Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear today.
I'm going to build on some of the comments my colleague just made and focus on the respective ability of the two sides of this war to get the materiel equipment they need to keep prosecuting the conflict.
As we've seen and the committee has heard, the Russians have taken very significant losses, both in personnel and in terms of equipment. Unfortunately, it's becoming increasingly clear that they've been able to compensate for this quite effectively for a few different reasons.
We underestimated, I think, the Russians' abilities to pull significant quantities and materiel out of their stockpiles to a significant degree. That's something we should potentially reflect upon if this type of conflict is likely in the future. The way we've approached stocking and having very minimal stockpiles needs to change.
More broadly, despite the very broad and extensive set of sanctions that the Russians had imposed upon them, they've been able to further acquire materiel through two means: donations from friendly countries—where again I think we underestimated their ability to absorb and be supplied—and their ability to ramp up their productive capacity despite an extensive sanctions regime. This has led to a situation in which, in a couple of key supplies, the Russians' ability at the moment is potentially outstripping what the west is able to help supply Ukraine with. That would relate to some types of ammunition, including artillery ammunition; some types of drones; and electronic warfare systems.
All this would place a premium on the west's ability collectively to continue supplying Ukraine, and on the onus on Canada, given some of the challenges amongst other western members of that coalition, to increase their own supply to the furthest extent that they can.
I was happy to read some of the recent comments made to the committee that there seems to have been some progress made on this in Canada, although the details of this remain a bit unclear, at least to me, in terms of our additional support moving forward on programs of donations of armoured vehicles and ammunition.
Particularly since this is still opaque and will likely be an important issue to continue evolving, furthering Canada's ability to contribute, I encourage the committee to keep up its inquiry on this subject matter and potentially consider looking at three different avenues, specifically when it comes to Canada's ability to continue making material contributions to Ukraine.
First, it's not clear to me what material, if any at all, has been replaced that Canada donated out of its own military stocks. I think that's worth examining, if for no other reason than I'm sure at this point it's starting to impinge on some of the considerations the Canadian military would be willing to take when it comes to further donating from its own stockpiles, their not having been replaced with the donations to date.
Secondly, in September the government announced the commitment of multi-year funding for our material assistance to Ukraine, which is a step in the right direction. However, it's not yet clear that there's any short- or medium-term plan for executing that in a way that would help align industry capacity with government intent.
Thirdly, and related to the second point, I think it would be useful to better understand how it is that we're only just at the point now—22 months, give or take, into this war—where we are making more meaningful donations of equipment and ramping up some of our own productive capacity on items like ammunition, which it has been clear for some time that Ukraine has needed—since roughly February 2022.
With that, I'll thank you. I look forward to your questions.