National Defence Committee on Nov. 29th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order.

We have our witnesses here for the first hour.

You'll notice, colleagues, that our real clerk is virtual and our virtual clerk is real. Apparently, our clerk's teeth don't always agree with him. He is in recovery mode as we speak.

With that, I will ask our two witnesses—Ms. Madeleine Redfern, chief operating officer of CanArctic Inuit Networks, and Dr. Jessica Shadian, president and chief executive officer of Arctic360—to speak for five minutes each. After that, we will open it up to questions.

Maybe I'll ask Madeleine Redfern to go for the first five minutes, and after that we'll go to Ms. Shadian, if that's all right with both of you.

With that, Ms. Redfern, you have five minutes, please, for your opening statement.

[Madeleine Redfern, Chief Operating Officer, CanArctic Inuit Networks Inc., As an Individual]

Thank you so much.

I'm coming to you from Iqaluit, Nunavut. I'm sorry I wasn't able to attend in person. We had a blizzard yesterday.

CanArctic Inuit Networks is an Inuit-owned and Inuit-led company based here in Iqaluit. The goal of our company is to build 4,500 kilometres of subsea fibre optic cable through Canada's Arctic, from Labrador to Inuvik. Basically, the route is up along the coast of Labrador, Baffin Island, through the high Arctic and into the Northwest Passage. The plan is to build out networks that will connect Inuit communities in all four regions of Inuit Nunangat, including industrial/military installations.

The cable will have multi-purpose infrastructure. It will allow for strategic parts of the route to be SMART cable, which stands for “science monitoring and reliable telecommunications”. There is currently a serious lack of Arctic marine environmental data, a lack of seabed mapping, and effectively very little to no marine baseline information on everything from temperatures to salinity and currents. Of course, the change in climate is significant.

The SMART cable can help develop that baseline data and begin to monitor climate change in real time. Both the U.S. and Canadian military want and need the same infrastructure as our northern communities: telecommunications, energy and transportation, everything from good connectivity—that is reliable, stable, high-throughput, fast and affordable—to ports and runways. We need infrastructure solutions.

Satellite can provide aerial and surface data, but it is limited in being able to provide data on what's happening in the marine environment. DISA, the Defense Information Systems Agency, is relying more and more on fibre. Fibre and satellite are integrated technologies, but fibre is needed to move large continuous data, especially for all-domain awareness. We know we're going to need to be able to analyze large datasets primarily through artificial intelligence.

Recently, Canada awarded a NORAD contract to Nasittuq, a majority Inuit-owned company, and both the United States and Canada have committed to NORAD modernization, especially since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, there is a growing risk and threat from China, especially as China has its sights on the Arctic and has begun serious plans for ice class ships, submarines and underwater drones.

Our allies, including other Arctic nations plus NATO, recognize that continental defence must include all-domain awareness. The marine environment is where we have the least capabilities and the necessity for under-ice persistence.

SednaLink has the support of the Inuit organizations, Inuit development corporations, chambers of commerce and northern and Inuit businesses.

CanArctic can save the Government of Nunavut $209 million by having the Inuit private sector build, own and manage the fibre optic cable, $209 million the Nunavut communities desperately need for other infrastructure, including schools, health centres, municipal water systems and municipal garages for water and sewage trucks and plows.

Despite the fact that SednaLink is the perfect project to be funded under the Canada Infrastructure Bank's indigenous funding program and ISED's universal broadband fund, the UBF does not support telecommunications redundancy or even favour the Inuit private sector.

The cheapest Internet can be provided by SednaLink because we plan to use the utility-based model. Customer rates are based on covering the base O and M. Any additional profits can lower the cost to customers, and money can be set aside to expand the subsea fibre networks in phases 2 to 4.

SednaLink has been independently reviewed by two international companies specializing in subsea fibre projects, which have deemed SednaLink viable and have recommended to Inuit organizations and Inuit development corporations to invest in it.

SednaLink, with the SMART cable, also has the opportunity to develop real Inuit capacity in telecommunications, develop a blue economy and monitor climate change, and we can do this better, faster and cheaper than the government can.

When we say northerners must be part of the solution, that includes Inuit businesses.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Dr. Shadian, go ahead, please.

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian, President and Chief Executive Officer, Arctic360]

Thank you, everyone, for having me here today.

Security takes several forms. There's hard security, achieved with missiles, ships, words of aggression, etc. Then there's security that's achieved through soft power diplomacy, or the power of persuasion. Soft power diplomacy turns into hard power via multilateral institutions, joint agreements, etc.

I'm here today to represent Arctic360, Canada's premier Arctic think tank. While we say that Arctic sovereignty and security begins at home, because it does, it is also interdependent of regional Arctic security, and within this Canada's role and influence in the region.

What is the role, then, of think tanks in all of this? According to the European Policy Centre, think tanks impact policy-making through public events, publications and media presence, as well as through such informal levers as closed-door working groups, round tables and convening spaces for backroom diplomacy. They therefore are important for promoting and even safeguarding values and interests in the global arena. They connect different policy areas, thus breaking down silos and group thinking. In effect, think tanks are a crucial component of the soft power landscape.

Arctic360 is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with a majority indigenous-led leadership team. Our mission is to elevate the national conversation about Canada's north and the Arctic region at home and to provide an inclusive and coordinated platform for Canada to engage in Arctic discussions around the world.

Our six themes all consider the intersection between Arctic security at home in the north and on the world stage. I'm just going to touch on several of them.

The first is infrastructure, as we just heard. The national security risks of Canada's Arctic infrastructure deficit are well known. I personally have testified on this topic numerous times. Canada's Arctic security relies on keeping unwanted investments at bay and having the mechanisms to attract the kinds of investments it would like to have. We've learned that investors need the strategic big picture, including an inventory of existing infrastructure, the range of proposed projects, their business cases, etc.

I and Madeleine Redfern, who happens to be the executive director of our northern branch, and our partners at the Wilson Center have spent four years, to no avail, trying to convince Canada to support our efforts to deliver the information that investors want and need. Today the Wilson Center's Polar Institute is actually going at it alone. They are building an inventory of the infrastructure investment potential for Canada's north. Subsequently, the United States is projecting on the global stage the state of critical infrastructure in Canada's north, what should be built and the security risks posed by the existing deficit. Their security message is being heard, from USAID to the Pentagon. Canada needs to do its own policy-facing research to accurately convey to the world its interest and its plans to build infrastructure in the region.

Another theme is diplomacy and geopolitics. Beyond convening conference sessions around the world, we also bring this discussion home through our annual conference to discuss the most pressing Arctic issues with our circumpolar allies. The conference is an invaluable platform for Canada to speak to the world from its own stage. Last year's conference took place less than two weeks after Russia's invasion. The session of Arctic nation ambassadors to Canada was set to basically share the stage with Russia. Arctic360 became a means for Arctic states to communicate at that time unofficially, to ask questions and to find a consensus on how to proceed with an international conversation about Arctic co-operation 10 days into Russia's invasion. Seamlessly, Arctic360 became an important venue for track two diplomacy and consensus building here at home in Canada.

The next theme is critical minerals. The world is looking forward to Canada's coming critical minerals strategy. The north will play a vital role. The national security risk in Canada's Arctic should not be underestimated, yet neither should the opportunity it creates for Canada's soft power diplomacy.

The next theme is Greenland-Canada relations and the North American Arctic. Through our activities, we focus on the importance of a proactive Canada in strengthening Canada-Greenland and North American Arctic co-operation. Without assertive soft power diplomacy, Canada undermines its position and power in the region and its ability to act in its own national interest. A lack of formal diplomacy also undermines Canada's position in the region. We see this happening in Greenland. Soft power diplomacy and formal diplomacy are both necessary for regional leadership and fostering co-operation in Canada's national interest.

In sum, it's not a coincidence that from the inception of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute six years ago, the U.S. has gone from being, I would say, a disengaged Arctic state to directly impacting circumpolar Arctic issues towards its own national interests. Canada takes pride in its active role in multilateral institution building and as a convenor. Soft power diplomacy enabled by think tanks is a crucial step towards formal diplomacy and thus national security.

We are the only Arctic nation with an Arctic think tank that does not have dedicated government support to carry out activities that are in Canada’s national interests in the Arctic. A secure Canadian Arctic is helped by the soft diplomacy mechanisms that think tanks provide to ensure that we do not have to use missiles or fighter jets to defend our north.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. Shadian.

We'll now move to our six-minute round.

We have Mrs. Gallant for six minutes, please.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

With respect to the Chinese Communist Party, their investments in technology complement their defence capabilities. Which technological investments would help the north with our surveillance and intelligence strategy in the north?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Whom are you directing that question to?

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

That would be to either one, probably Ms. Redfern.

[Madeleine Redfern]

We know that telecommunications are absolutely vital in being able to provide the necessary communications that the military and our communities require. The SMART cable component, which has sensors on the cable, would be able to, as I said earlier, collect the baseline data, as well as real-time data with respect to climate change but also, more in this context, any sort of incursions that are happening underwater, whether that is submarines or unmanned drones.

The other thing that's absolutely needed and necessary, and why fibre is good with data centres, is being able to process the sheer volume of data through artificial intelligence. We're seeing that type of infrastructure and support being provided in Alaska, as well as in the Nordic countries.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Would you kindly share with the committee any instances you're aware of with respect to the interest in our north by the Chinese government?

That would be for all of the witnesses.

[Madeleine Redfern]

We've seen Shandong, which was a Chinese company, try to acquire TMAC Resources, which was a mine situated in the Kitikmeot region. They're definitely interested in any critical minerals.

Also, there was an attempt by Huawei to provide their technical solutions for connecting 70 of our northern communities. Most of the Five Eyes are now aware that Chinese telecommunication hardware is also software, and it is very concerning and problematic to see Chinese telecommunications infrastructure being provided to Canada's north. It is a massive—not only personal but regional and national—security risk.

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

To follow up with a few pieces, I will piggyback on Madeleine's comment.

I do believe that telecoms are one of the most pivotal concerns of interest for Canada in building our own telecommunication networks. We need to be able to collect and also control the data that a company has, and we are heading towards an era when all infrastructure has become smart infrastructure and, of course, all types of data are being accumulated that way and we need to be able to have control over that data.

I will say, in terms of Chinese interest, that the Shandong-TMAC mine was, of course, one clear example, but I think what's well known and what we can all agree on is that China is very interested in not just buying Canada's critical minerals but buying the mines themselves so they can produce and create supply chains back to Beijing.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

Ms. Redfern, what are the current gaps in infrastructure in the north that are directly due to energy? Please give us your thoughts. Most of all, I'm interested in a small modular reactor as a possible solution to the energy needs.

[Madeleine Redfern]

I happen to be the special adviser to the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories, as well as to the Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation, which is working on the smaller, five-megawatt SMRs. I'm also a member of the national advisory council on SMRs.

Without a doubt, of the 177 indigenous communities that are currently diesel-dependent in this country, there are a number of those communities, like Iqaluit, for which an SMR could be a solution. Hydro, solar, wind and geothermal may be options, depending on the geography. Iqaluit is currently looking at hydro, but we're also doing an SMR feasibility study for Iqaluit, as well as for the Kivalliq region. It can provide the full base power solution, whereas solar and wind right now are only capable of offsetting a small amount.

It is also possible to integrate SMRs with other energy solutions like hydro and/or solar, especially since you want to have some backup when the SMRs have to go down for some maintenance. It's definitely something that both the NRC and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories are absolutely reviewing as solutions for northern, indigenous and remote Canada.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

How receptive are the communities in the Arctic to SMRs, and what can we do to further promote this and enlighten them on SMRs and how beneficial they can be?

[Madeleine Redfern]

We had some consultations and information sessions done by NRC when I was mayor for the City of Iqaluit as well as president of the Nunavut Association of Municipalities. What I can tell you is that the mayors and the community members were at least open and receptive to learning more about this technology as a possible solution.

The recommendation coming from the community representatives was that this industry needs to engage with us early, frequently and honestly, and we're very interested in information for doing comparative analysis. That's why the indigenous advisory council for SMRs wants to ensure that we are able to provide all our indigenous communities really good information on all the energy solutions as well as the comparative analysis so that communities can have informed discussions and make informed decisions—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, we'll have to leave the answer there. Thank you.

Ms. O'Connell, you have six minutes, please.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you both for being here.

I'm going to start with Ms. Redfern.

Following up on your comment, I think you said that Inuit business must be part of the solution, or something like that. I tried to write it down. We've heard from CAF or Defence witnesses about the partnerships in the north, and they also find it incredibly helpful.

I'm curious if perhaps you could elaborate on some of those indigenous-led partnerships that could not only help with the security of the north but also with the development of the north for residents living there, that dual purpose. Are there perhaps indigenous-led organizations that we haven't thought about yet or perhaps we haven't heard about that could help with some of these gaps?

[Madeleine Redfern]

Nasittuq, which is a partnership with ATCO, has secured a NORAD contract. There's also work under way to identify NORAD modernization infrastructure opportunities. Telecommunications and the SMART cable are, without a doubt, something that Nasittuq is fully aware of, and the ability to move the current work on the research that is being done, such as the partnership with Canada and the United Kingdom, CINUK, which just launched their website yesterday.

We know that we're going to need, for the SMART cable, sensors that also require significant maintenance. There is an Arctic company, an Inuit-owned company here in Iqaluit, called Arctic UAV, so there's an opportunity to train and develop the necessary skill set for Inuit to be part of that digital and blue economy, but it requires us to make much smarter and more strategic investments for that dual purpose to allow us in the north to be part of that and not just to see international or southern-based companies doing this on our behalf with little to no involvement.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

You spoke about the Canada Infrastructure Bank and different broadband funding opportunities, but then you said—and I want to make sure I heard you correctly—that it's not built for redundancies. Could you speak to the redundancy that's needed and how we can make those programs better to take into account the very unique nature of northern broadband needs or telecommunication needs? I want to make sure I heard correctly.

Can you elaborate on that?

[Madeleine Redfern]

You did hear correctly.

ISED's universal broadband fund does not support telecommunications redundancy, including in northern remote Canada, which is extremely concerning and problematic. When Telesat effectively goes down due to weather issues or because of fibre optic lines in northern British Columbia, Yukon or NWT and is cut off, we lose telecommunication services right across the Arctic. That can even include the RCMP informing our community members that, if we need their services, we have to physically go to their detachment.

Imagine, in a domestic violence situation, that a child has broken their arm or there's a fire. It is absolutely that vulnerable, and lives are at stake. We need redundancy in the part of the region that is incredibly vulnerable. We also want redundancy for the purposes of military defence. They need real-time data under all-domain awareness, and, when and if there is a failure in one of the networks, you want a seamless transition to another redundant network so that you never lose telecommunication.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

How much time do I have?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have one and a half minutes.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Okay, thank you.

Ms. Shadian, I want to speak to you about your testimony around the planning for infrastructure. I know that you were limited in time in your opening, but I'm curious if you have thoughts or comments that you can add on dealing with climate change, in addition to the planning for national security purposes. Obviously, the north, and the Arctic in particular, is going to feel the effects of climate change.

Do you have any comments on the need for resiliency in that planning?

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

A big part of what we're working on is trying to create the mechanisms for Canada to create a long-term infrastructure strategy. We submitted a large proposal to the CIB, and we were perfect candidates for that because it was exactly to do with local communities and building up infrastructure there.

Of course, what we're focused on is this piece of multi-purpose, multi-user infrastructure. We want to understand what the long-term goals are and what we need to build. It's a codeveloped process, so we need to understand. First things first, we don't even have an inventory of what we have or the state of those assets that we do have in and of themselves.

We need a vision, so we need to have a sense of where we want to go and where Canada hopes to see itself in 2050 in terms of the infrastructure there. As part of that project plan, we intended to work with folks from the smart cities challenge and the construction engineers to talk about 2050. What kind of infrastructure do we need to build, and how do those supply and trade chains look in 2050 to bring in new technologies, SMRs—