, commander, Royal Canadian Air Force, and Major-General Conrad Mialkowski, deputy commander, Canadian Army.
Mr. Chair, as you are aware, we are living in a time of great disruption.
The world is more dangerous now than at any time since the Cold War, and maybe even since the eve of the Second World War. The rules-based international order that has underpinned our peace and prosperity for 80 years is fragile and threatened and needs to be defended. Strategic competition once again dominates the geopolitical landscape.
Rapid technological advances are changing the character of conflict. All of this upheaval is set against the ever-present backdrop of climate change, which has improved access to resources and shipping routes in the region.
Russia's illegal war in Ukraine not only is an alarming demonstration of Russia's disregard for established international borders, but also has important implications for Arctic security.
Russia has made it clear that it considers the Arctic of great importance to its security and its economic interests—and continues to increase its military presence there.
China, which has declared itself a near-Arctic state, also has aspirations of northern influence. Its polar silk road ambitions include using the northern sea route through Russia's Arctic to import energy and export goods. Russia seeks to undermine a rules-based international order, while China seeks to bend it to its advantage.
The complexity of this landscape cannot be overstated. Even in the depths of the Cold War, we had the luxury of being able to laser-focus on a single strategic competitor. Now we must face the reality that we live in a tri-polar security environment where liberal democracies must divide their attention between two competitors who employ different strategies but pose the same danger to this security and stability that we have enjoyed, for the most part, for generations since the Second World War. They are the security and stability that have underpinned our prosperity here at home.
As Russia, China and a host of other countries express interest in the Arctic, the politics of the region become more complex, and the danger of escalation sparked by miscalculation, miscommunication or misunderstanding becomes more acute.
This summer, I hosted my fellow chiefs of defence from Arctic nations as we met for the first time since Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. My counterparts from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States and I all agreed that this forum is more necessary now than ever. We plan to resume meeting regularly to advance our co-operation, collaboration and information sharing.
To defend the Canadian Arctic, our northern approaches to the south, and our sovereignty over the region, require a sustained and visible military presence there.
I see no real threat today to our territorial sovereignty; nor do I see one in the near future, but given the upheaval and disruption I have spoken of, we cannot assume this will always be the case. If the day arrives when that sovereignty is threatened, our presence there is limited.
It's reassuring to note that Canada and the United States have agreed to modernize NORAD, increasing NORAD's ability to sustain a presence and its capacity and domain awareness in the north.
This will complement initiatives being pursued, such as the DeWolf-class Arctic and offshore patrol ships, the Nanisivik naval facility, improved satellite communication platforms, future fighter aircraft, remotely piloted aerial systems, and enhancements to the training and effectiveness of the Canadian Rangers.
But we can, and must, do more. For example, our hold on our Arctic would be much more secure with greater subsurface domain awareness at sea, and with greater capacity to deploy forces from the south strategically and efficiently on land.
Mr. Chair, preserving the security of Canada's Arctic is a significant challenge, a challenge that will only become greater in the decades to come. Given the challenges of developing capabilities and infrastructure to operate in that harsh environment, it will take decades to be ready.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this challenge with you. We look forward to your questions.