National Defence Committee on Nov. 15th, 2022

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

We don't need to debate. We can have a vote.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Okay.

[An hon. member]

I don't even know what it was.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Does everybody understand? Okay. We don't understand.

Mr. Bezan has moved that the Auditor General be invited to this committee for our study. As I said, the motion is in order. He wishes to have it voted on today, but of course, we may want to debate it.

I see Mr. May's hand.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Can the clerk...? Again, we're going to get into a bit of a rabbit hole here if we debate this too much, and we do have witnesses for a few more minutes here.

I'm wondering if the clerk might be able to share where we're at with this study and the number of meetings we have left. I know we had some discussions about the number of meetings and what kind of timeline we have and when we would potentially fit this in. I know we're losing a meeting on Thursday, so I'm wondering what could be in the realm of possibility for this.

[The Clerk of the Committee, Mr. Andrew Wilson]

Thank you, Mr. May.

I currently have invitations out for the meetings on November 22 and November 24, so next Tuesday and Thursday. This is our sixth meeting on the arctic security study. The work plan that was agreed to by the committee and that was put together by the analysts identified nine meetings. However, some of the witnesses that appeared on that work plan have been unavailable, so should the committee wish to have those witnesses, we would need to add additional meetings.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

I personally don't necessarily disagree with Mr. Bezan's assessment of the motion. I'm wondering if we could move this to committee business to plan this out so that we have an idea of what the timetable looks like.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Bezan, I don't want to take a lot of witness time to do this. Would it be acceptable that we move it to the end of the second hour and deal with it then? Maybe by that time we will have settled our concerns.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I'm good with doing that.

I'll say this, though. The Auditor General is an officer of Parliament. She's written a report that is very relevant to our current study on Arctic surveillance. I think it's important that we have the office attend and describe exactly what they found in their report. They made a couple of recommendations. We have to make sure that those recommendations are being acted upon.

I think it is incumbent upon us as a committee to have her here. The sooner that we can do that, the better. If we need to take another hour or so to determine whether or not we want to vote on this, I'm more than happy to defer it.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I think the sentiment and the principle of your motion, as I'm sensing in the room, is probably acceptable. We're down to mechanics, so let's get down to mechanics in about an hour. Is that all right?

Go ahead, Cheryl.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Chairman, in one of our meetings, I asked the clerk to provide us with a calendar so that we'd know what our work plan is. I haven't received one yet. We could have saved some time if we'd had them. I request that they be prepared for us.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

It's a flexible calendar, shall we say.

Let me finish with the witnesses. We will suspend for a minute or two while we bring in the next panel. Maybe there will be some settling among ourselves.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Didn't I ask for time out before I moved my motion?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You did, but you didn't get it.

With that, Mr. May still has five minutes, if he wishes to use his five minutes right now.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, thank you, Mr. Hamilton and your team, for being here today.

Earlier last month, the United States released a national strategy for the Arctic region. It focuses on four pillars: security, the environment, sustainable economic development and international governance. In response to the new strategy, the Arctic Institute's founder and senior fellow, Malte Humpert, stated:

The new U.S. national strategy for the Arctic suggests that rising geopolitical tension resulting from the war in Ukraine will spell an end to Arctic exceptionalism. The region is likely to see less international cooperation and expanded military activity, by Russia, China, the US and its NATO allies, in the coming years.

In your opinion, how has Russia's illegal invasion influenced the U.S. Arctic strategy? What implications do you see this having for Canada?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, it's an excellent question.

The U.S. strategy is something that we looked at very carefully. I would suggest that from where we stand now, understanding the geopolitics of today, we would certainly agree with the sentiments that are put forward that, because of greater geopolitical competition globally, one can't help but think there will be an impact on the Arctic.

That said, all of the Arctic states, minus one, are exceptional allies and are very co-operative in nature in terms of the security of the circumpolar region. That one exception is, of course, Russia. I think it's undeniable that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has influenced the U.S. assessment, as it has influenced our own assessment.

That said, the future of the geopolitics of the Arctic is very long term. Vladimir Putin is not going to be president of Russia forever. One could imagine a day when we become co-operative with Russia again. That day is not soon, but it requires diplomacy. It requires coordination among Canada and the other Arctic allies to hold Russia to account, but also to create a space where co-operation can be reborn. That is not going to happen in the near term.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

As stated in the Arctic and northern policy framework, the Canadian north is warming at about three times the global average rate, which is affecting land, biodiversity, cultures and traditions. The framework states that while this presents possible opportunities, it also brings increased safety and security challenges. What are those safety and security challenges? How is climate change impacting security dynamics?

In addition, can you elaborate on how the Government of Canada is addressing the issue of climate change with the Canadian north?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have less than a minute and a half.

[Kevin Hamilton]

It's happening in a great many ways, but I won't get into them because they're not my areas of expertise.

I would point out the forthcoming NATO climate change and security centre of excellence that Canada will host in Montreal, and we anticipate that it will be operational by next year. That centre will elaborate NATO doctrine as it pertains to how climate change affects security. One large aspect of their studies will be on the Arctic and how the changing environment is, as you say, creating opportunities but also creating new challenges, so there will be more doctrine to follow under this Canadian initiative.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. May.

On behalf of the committee, I want to thank all three witnesses.

Mr. Hamilton, you're becoming a frequent flyer before this committee, and we appreciate it. We appreciate Ms. Kutz and Mr. Randall as well.

Thank you for the way in which you presented yourselves and how you informed our study.

With that, we're going to suspend and bring in the next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

The meeting is back in order.

We have, for our next hour, Mr. Clint Davis, president and chief executive officer of Nunasi Corporation; and Mr. Les Klapatiuk from International Logistical Support Inc., from somewhere; we're not quite sure where.

Mr. Davis, you're present, so you have five minutes.

Colleagues, I'm looking at the clock and I'm mindful that we have a couple of motions at the end, so I'm going to have to cut back everybody's time. I'm not sure by how much, but be forewarned.

Mr. Davis, we're not going to cut back your time. You have five minutes, please.

[Clint Davis, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nunasi Corporation]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. It's an honour to be here to have a conversation about a topic as important as Arctic security.

Nunasi is a Nunavut Inuit birthright corporation owned by two regional Inuit associations, QIA and Kivalliq Inuit Association, and one regional Inuit development corporation. The structure ultimately means that Nunasi is owned by all of the beneficiaries under the Nunavut Agreement.

It actually has a very interesting story. It's the oldest Inuit development corporation in the country. It was started in 1976 by the Inuit Tapiriit of Canada, now known as ITK, and it was done in a way to ensure that Inuit had an opportunity to participate economically in anticipation of the resolution of Inuit land claims. It was involved in a variety of different business activities at the time, from mining to airlines, hotels and hospitality. Today it's focused on four areas: health services, energy, infrastructure with transportation, and national defence.

Nunasi is a shareholder of Nasittuq, which is the majority Inuit-owned corporation that is currently operating and maintaining the North Warning System under a seven-year contract. That contract was actually awarded at the end of January of this year.

The second shareholder of Nasittuq is the Pan Arctic Inuit Logistics Company. This company represents the six Inuit development corporations located all the way from the Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the Northwest Territories, across Nunavik in northern Quebec, to Nunatsiavut in Labrador, where I'm from.

The third shareholder of Nasittuq is ATCO Frontec, which is a subsidiary of ATCO Ltd., with an extensive history of working in the north and partnering with the Inuit.

As many of you know, the North Warning System is a chain of radar sites and support facilities that forms part of Canada's NORAD agreement with the United States. It was established in 1985 to detect and allow for an early response to potential threats entering the North American airspace. The federal contract requires the maintenance of 47 remote sites in the Canadian Arctic, in addition to three facilities in Ontario. This is the second time that Nasittuq actually will be managing this military infrastructure. The first was from 2001 to 2014. Needless to say, we were very happy to learn that we actually secured that contract once again.

In early October of this year, Nasittuq was also awarded the eight-year contract to provide operations and maintenance services and support at CFS Alert on Ellesmere Island, Nunavut. Nasittuq was the incumbent contract-holder and has provided services at CFS Alert since 2012.

I'm here to say that Canada's plans for policy development and investment in Arctic security must include the Inuit.

First of all, according to the Inuit business leader Harry Flaherty, we are the eyes and ears of the country in the north. The Arctic region that we're talking about encompasses a massive amount of land referred to as Inuit Nunangat, or the Inuit homeland. It makes up 35% of Canada's land mass and 50% of its entire coastline. There are 53 communities within Inuit Nunangat, with a population of over 56,000 people, of which 47,000 are Inuit. Inuit have lived there for 5,000 years, and our uninterrupted presence substantiates any Canadian claim of sovereignty over the Arctic.

Second, Inuit business and development corporations have grown in financial capacity and business acumen over the last 10 years. We're very good business partners, and our experience should be drawn upon throughout the various stages of planning for domestic security.

Third, the federal priorities of reconciliation and national security can support each other when it comes to the Arctic. Inuit development corporations are ready to work with the military and other federal departments to develop plans that will meet security needs, while respecting the sovereignty, rights, and way of life of our communities. This approach recognizes the obligations under Inuit land claims agreements and supports the federal government's commitment to economic reconciliation.

Finally, the goals of Arctic security can only be reached through well-planned investments in local infrastructure. It should not be a surprise that infrastructure in Nunavut, and in fact all across Inuit Nunangat, is in some cases non-existent as compared to the communities in the south. Reliable services that many take for granted, such as clean water, reliable power and consistent Internet connectivity simply do not exist at the acceptable level that we see here in the south.

Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, which is the territorial Inuit political body, released the report entitled “Nunavut's Infrastructure Gap” in October 2020. It was the first of its kind, and it showed that Nunavut's infrastructure is commonly inadequate, in poor repair or altogether absent when compared to the Canadian baseline. This situation has to change.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Davis. That was nicely under five minutes.

Mr. Klapatiuk, you have five minutes, please.

[Les Klapatiuk, International Logistical Support Inc.]

Mr. Chair, thank you very much.

Members of Parliament, Inuvik is the most active NORAD base in Canada.

I speak to you from the same ramp and hangar from which the CC-130 tactical air-to-air refueller operated 439 times, and ILS supported the RCAF and the United States Air Force an additional 600 times over 16 years. The “green hangar”—as we're commonly called—on the Inuvik airport is the only infrastructure of its kind in Canada's western Arctic, north of the Arctic Circle and on the Arctic Ocean, yet a division of DND Real Property Operations removed us from the “here and now” and the leading edge of North American defence.

This is the same property that Innovation, Science and Economic Development on August 25 of this year stated was critical to North American defence, but DND will not lease, contract or buy it to support NORAD. It is the same property for which, on September 12 and 13 of this year, two United States military attachés visited and spoke with me about a possible purchase. This is now country to country and actively being pursued.

In testifying before the House of Commons committee, General Pelletier—I believe it was on November 1—did not mention this. I was advised that everyone in Ottawa, Washington and NORAD knows of what's transpiring, as do the British and NATO.

“Trust, but verify.” You as a committee are operating at a complete disadvantage. You have to trust what you are being told, but how do you verify? All of my statements and charts can be verified through open-source information, ILS records, invoices, photographs and notes or emails with individuals.

The gist of the matter is I cannot answer why Real Property Operations, during a time of nuclear crisis, refuses to support NORAD by providing the only available hangarage in 40% of Canada's land mass.

Real Property Operations will not support our air-to-air refueller crews, who have intercepted Russian bombers from the ILS hangar.

Real Property Operations is forcing the RCAF and NORAD to conduct snowbank operations in Arctic conditions without any security for the airplanes.

In October, 2021, a lieutenant colonel in Real Property Operations ordered his staff to develop a new contract for ILS. They refused. Why?

Real Property Operations gave away NORAD's strategic fuel supply of approximately 270,000 litres on the Inuvik FOL, the forward operating location, and had four 75,000-litre tanks destroyed. Fuel availability throughout the Arctic is and remains critical to all RCAF and NORAD operations.

On June 11, 2021, a NORAD general and a Canadian general asked me about the state of contract negotiations between Real Property Operations and myself. When I replied that there were none, there was puzzlement and betrayal. NORAD made their needs known. Real Property Operations and Canada have ignored them and our common defence.

Real Property Operations started this attempt to destroy ILS in 2015. They have persisted ever since, but at what expense to our country and harm to our relationships with our allies, including NORAD and NATO?

We appear to be at a state of overlapping, cascading failures, where a decision has ramifications several times removed. By that, I mean that Canada's termination of ILS is an infrastructure retreat that impacts NORAD, our defence, and search and rescue. Each of these has further ramifications. Unaccountable bureaucratic decisions have impacted air-to-air refuelling, search and rescue, and fuel, each with downstream effects. We can remedy this.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.