Evidence of meeting #37 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
12:20 p.m.
Liberal
Bryan May Liberal Cambridge, ON
That's excellent.
This question is for Professor Fergusson. In light of growing tensions between NATO and Russia, is Canada doing enough in terms of allied military exercises in the Canadian Arctic? What are the pros and cons of potentially expanding allied exercises in the Arctic?
12:20 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
The pro side is that it enables us to integrate, to be interoperable and to have a centralized command and control system to deal with threats to the Arctic.
The con side specifically is that NATO's interest in the Arctic is not Canada's interest in the Arctic. To put it in blunt terms, NATO's interest in the Arctic is that the Arctic and the Arctic approaches down the North Atlantic are the back door to NATO. They're interested in one set of problems emerging for NATO security or European security. We have other interests and other problems related to North America. That's the difficulty.
The second element of the downside of this is that it now creates an image. If you think about the meeting of the Arctic 7, the NATO allies chiefs of staff meeting, this implies that North America and NATO are integrating together and that as a result of this we will use this as an avenue to threaten Russia. It is politically and diplomatically problematic, in my view.
12:20 p.m.
Liberal
Bryan May Liberal Cambridge, ON
Thank you.
In terms of international co-operation on the Arctic, what are the most important steps Canada can take to advance its interests, enhance its Arctic security more broadly and co-operate productively with its allies?
Hopefully, I can get a quick answer from both of you.
12:20 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
The simple answer, in my mind, is to restore the Arctic Council to deal with the non-military side of it and to begin lower-level discussions with Russian military officials, because that is a key issue here, to avoid the miscommunication or misunderstanding that can lead to accidental warfare in the Arctic. Canada and Russia have a common interest to keep the Arctic isolated. If we can do that through what was known in the past as confidence- and security-building measures at the military-to-military level, that will facilitate a more secure Arctic, in my view.
It doesn't mean that we're justifying the Russian invasion of Ukraine at all. That's a different set of issues.
12:20 p.m.
Liberal
12:20 p.m.
Academic, As an Individual
I would look at China. China is building icebreakers. China is looking at the north for resource extraction, from fishing to minerals in the seabed. I think that's more of a long-term threat to Canada and North America than the Russians are at the present.
12:25 p.m.
Liberal
12:25 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much.
Thank you to the two witnesses.
Professor Fergusson, Major-General Huddleston, in the previous panel, said that deterrence capability would be important in the future, because the expectation is that—
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
My apologies. I'm not getting the English translation.
12:25 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
You probably need to change your settings to get the English translation.
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Okay. I think I have it.
12:25 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
I'll repeat the question.
Major-General Huddleston was in the previous panel of witnesses, and he said that deterrence capability would be important for NORAD in the future, because missiles were becoming faster and faster and our ability to intercept and destroy them was becoming more and more limited.
As we speak, how do our potential adversaries view NORAD's capability? Does NORAD come across as being strong? Can NORAD flex its muscle and scare or deter them, or do our current adversaries not really take NORAD seriously?
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I think NORAD is taken seriously. I can't speak to the perceptions of the Russians, but if I look at the world, the answer is that we're not very persuasive at all. We don't have the capacity with the current North Warning System to track cruise missiles. We have a limited capacity with our F-18s, and our future F-35s when we buy them, with look-down radar capabilities to be able to track them and intercept them. That's a limited capability. We don't have the capacity to track hypersonic vehicles.
The answer is that we are vulnerable. The Russians, in terms of thinking about these vulnerabilities, have one big calculation in the back of their minds, which goes back to the Cold War stance of deterrence in North America relative to the Soviet threat, etc. That is, can the Russians be sure that any sort of military use using conventional weapons will not be met with nuclear retaliation? At the backbone of North American defence and security is the nuclear retaliatory capability of the United States. That is the ace in the hand that partially mitigates the concerns of the conventional threat of the missile world, hypersonics and cruise missiles. How credible that is is another important question, and for NORAD, the thinking right now is that it's not very credible.
12:25 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you for such a detailed answer.
I'd like your take on the missile defence shield, ballistic missile defence. In 2005, Canada said that it would not join the system, but we're hearing that Canada may have changed its tune.
If Canada decided to join the system, might the U.S. say it doesn't want the dead weight? Do we have the wherewithal to be a credible partner if we decided to join the ballistic missile defence system?
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
That's the million-dollar question, and it refers to understanding the Canadian policy in terms of what participating means for Canada and what we have to do.
Generally in the threat environment today, which is technologically based—in which the United States is integrating air and missile defence, which includes defence against air-breathing bombers and fighter bombers, cruise missiles and hypersonics all integrated with ballistic missile defence into one—Canadian territory starts to become very important. If the United States, for example, proceeds with their third missile defence site in upstate New York, which hasn't proceeded yet, the value of Canadian territory in terms of tracking battle damage assessment radars goes up significantly.
You can imagine that in the future, if this goes ahead, relative to integration, Canada's participation will be welcomed by the United States because we're going to provide a very valuable piece of territory to them for an effective defence of North America.
It also raises the question of whether we're defended right now anyway. We don't know, and that then raises questions about command and control. If you go back to 2003 or 2004, when we discussed this with the United States, the United States said that Canada could not have a role—nor would NORAD have a role—in command and control, but that may all change.
There are a lot of emerging issues in this. My hunch is that down the road, we will have to be engaged one way or another, but how that co-operation with the United States will work out is the million-dollar question.
12:30 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
You talked about the fact that NORAD is a bilateral agreement. Where do you stand on the possibility of bringing other countries into NORAD, while keeping NATO independent? Is that something worth considering or not?
12:30 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I think it's a really important thing. Remember, it is a binational arrangement, but you have Greenland and Iceland, and, as I mentioned in my opening comments, part of the track now—which didn't exist in the Cold War—because of technology, brings the direct threat down the eastern approaches of the North Atlantic between Greenland and Iceland. Those need to be integrated into our defence system.
Historically, that part of the North American defence component was NATO, but, by and large, it was bilateral between the United States and Greenland and Denmark, with the Thule radar, for example. There were also American relations with Iceland on the defence side, so it was sort of pushed to the side. Because of the integrated nature of this threat environment, I think it's vitally important that Canada and the United States engage Greenland, Denmark and Iceland and begin to integrate a system of systems—we talk about that for the Arctic—for surveillance to make sure they're integrated into North America. As I said, those approaches are the front door to North America but they're the back door to Europe.
12:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Madame Normandin, for those two million-dollar questions. With military inflation, they're more like two billion-dollar questions.
Welcome, Dr. Charron, to the panel. We have a little over 20 minutes left. I'm thinking that we will stay with the questions, unless you have maybe a one- or two-minute statement, and then we can keep on going through our questions.
What would you prefer?
12:30 p.m.
Conservative
Pat Kelly Conservative Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB
The statement can be provided to the committee and then it will get onto the record that way. That will save time.
12:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I think they want to carry on with the questions, and I'm sure that between Dr. Fetterly and you and Dr. Fergusson, you'll sort out something.
Let me just turn it over to Ms. Mathyssen for six minutes, and you'll jump in as you're able. Congratulations on the book.
Ms. Mathyssen, go ahead.
12:30 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Last week, we heard from Dr. Michael Byers. He said specific things, such as that we need to preserve that assured mutual sense of destruction to hold some of our opponents at bay. Certainly, Dr. Fergusson, you touched on that. He also said, though, that Russia will not invade the North American Arctic.
You touched on that a bit today and talked about the confidence and security agreement and working on those relationships. There was certainly a discussion in terms of the fact that, through that resource extraction or additional number of people going through the Arctic, that can be done through policing and through the international agreements and laws we already have in place, and that the idea of Arctic security takes a different role.
Can you talk about that? Can you expand on your opinion on that?
I will open that to Dr. Charron as well.
November 1st, 2022 / 12:35 p.m.
Dr. Andrea Charron Associate Professor, Department of Political Studies, and Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Thanks very much.
I think what you're trying to get at is whether we have the right laws to entice Russia to continue to respect the rules-based international order. Notwithstanding the egregious behaviour in Ukraine, when it comes to the Arctic, they've actually been a very helpful Arctic partner. NORAD, for example, is very quick to note that even when Russia is buzzing our air identification zones, they are remaining in international airspace. We still have the search and rescue agreements. We still have the moratorium on Arctic fishing in the central Arctic Ocean.
What we really want to do is encourage the Arctic states and especially Russia, and by extension observers in the rest of the world, to respect the rules-based international order, to get back to the business of scientific, indigenous, knowledge-based projects that work to mitigate the effects of climate change, to respect the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which to date has been respected, and to return to that more co-operative tone we had pre-2014.
12:35 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I would only add that if you look at the projections about transportation in the Arctic, in the United States, for example, their Coast Guard, the policing arm, is also under title 10 and can be transferred to the Department of Defense—they are military vessels.
I think it's similar in the case of Russia. Along with increased transportation up there, assuming that this all plays itself out as projected, you will have a more military naval presence there. That means you're going to, in the international waters side of the Arctic, depending on how it all opens up, have more likelihood that you're going to have not confrontations but connections or meetings of Russian naval vessels, military vessels, Canadian, American, etc., and Chinese potentially, in the future.
In that context, it's important that when we talk about the rules-based order, the notion to extend this in the ideal...we need to develop common rules that go beyond simply the law of the sea and the way it's been done elsewhere. These were problems during the Cold War. We need to start talking about how to manage this co-operatively because of common interests. That's an issue that has to emerge as one of the confidence-building and security measures that I think are important in the Arctic.