National Defence Committee on Nov. 1st, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We'll open the 37th meeting of the defence committee.

We welcome some familiar faces to the committee.

Welcome to the committee, General Pelletier, General Huddleston and Mr. Quinn. All of you are experienced members before this committee. With that, I'm going to ask General Pelletier for his five-minute opening statement, and then we'll go to our rounds of questions.

General Pelletier, please go ahead.

[Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Department of National Defence]

Good morning, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. My name is Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier. I'm the deputy commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, known as NORAD, and we are headquartered at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Joining me today are Major-General Iain Huddleston, commander of 1 Canadian Air Division and of the Canadian NORAD Region, and Jonathan Quinn, director general, continental defence policy, Department of National Defence.

As deputy commander of NORAD, I am the second in command and support the commander of NORAD, U.S. General VanHerck, in the execution of our missions, responsibilities and functions outlined in the NORAD agreement and the NORAD terms of reference.

Formalized in 1958, the NORAD agreement established three primary missions for NORAD in North America: aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning.

In the context of NORAD's mission, “North America” means Alaska, Canada, the continental United States, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, including air defence identification zones, the air approaches, the maritime areas and the maritime approaches.

It is also worth mentioning that NORAD also delivers integrated threat warning and attack assessment for missiles, a mission that spans the entire globe.

The commander of NORAD, or I as the deputy commander in his absence, is responsible to the Government of Canada and to the Government of the United States of America for the execution of our mission.

Subordinate NORAD organizations include the Canadian NORAD region, known as CANR, the continental U.S. NORAD region, known as CONR, and the Alaska NORAD region, known as ANR, all led by their respective region commanders with embedded U.S. and Canadian Forces members alike.

NORAD has a history of evolution that has ensured the command is positioned to effectively respond to changes in the security environment and technological advances. Over its history, the threat to North America has evolved from a northern approach long-range aviation to now a 360-degree threat, and from all domains.

For the first time in our collective history of binational defence, we now have two strategic competitors, Russia and China, both with nuclear weapons, and a third actor in North Korea.

With ongoing climate change, Russia, China and other states are increasingly interested in the Arctic. As time goes on, the Arctic is becoming an interconnected and increasingly globalized region, as well as a source of contention.

From a NORAD perspective, the concern is that the Arctic is the closest path to attack North America. Our adversaries have already modernized their Arctic infrastructure, deployed new coastal and maritime defence missile systems, upgraded their maritime forces and increased military exercise and training operations, with new command organizations dedicated to the Arctic.

To effectively execute our assigned NORAD mission, we must outpace our global competitors, deter our adversaries, deny and defeat threats through all-domain awareness, information dominance and decision superiority, and be globally integrated with our allies.

In June, the Minister of National Defence announced funding for Canada’s continental defence capabilities, namely for the modernization of NORAD.

NORAD modernization will contribute to the defence of North America and help address evolving missile threats and maritime warning challenges, consistent with the NORAD agreement, helping to ensure our continent is a secure base to project power and be engaged abroad.

NORAD headquarters is working closely with National Defence headquarters and the Pentagon to synchronize and coordinate NORAD modernization from a project/acquisition perspective.

As threats continue to rapidly evolve and the Arctic becomes increasingly accessible, it is important for both countries to field critical capabilities, as soon as possible, that will enhance our domain awareness, enable persistent operations and provide national decision-makers adequate time to make key decisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to address this committee.

We look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, General Pelletier.

With that, we'll commence our six-minute round.

Mrs. Gallant, you have six minutes, please.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

To the generals, since February 2022, what number of times has NORAD had to scramble jets due to Russian or Chinese incursions in the Arctic?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

We don't talk about a specific number of activities, given the fact that some of them are reactions or actions against.... The activities vary, but I can say that the number has increased. In 2022, we've seen one of the largest numbers since the reduction in Russian activities in the north. That's probably since 2014, as I mentioned.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

The U.S. does report on their incursions. You're saying the tempo has increased, then.

Do countries check in with Canada, the U.S. or NORAD in advance of their intention to be in Canadian Arctic waters, be it air or below the water surface?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

The country would not report their activities if they're intending to actually operate in the Arctic, either below the surface or above the surface. Quite often we depend on our threat warning and attack assessments, our detection systems and capabilities in the air and the maritime environment, to be able to actually detect any encroachment of our air defence identification zone or below the water surface.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Does that include traversing through the Northwest Passage?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I'm not an expert with regard to the Northwest Passage. I believe that countries are expected to actually report transiting through the Northwest Passage proper, but that's a system I'm not familiar with.

Maybe Mr. Quinn would be able to answer that.

[Jonathan Quinn, Director General, Continental Defence Policy, Department of National Defence]

Just very quickly, if the question is specific to underwater incursions, then I would say no. The idea there is specifically for stealth. We wouldn't necessarily expect to receive a request if it's coming from a non-allied country or competitor.

Thank you.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

Have foreign drones been detected in the air or subsurface waters in the Canadian Arctic?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Major-General Huddleston, would you like to answer the question for the Canadian NORAD region?

[Major-General Iain Huddleston, Commander, Canadian NORAD Region, Canadian Armed Forces, Department of National Defence]

Certainly, sir.

To my understanding, no foreign drones have been detected in the Arctic airspace. We haven't detected any undersurface drones, either. I believe that was the second part of the question.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

In the absence of hangarage in Inuvik, Canada's air-to-air refuelling response is non-existent. If the U.S. air-to-air refuellers are needed to refuel U.S. aircraft, to what extent will Canada be able to add to the response equation?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

First of all, we do have a limited air-to-air refuelling capability that we've employed over the years. Canada and the Royal Canadian Air Force have been providing both our tactical tankers, the C-130H tanker as well as the Airbus, which has a multi-role platform as well, to support our operations on a non-persistent basis. For the regular response, we actually rely on tankers provided by the U.S. Air Force.

However, I can tell you that, as part of the NORAD modernization package approved in June of this year, there will be an enhancement to the strategic air-to-air refuelling capabilities of the Royal Canadian Air Force that will enable greater participation and support of our activity. It's going to increase not only our response posture but also our reach in the very wide area of the Canadian Arctic.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

When do you anticipate our North Warning System will be adequate to detect threats we see emanating from Russia, China, or North Korea?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

First of all, the North Warning System, as is, is very limited in its ability to actually detect the current threat represented by Russia right now, and China in the future—especially given that the threat from China may be coming from the west coast, and the North Warning System is geared towards a threat coming from the Arctic, which is what it was designed for back in the early 1980s.

We're talking about modernization of the layered sensor systems, and that includes the arrival of over-the-horizon radar, which are not going to be co-located with the current North Warning System, but will be optimized in order to actually provide North America, i.e., Canada and the U.S. specifically, with a long-range detection of air and space threats. That is expected to be available in the later part of this decade.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Robillard. You have six minutes.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

How will the recently announced investments in NORAD improve the Canadian Armed Forces' operating capability in the north?

As well, can you tell us more about the types of infrastructure investments that are planned, including for forward operating locations?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thank you for your question.

I'm going to ask Mr. Quinn to answer first, and then I'll take over.

[Jonathan Quinn]

I'd like to thank the honourable member for his question.

As the member indicated, infrastructure investments will be a big part of the NORAD modernization effort. The intention is to upgrade northern Canadian Armed Forces installations in Yellowknife, Inuvik, Iqaluit, and Goose Bay by modernizing the infrastructure to accommodate the arrival of the future fighter aircraft and also different types of aircraft to expand the types of operations that can be conducted out of those important locations.

As well, further south the NORAD modernization plan also includes new investments to enhance fighter aircraft infrastructure across the country, and also quick reaction and alert infrastructure and fighter training infrastructure as well. Lots of investments are funded and under way, but it will be a long-term, multi-year effort to get all of those infrastructure investments implemented and improvements on the ground.

Thank you.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I'd like to add to what Mr. Quinn said, if I may.

Once the over-the-horizon radar mentioned earlier is in place, it will provide defence in depth for the Arctic area, namely thanks to the approaches at 1000 hours and 1400 hours, that is, towards Alaska and Greenland. This will provide a better understanding of what enters our area of interest.

Enhancements will also be made to the command, control and communications system to make our operations more resilient, so we can not just operate aircraft but also retrieve the information they can pick up.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Tens of billions of dollars have been allocated to NORAD modernization, including major infrastructure investments in the north. How, then, will the government work with northern and indigenous communities to make sure they benefit from those investments and have an adequate role in the decision-making process?

[Jonathan Quinn]

Thank you for your question.

I'll start, and then, Lieutenant-General Pelletier may have something to add.

We have conducted some initial consultations with indigenous and northern communities to get a better handle on community needs and to identify areas where National Defence investments can assist and provide dual-use benefits for those communities.

I mentioned some of the specific infrastructure projects. As those projects move into the implementation phase and we start doing site assessments and that sort of thing, we'll continue those consultations and move into much more in-depth targeted interactions with local communities, again, to maximize opportunities for our mutual benefit. As we all know, northern communities have many of the same challenges that the Canadian Armed Forces have in operating and existing in those high latitudes. There are certainly lots of opportunities from an infrastructure perspective, technology perspective and so on.

I would mention as well that as we look at fielding capability, much in the same way as with the recently signed contract for the sustaining maintenance of the current North Warning System, there will be lots of opportunities for indigenous companies and communities to benefit economically as well. That maintenance contract was given to an Inuit-owned organization, and certainly we envision more opportunities along those lines as we move forward with the NORAD modernization plan.

I'm not sure if General Pelletier may have something more to add.

Thank you.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I have just two things to add to what Mr. Quinn said.

Clearly, consultations are important in the process to modernize NORAD. We need to make sure that our current and future activities support each of those communities in a complementary way. That's something that's important to us, because as the work advances and since the facilities will more than likely be used on a more frequent basis, we want to make sure we don't infringe on the resources local communities need to survive the severe Arctic winters.

I should also mention that that isn't unique to the Canadian NORAD region. Alaska, which has its own nations—