Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
It's great to see you.
Good afternoon. My name is Cristina Pekarik, and I am appearing today as an independent expert.
I recently retired from the Yukon government following a 32-year career in the Yukon, most recently in the position of senior planner and chief economist for Energy, Mines and Resources.
My focus today is on the economic policy and fiscal aspects of critical and strategic minerals. I want to thank the committee very much for inviting me to appear today in what really is a moment of strategic reckoning for critical minerals and the defence-national security nexus.
My testimony today makes one central argument: Canada's originating 2022 critical minerals strategy was built with its focus on energy transition. The world has changed. There have been action plans emerging that take more account of the defence framework. We now need a framework that is purpose-built for defence, sovereignty and fiscal capacity, and those things are not the same.
The committee has heard extensively about critical minerals and defence supply. What has not been addressed is the fiscal dimension: that critical and strategic minerals revenue may be one of the most direct tools available to Canada for financing the defence commitment we have made to our allies. What I want to leave you with today is the fiscal case around critical and strategic minerals.
Canada has committed to spending 5% of GDP on defence by 2035. The Parliamentary Budget Officer, in his report of February 5 of this year, tells us this means an additional $33.5 billion per year on average. As we know, this is also in the context of a projected $78.3-billion deficit this year. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Budget Officer has projected that annual deficits will average approximately $64 billion out to 2030, for the foreseeable horizon.
To finance a near quadrupling of defence spending, Canada has four options: borrow more, raise taxes, cut programs or grow revenue. I am here to make the case for the fourth option.
Critical minerals currently contribute $40 billion to Canada's GDP. Scaled strategically with a deliberate commissioning pipeline, competitive investment conditions and allied market demand, this revenue base can grow materially. Failing to treat it as a financing instrument for defence leaves one of our most significant strategic levers unused.
In terms of setting this framework, I identify seven categories of measures in the detailed brief that has been submitted. Here, I am going to flag four as the most salient.
First, I recommend that the committee consider asking the Parliamentary Budget Officer to model a pipeline of critical and strategic mineral projects, as well as a commissioning schedule for this pipeline of projects. This should be tied to two scenarios.
The first scenario is what it would take to generate the revenue to meet the $33.5-billion annual defence growth target. The second scenario is what revenue and what pipeline of projects it would take to cover Canada's total defence spending.
This gives the committee an evidence base for action and signals priorities to the Major Projects Office, the role of which was discussed here this morning.
Second, execution timelines become the binding constraint. Mine development averages 15 to 16 years from discovery to production in Canada, and we know that in terms of alignment with our major competitors for mining investment, timelines take up to 26 months longer on average for project commissioning.
A defence imperative requires us to ask, what does “expedited” actually mean?
Federal-provincial equivalency agreements, some of which are under pre-assessment scheduling, and AI-assisted regulatory databases are some of the tools that I cover in more detail in the brief as measures to really improve or that will align with the new definition of “expedited”.
Third, foreign ownership gaps are a documented intelligence risk, and not a theoretical one. CSIS has named China's critical minerals acquisition strategy as a direct national security concern.
The Tanco mine, which has been mentioned this morning, is 100% Chinese-owned, and it holds 60% of the world's known cesium reserves. The Beaver Brook mine, an antimony mine, also mentioned here, has been idle since 2012 under Chinese ownership, while last year manufacturers declared force majeure from antimony supply shortages.
These are not edge cases. They are symptoms of a screening regime with gaps that the Investment Canada Act regulations must close. Regulations are under development, so there is a very strategic and timely role for the committee to play.