Certainly.
The Ukrainians are having to fire approximately 90,000 to 140,000 rounds of 155-millimetre ammunition per month. The United States previously was able to produce fewer than 20,000 rounds per month. It is looking to significantly increase that capacity. However, by the end of the year, in public reporting, we're still looking at a capacity of around 40,000 rounds per month. In the U.K., in public reporting, the entire national stockpile of 155-millimetre ammunition prior to this conflict was lower than 44,000 rounds, and our ability to manufacture 155-millimetre ammunition is at the rate of about 5,000 rounds per year. There are plans to push that to 40,000 rounds per year, but as you can see—and I could go country by country—when you add them up, the entire alliance's capacity is not meeting the requirement for monthly consumption rates of ammunition.
My experience with this conflict is that if you do not have firepower, you cannot manoeuvre. You will be fixed in place and you'll be destroyed. A lack of firepower is a recipe for very high casualties and a sure path to defeat. Therefore, it is very important we generate that industrial capacity.
The fact the United States does have significant stockpiles in reserve means that we do have time to resolve this issue, but it is a complicated problem, because you need to expand production of explosive energetics; you need to expand the ability to cast shells and produce primers; and then you need to be able to handle those explosive energetics and have the facilities to be able to fill those shells and cool the explosive energetics in them. That means that government departments that deal with planning permission, for example, are critical if this is to happen quickly.
There are international supply chain challenges. There are also regulatory challenges that ministries of defence cannot solve by themselves. It's really important that the alliance co-operate to close that gap.