National Defence Committee on Sept. 21st, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order.

I want to welcome our witnesses to the 69th meeting of the defence committee. All three of our witnesses have appeared at previous meetings. Major-General Prévost was so excited about last Tuesday that he thought he'd come again today.

With that, I will ask Major-General Smith to make an opening five-minute statement. Then we'll turn to our colleagues for questions.

Major-General Smith, please go ahead.

[Major-General Greg Smith, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, we are honoured to once again appear before you. As stated, I'm Major-General Greg Smith, the director general of international security policy. With me is someone who needs no introduction, Major-General Paul Prévost, director of staff for the strategic joint staff here at DND and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Thank you for this opportunity to support the committee’s discussion of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and to provide an overview of the progress made by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in the implementation of our initiatives.

You will recall from my previous appearance at this committee that, among the five interconnected pillars of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are primarily focused on the Peace, Resilience and Security pillar. But we also have an important supporting role in the Active and Engaged Partner pillar.

It is important to remember that prior to the release of the Indo-Pacific strategy, Canada already had a significant regional presence, including a commitment of over 70 years to the United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea, regular ship and aircraft deployments in support of forward presence operations and sanctions monitoring, participation in major regional exercises, and capacity-building activities through our military training co-operation program.

Through new and significant investments announced under the Indo-Pacific strategy, the defence team has moved forward to broaden and deepen its presence in the region for years to come and position Canada as a positive contributor to peace and stability in the region.

In fact, we have aggressively leaned forward on our five lines of effort to help implement the strategy. So far, the Canadian Armed Forces has augmented Canada's naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, moving from two to three warships per year. Earlier this year, His Majesty's Canadian ship Montréal deployed from Canadian Forces Base Halifax to conduct operations in the Indian and Pacific oceans. His Majesty's Canadian ships Ottawa and Vancouver are currently in the region working with our allies and partners. Their contributions in upholding the rules-based international order have been well noted across the region, specifically when HMCS Ottawa conducted a Taiwan Strait transit in company with the U.S. Navy—a bilateral activity that the U.S. Navy only conducts with the Royal Canadian Navy.

We have increased and diversified our regional engagements by participating in new multilateral exercises, with the Royal Canadian Air Force joining for the first time exercise Mobility Guardian across multiple locations in the Indo-Pacific this summer, among other new exercises and activities planned in the upcoming weeks.

We have expanded our capacity-building efforts through new programs and activities, with discussions under way to identify other relevant opportunities with regional partners. Notably, the Canadian Armed Forces co-hosted a “women, peace and security” conference with the Malaysian armed forces, one of the focus areas for capacity-building and security co-operation efforts. As well, the Royal Canadian Navy supported capacity-building efforts during SEACAT, the Southeast Asia co-operation and training multilateral exercise led by Singapore. These activities are important in building interoperability and trust with regional partners.

The defence team is ready to establish four defence policy advisers in the region, with candidates identified and preparing to assume their posts in the coming weeks. These new positions will have an immediate impact on deepening key partnerships and raising Canada's visibility in regional discussions on sensitive defence and security issues.

Finally, the defence team co-hosted with U.S. counterparts a cyber-defence co-operation workshop with the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, focused on cyber-incident response and workforce development, to improve their ability to detect and respond to threats. These activities strengthen overall resilience and preparedness, protecting against coercive tactics and preventing theft of valuable intellectual property.

As we deliver on these initiatives, the defence team is concurrently supporting the Indo-Pacific strategy's objective to be an active and engaged partner in the region by focusing our activities, engagements and port visits on ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. These efforts, among those across the whole of government, have contributed to tangible outcomes in support of our ASEAN-related objectives, including invitations to observe for the first time ASEAN defence ministers' meeting plus, or ADMM-Plus, and experts' working group meetings and activities in 2023.

In my view, this reinforces the good news coming out of Jakarta just two weeks ago, following the Prime Minister's successful visit at the ASEAN summit, where ASEAN and Canada officially upgraded our relationship to the level of strategic partnership. In concrete terms, these complementary efforts across the whole of government to strengthen our presence in the region and increase our co-operation with ASEAN partners help us to deliver on the defence and security objectives outlined in our Indo-Pacific strategy.

In sum, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are on the right path to deliver a meaningful and multi-faceted regional presence for Canada, from which we can promote peace and stability in support of our international interests and values.

I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Major-General Smith.

Mrs. Kramp-Neuman, you have the opening six minutes.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Perfect.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

As my first question, within the Indo-Pacific strategy, it states, “Canada will increase our military engagement and intelligence capacity as a means of mitigating coercive behaviour and threats to regional security.” As well, “Canada will deploy additional military assets and increase its investments in border and cyber security, as well as in intelligence.”

I recognize that this is something that we definitely need to do, and that it's a great commitment. However, as we all know, commitment needs to be backed up with capability. I'm wondering if you could address how the Canadian government intends to increase our capabilities, in both the cybersphere and more traditional military areas, to meet our commitments laid out in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

[MGen Greg Smith]

Thank you, Chair. I'll go first, but I'm sure my colleagues here will do better than I will.

In terms of the Indo-Pacific strategy, you've heard talk of reconstitution and how we're trying to rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces. The CAF indeed was rebuilt with that just in mind. Everything we just described in satisfying the different pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy was done in mind with a reduced size of the Canadian Armed Forces. We've nevertheless been able to do everything I just described. We're participating in cyber. We're participating in intelligence sharing. I can speak from a defence perspective that it's actually happening very well within the existing resources that we have.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

I'll go on to my next question.

Just a short while ago, I met with the military attaché of the embassy of Japan, who was kind enough to give me a briefing on the threats facing the nation in the region. They indicated that the primary causes of concern for them came from Moscow and Beijing, both independently and in the form of joint operations, as well as some rattling coming from North Korea.

Specifically with regard to the first two, what are the capabilities of the Russian forces and the People's Liberation Army in the region, and how do you see Canada contributing to dealing with both these threats?

[MGen Greg Smith]

I'll take a swing at this one, unless somebody [Inaudible—Editor].

I can't actually tell you—I'm a policy person, so I don't know—what capabilities Russia and China have. Obviously, China particularly is a world power. Russia is a very large military power. What we're doing, though, is reinforcing the rules-based international order. I talked about three frigates. I talked about exercises; capacity building, including women, peace and security; putting more policy people into the region to have a presence; and cyber. These are all important steps in reinforcing and deterring, if you will. We're there. We're present.

You mentioned Japan. They're a great partner. They know that we're there. We have an excellent relationship with them. We're continuing to build on that. The fact that we're showing that we have skin in the game—we physically have presence there, constantly—is very helpful to deter, I would say, both Russia and China, and, for that matter, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Let's now speak to the most recent defence update, indicating the need for tripling the size of our submarine fleet. Given the recruitment and retention crisis, could you speak to whether it's even feasible to triple the number of our current submariners and train our current ones on new equipment?

[MGen Greg Smith]

I'll take a swing at this one too. I'm not an expert in the defence policy update, because that's not my file, but I'm not trying to cop out of this one.

That said, I can tell you that it's consistent with the Indo-Pacific strategy. We're not going off in a direction unexpected. They will be coherent together. They'll be respectful of our present capacity and any future capacity that we're going to build.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Outside of submariners, what sorts of commitments in terms of manpower will our Indo-Pacific strategy commitments, our IPS commitments, mean in terms of ship complements, support and logistical staff? Are we currently able to meet these commitments?

[MGen Greg Smith]

I'd reinforce that the Indo-Pacific strategy was built within our current capacity. We went from two frigates in the region to three, a very heavy presence for Canada now. That was designed very specifically by the navy, which participated in this, to be respectful of what they were doing to rebuild the force under reconstitution. We are able to do both.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Switching gears here, given that the development of our military and of our NATO allies in tactics, equipment capabilities, etc., has largely been geared toward conflict in Europe, could either of you elaborate on some of the unique challenges, be they diplomatic or military, that we may consider as we look to increase our presence in the Indo-Pacific region?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Sure. Thanks for the question. I'll start, having served in NATO.

NATO is a very solid military organization. It's a military fighting force that works from diplomatic to tactical. Currently it's 31 countries, soon to be 32. Canada, of course, is one of the original founders of that organization. There is no equivalent in the Indo-Pacific. We have partners there. We've described Japan and the Republic of Korea. We're working with Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. However, there is no comparable military headquarters or military system to plug into.

I think the recent progress we've made with ADMM-Plus and ASEAN writ large is a good indicator of how our continued presence is a good-news story in showing that Canada is heavily involved in the Indo-Pacific, but we also have to understand that there is no equivalent of a 70-plus-year-old organization called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have 30 more seconds.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Do you have anything further on that?

[Peter Lundy, Director General, Indo-Pacific Strategy Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you for the question. I'm Peter Lundy, director general of the Indo-Pacific strategy secretariat at Global Affairs Canada.

On the diplomatic front, I think the general has outlined some of the recent successes. It was really a triumph of diplomacy over many years to get the strategic partnership with ASEAN across that particular finish line. It's that demonstration of commitment to the partners in the region that's so important to move forward.

As you look to implement the types of initiatives that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are undertaking, a lot of diplomatic groundwork needs to happen in advance. At some point, depending on the state of the relationship, you may need certain types of MOUs and legal agreements. In order to put those in place at the time that you need them, that requires, absolutely, Canadian diplomacy.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Kramp-Neuman.

Just following up on her second question, this is a threat analysis study. It would be helpful if we understood what the threat is from a military standpoint. What are the assets that China in particular puts into play and has access to? I'm given to understand that they have the largest navy in the world.

Is either of you capable, or is the department capable, of sharing with the committee the actual nature or extent of the Chinese military capability in particular?

[Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Without getting too much into classified information, I think the best way to look at it is that China has been increasing tenfold—or maybe not tenfold, but close to it—since 1999.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

This is not classified information.

[MGen Paul Prévost]

This is not classified. Classified is what threats we're most concerned about and what the gaps are within the allies, but there's a match to every capability that China puts forward there. This is why it's important for us to work with our partners in the region. With Five Eyes we exercise together. We make sure we're interoperable.

As the general mentioned, it's not—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I don't want to interrupt you, and I don't want to take away from colleagues' time, but were I sitting over there, this is what I would be asking you: How many ships? What are the kinds of ships? What are the airplanes? What are the kinds of airplanes? What are the drones? What's the overall capability of the People's Republic of China? You can't really understand the threat unless you know what the capability is.

Let me end it there, but I'll ask colleagues to follow up, because I think it's pretty significant for us to actually know what the threat environment is.

Anyway, I'll leave it to Ms. O'Connell. It's her last day here, which is unfortunate, I would say.

You have six minutes.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I could just say, “Can you please answer the chair's questions?”, because they are very good, but part of my new parliamentary secretary role is actually on cybersecurity. I think everyone on this committee knows that it's something I've been really interested in here as well.

Through you, Mr. Chair, to our witnesses, this question is for whoever can answer it.

Could you elaborate a little bit more on the work around the cyber-incident response team? Is that building capacity for our partners and allies in the region or building capacity for us? Given the fact that obviously you can't disclose all confidential information, can we maybe have a little bit more there in terms of what cyber work you're doing in the region?

[MGen Greg Smith]

I'm not a cyber expert, but I do recognize that Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces are very good at cyber-defence.

Particularly within the IPS, this is about working with allies and partners. I'm talking about Japan and the Republic of Korea. These are sophisticated, capable allies as well, but it's a good partnership. We learn together. As I said in my opening statement, we did a recent exercise with Japan. They were very appreciative of what we did. I would call this a partnership whereby we work on our capabilities together.

You probably know the cyber space better than I do, but protecting it over there helps us here. Yes, this is about helping partners and about being present in the Indo-Pacific in a cyber sense, but it helps us as well.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you for that.

Following up on the chair's questions in relation to cyber-threats and the threat analysis, I recognize the classified situation, but would cyber be a capability or an area of concern where our allies would be saying that this is why they want to build on the Canadian experience and the capabilities that we have? Do they deem cyber a major threat? I've talked before about being in Estonia. That was a fundamental priority for the Estonian government.

How is this seen in the hierarchy of threats, again building on the chair's comments about better understanding what the priorities are in this region?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Again, I'm not a cyber expert, but there is a threat. It's extensive in that region.

That being said, again, I gave the example of the Japanese exercise. They were very welcoming to us and the American forces going there to practice together. They were very receptive to our capabilities.

That is just an example of how we are welcome in the region. We have very valid defence capabilities. For our allies and partners in the region, that's one of the things they're asking for. It was built into one of the five pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy deliberately. We're actioning it now.