National Defence Committee on Oct. 7th, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Welcome to meeting number six of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to the motions adopted on September 16, 2025, and September 23, 2025, the committee is meeting to commence its study of the modernization of NORAD.

Today’s meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

Before we continue, I would ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines on the cards on the table and help to prevent, in this case, audio feedback incidents and protect the health and safety of our interpreters.

I'd also like to take a few moments to comment for the benefit of the witnesses and the members.

Please wait until you're recognized by name before speaking. For those participating by video conferencing, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic and please mute your mic when you are not speaking.

For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation—floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel. I would remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. We appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses.

We have Mr. Jean-Pierre Hickey, associate professor; Mr. Robert Huebert, professor at the Centre for Military Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, via video conference; Dr. Jessica M. Shadian, president and chief executive officer for Arctic 360; Mr. Richard Shimooka, senior fellow at Macdonald-Laurier Institute, also by video conference; and Madeleine Redfern, chief operating officer at CanArctic Inuit Networks Inc.

I would now like to invite Mr. Hickey to make his opening statement.

You have five minutes.

[Jean-Pierre Hickey, Associate Professor, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and committee members, for the opportunity to speak today.

My name is Jean-Pierre Hickey. I am a professor at the University of Waterloo in mechanical and mechatronics engineering, specializing in hypersonic aerodynamics and propulsion. Through NATO working groups, government and industry collaborations, my research advances hypersonic technologies. It's a dual-use area that touches civilian space and also defence applications.

Today, I want to emphasize the need for a coordinated national effort under the NORAD modernization plan to build hypersonic expertise and infrastructure in Canada. Doing so will strengthen our defence capabilities, but also synergize Canadian industry.

Hypersonic weapons are no longer a theoretical threat. They are already being used in Ukraine. Russia’s Avangard glider can reach North America. Both China and Russia have hundreds of operational hypersonic weapons. Like traditional ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons can travel up to and beyond Mach 10, which is two to three kilometres per second, but they do so while manoeuvring unpredictably at low altitude. They are difficult to track, difficult to intercept, and they compress decision-making time. These systems pose a serious challenge to Arctic defence, as our current radar and response infrastructure were not designed to detect or counter them.

Canada’s NORAD modernization plan and the defence innovation strategy acknowledges this threat, committing that Canada “will harness innovation in hypersonic and cruise missile defence”.

At hypersonic speeds, the air molecules impacting the vehicle cause aerospace materials to actually melt. They bring complex control stability issues, and require completely different propulsion systems. However, Canada does not currently have any specialized facilities to reproduce these extreme flight conditions.

High enthalpy tunnels are needed to recreate these flight conditions to study flight dynamics, propulsion, thermal protection and even to help identify threats, yet Canada does not have a fully functional high enthalpy hypersonic facility. Without such facilities, we cannot validate and train the next generation of hypersonic experts. It's not about developing offensive capabilities. It's about understanding the threat, modelling trajectories and identifying hypersonic signatures so that we can defend against it. That requires the right infrastructure and skilled personnel.

If Canada wants “to adapt to rapid technological change faster than its adversaries and as fast as its allies”, as stated in our vision for defence, we must act now.

Our adversaries and allies are moving very quickly in this space. Since 2007, China has built one new large hypersonic test facility every year. The University Consortium on Applied Hypersonics links over 120 U.S. institutions with advanced hypersonic capabilities. Australia, Europe and others have made similar investments in hypersonics, combining national scale facilities with university expertise and research.

In Canada, the talent base is thin. Since 2001, only four doctoral fellowships by NSERC were given to students whose titles even mention hypersonics. All are from Waterloo, and all did their studies in the U.S. and Australia.

Canada needs a national hypersonic strategy that fits within the NORAD modernization plan and advances our understanding, modelling capabilities and identification of hypersonic threats while simultaneously growing the space launch industry that relies on this advanced R and D. Unlike other areas of investment in research, development and innovation within the NORAD plan where Canada has a thriving ecosystem of innovation, such as quantum, AI or advanced materials, we need a dedicated and coordinated effort to build out our expertise in hypersonics. We need to synergize Canada's industrial base, such as Reaction Dynamics in Longueuil or Tekna plasma systems in Sherbrooke.

In the short term, this means establishing university-based hypersonic facilities that enable collaboration with DRDC, DND, NRC, and even the CSA, while creating training programs possibly in collaboration with our allies to develop high-quality personnel in this field.

In the long term, Canada should develop a national hypersonic test facility, ideally at DRDC Valcartier, where much of our historical expertise in high-speed aerodynamics already resides.

For Canada to harness innovation in hypersonics, we need to invest in people, infrastructure, and coordination. This will ensure that Canada not only keeps pace with our allies, but also helps shape the future of hypersonic defence and civilian space research.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you very much, Mr. Hickey.

I will pass it over to Mr. Huebert, by video conference, for five minutes.

[Robert Huebert, Professor, Centre for Military Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

As the chair said, my name is Rob Huebert. I'm a professor at the University of Calgary, but I'm also the director of the Centre for Military Security and Strategic Studies.

The focus of my five minutes is to introduce the concept of why we are actually doing NORAD modernization and how serious it is for Canada. We are seeing, since approximately 2002, efforts that have redeveloped the nuclear deterrent system. We, of course, have had the narrative that there was a peace dividend, that in fact the use of force, more or less, had been eliminated at the end of the Cold War. But if we look very closely at the developments particularly of our enemies, Russia and China, and also in terms of our ally, the United States, we will see—and it follows very closely to some of the issues that Professor Hickey just raised—that the technologies of the delivery system of nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed this balance.

Canada now faces an existential threat to the possibility of becoming engaged in a nuclear war if, in fact, a deterrent system is not maintained. What we have to understand is that the new geopolitical transformations that have been occurring since the early 2000s now mean that the nuclear deterrent system that most people have assumed existed, the idea that we will be able to detect and fire our missiles at them when they fire their missiles and that knowledge, the MAD policy, mutual assured destruction, will prevent us from ever engaging in the use of nuclear weapons against each other.... I would contend that the technological and geopolitical transformations have, in fact, fundamentally changed that to the degree that Canada now faces the reality that it must demonstrate with its allies that it has a war-fighting capability in a nuclear environment to actually act as a deterrent.

In other words, we have to show that we can actually fight our enemies in such an environment to ensure that they never engage in a fight in the first place. The challenge we are facing now is the technological challenges are vast, but even more important, there is the danger, whenever you are getting into such a sensitive system, that we may find ourselves in a war-fighting environment. This means that we not only have to worry about the deterrent forces but we also have to worry about the ability to actually fight if we find ourselves in it.

One of the contexts that is often lost in all of our discussions is that we are seeing a massive modernization of the nuclear capabilities of the Americans, Russians and Chinese along with the lesser powers. We know that China is changing from a limited deterrent stance of 300 nuclear weapons to where the United States Department of Defense now predicts at the end of the decade there will be up to 5,000 weapons. We know about the Russians in terms of some of the missile delivery systems that we have talked about already in this meeting, the hypersonics, but we also have maritime delivery systems, such as Poseidon, that are designed to be fast, stealth and undetectable, which again goes to the point.

The United States is about to entirely replace its deterrent force. They are changing from a triad system into a fourth leg of introducing air-launched nuclear-capable missiles. We also have to take into consideration not only facing our enemies, but the impact of the Trump effect which, of course, is causing serious questions over our aligned systems.

What are the main attributes of this to Canada? First and foremost, a nuclear weapon environment has fundamentally shifted, and Canada has to appreciate that if it is to ensure the security of Canadians, we are in fact willing to take up this necessity to demonstrate that we can in fact engage and stop attacks on and over Canadian soil. Russia, China and the U.S. have been rebuilding their weapons and delivery systems, and that is the real challenge Canada faces.

Deterrence now means that you need to show that you can fight a nuclear war, not merely respond to one. Ultimately, NORAD must be able to detect new delivery systems. NORAD also must show that it can respond and respond quickly. No longer is it only required that we give warning of any incoming missiles, but we now actually have to go out and be able to defend against the delivery systems that will be bringing in the hypersonics, the Poseidons and so forth. Ultimately, the system has to be as fast and of the highest level of technology possible. Even in spite of the difficulties we are having with our American ally, almost all of these systems are ultimately tied to the Americans or American technology.

Ultimately, the speed of the threat is increasing so much that, in Canada's modernization, as much as we are trying to catch up, the question still remains whether we are doing enough to avoid what many predict is to be the next war. Therefore, NORAD modernization is not just simply about getting the most recent equipment to try to show the Americans that we are a trustworthy ally; it is truly about doing what is necessary to protect Canadians from the most serious existential threat we have faced in a lifetime.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Huebert.

I will now pass it over to Dr. Shadian for five minutes.

[Jessica M. Shadian, President and Chief Executive Officer, Arctic 360, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Bonjour et merci for the kind invitation to speak today. Assuming it's not for my expertise on defence weaponry, I'm going to focus on two specific issues: infrastructure and Greenland.

The new government has made clear Canada that will be strong on defence and strong on the economy. The approach then to fast-track, nation-building infrastructure merges the two. Critical infrastructure tied to NORAD modernization fits squarely here. It spans everything: digital infrastructure and data storage, ports, airports, runways, roads, etc.

Several Arctic projects are regularly named for potential fast-track approval, but missing from the discussion is innovation, whether it is costs, necessity or opportunities. Innovation is core, of course, to every dual-use asset and is literally what we mean when we're talking about NORAD modernization.

Before specifics, I'm going to put my conclusion up front, which is that infrastructure discussions on NORAD modernization cannot be independent of a broader national Arctic infrastructure investment strategy designed for next generation transportation systems, not the last, tethered to Canada's innovation, defence strategies and updated critical minerals strategies for national security and, per the new defence procurement office, to build Canadian-made technologies. These must then be what the new major projects office business development teams use to build their business case from. Add in an updated Arctic foreign policy all under, as Vincent Rigby and others have repeated, a strategic national foreign policy umbrella. We need a vision of who we are, our role as an Arctic nation in the world and how we will get there.

In perspective, no single Arctic project stands on its own. Each project, big or small, depends on every other. Fibre needs reliable, affordable energy. Energy requires high-speed Internet for data collection, cybersecurity, efficiency and operations, etc. Transportation, roads to ports, connects energy to grids and supply chains.

Critical infrastructure must be sensor- and AI-embedded to guard against cyber-attacks and, in the Arctic, to measure and monitor everything from permafrost melt to subsea activity and infrastructure interoperability. All is for naught if Canada’s Arctic sovereignty does not include data sovereignty, in other words, future-proofing to defend and protect Canada from our adversaries. With China, it is not future-proofing, it is today-proofing to meet its emerging defence technologies that every other adversary may soon adopt in tow. We are stuck at saying multi-purpose. Okay, so then what?

It's also about opportunity. What should be low-hanging fruit is Canada’s potential as a world leader in cold weather technology. When we do build Arctic infrastructure, often we use U.S. cold-weather IP. We are laggards, but not for a lack of Canadian expertise or competence. It's the lack of a strategic national vision and plan.

Our NATO allies, for example, are well ahead. Finland’s VTT Technical Research Centre has a dedicated cold-weather marine R and D program based in the Arctic, not Helsinki. Pilot testing covers infrastructure and digital portals, sensors and systems for cold climate operations, modelling and predicting ice behaviour for shipping and also offshore structures in icy seas.

Canada has launched BOREALIS, which is focused on frontier tech from AI and robotics to quantum and space. It should live up to its name, be rooted in the Arctic and develop the cold-weather frontier technologies needed for NORAD modernization, for Arctic security, mining and critical infrastructure, housing and energy for Canada and for export.

As a hub, CHARS comes to mind, driving industry, researchers and private capital north to innovate with northerners out of the north. This is literally how NORAD modernization then enables defence research and development in the Arctic. It may also be the ROI for Arctic nation-building projects. Data is the new gold.

My second point is that times are tough for our U.S. relationship. Defence diversification is a laudable aim, but it's about leverage as much as it is diversification. Canada–U.S. Arctic co-operation will remain critical to Canadian and North American Arctic security and defence and to support our transatlantic NATO commitments.

Canada’s North American Arctic, though, is also bookended by Alaska and Greenland. Greenland sits at the intersection of NORAD and NATO. As we consider how to best proceed with our bilateral NORAD commitments, whether strengthening, maintaining or retreating, we should also consider our North American Arctic ally Greenland/Denmark. Sharing an Arctic maritime border is reason enough for defence and security co-operation. Greenland is also part of NATO.

On NORAD infrastructure, we should consider strategic opportunities for dual-use critical infrastructure co-operation—call it hedging—including under the legally binding Arctic coast guard co-operation. Again, it is vision, will and national foreign policy strategy.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Dr. Shadian.

I'm going to call on Mr. Shimooka, who is here via video conferencing.

You have five minutes.

[Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Chair.

To start, I want to thank the committee for holding this timely meeting to discuss this topic and for inviting me to speak. It's very much appreciated.

NORAD modernization is clearly a critical topic of conversation, not just in Canada's bilateral defence relationship with the United States, but in its broader diplomatic relations as well.

Successive U.S. administrations have highlighted the growing threat of adversary systems, particularly, but not limited to, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. These include a qualitative improvement in existing and new systems, such as in low-level cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles, as well as a quantitative increase in the number of systems. I'd point to the March 25 statement by General Anthony Cotton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to the Senate armed services committee in the United States, which provides a detailed, unclassified survey of the emerging threats today.

These developments are not new. China's buildup of its strategic nuclear forces started over a decade ago, and Russian systems were at least five years before that. The reality is that, to some degree, both the United States and Canada were tardy in their initial response, but have made some significant moves over the past decades to address this challenge.

The Trump administration has made homeland defence a signature component of its defence policy for its second term and is attempting to pursue an aggressive modernization agenda, officially known as the golden dome for America, or GD4A. This involves a large networked array of different surveillance and targeting systems, as well as new and improved capabilities intended to defeat these threats. A key enabler will be a highly advanced, AI-driven data processing capability that will improve the sensitivity and reactiveness of the entire system.

It should be noted that many of the key programs that will improve homeland defence, like the space-based communication layer, are already facing significant delays. The administration seems more willing to pursue technically risky, space-based in nature capabilities, due to the capability and survivability advantages offered by them, over more traditional ground and air-based systems. The technical feasibility of the space-based interceptor program, which is arguably the centrepiece of the golden dome for America system, is deeply in question and its cost is likely to be extreme. I'd point to the work of former congressional budget analyst Todd Harrison at the American Enterprise Institute as a leading voice in this area.

Canada, for its part, has also realized the need to address these threats. The 2022 announcement concerning NORAD modernization and earmarking of approximately $38 billion was a good first step, but the process is seeing delays in program execution, in part due to austerity measures placed on the Department of National Defence over the past few decades. This is in front of the backdrop of an aging set of capabilities, a large portion of which was acquired during the Mulroney era, over 30-plus years ago.

Consequently, Canada's contribution to the existing NORAD capabilities is highly limited in the face of this new threat environment and the delivery of new systems will potentially take over a decade to accomplish in full. For example, the purchase of the F-35s for the Royal Canadian Air Force fleet, which is arguably one of the most critical defence capabilities we provide to NORAD, is now being questioned for the fifth time in 15 years. A full operating capability is likely to slip beyond 2032.

A deep bipartisan consensus in the United States has pushed Canada to do more in this area. The frustration over the lack of alacrity and actual defence deliverables is palpable. It is one of the core impediments to the bilateral relationship today. The relatively limited state of Canada's contribution to NORAD must be addressed.

Canada must play a stronger role in this area by becoming more proactive in its efforts. There are areas where the U.S.'s plans for the golden dome have obvious deficiencies and if Canada was agile and reactive, it could complement their efforts to create a more secure North America. This approach could help build a stronger foundation for the two countries' bilateral relationship going forward.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you very much.

The last five minutes go to Ms. Redfern.

[Madeleine Redfern, Chief Operating Officer, CanArctic Inuit Networks Inc.]

Thank you.

I am an Inuk woman from Iqaluit, Nunavut, in high tech and innovation. I'm actively involved in transformative technologies in the areas of transportation, energy, telecommunication and digital infrastructure. As the chief operating officer of CanArctic Inuit Networks, I and my partners are committed to build 3,000 kilometres of marine fibre optic cable into Canada's Arctic and to connect with as many existing or proposed fibre networks. As the chief executive officer of SednaLink Marine Systems, we would transform segments of SednaLink fibre optic into a SMART cable. What is that? It's a cable with sensors in order to monitor marine climate changes and to assist with environmental monitoring, especially near marine-protected areas, as well as assist with collecting marine intelligence.

I am also a special adviser to Canadian Nuclear Laboratories, and I sit as an indigenous member at the nuclear energy leadership table, a group of mostly CEOs and presidents of energy or power corporations who have signed onto Canada's SMR action plan advancing the potential of micro and small modular reactors to provide a full energy solution throughout our country including in rural, remote and northern Canada.

I am also a director with the Canadian Arctic Innovation Association, which undertook and completed a similar report done by DND into the viability of airships for commercial and surveilling perspectives.

The reason I am in these spaces is the necessity of our northern communities to have basic or fundamental infrastructure related to transportation, energy and telecommunications, including data, digital infrastructure. At the same time, we need these investments to be dual purpose or multi-purpose insomuch as being able to assist with local security to national security, security as it relates to reliable, stable, abundant and affordable energy that supports economic development opportunities, but also powers other infrastructure, whether it is fibre, ground stations or data centres. We need that for all-domain awareness.

We need to be able to assist with security as it relates to reliable, stable, abundant and affordable telecommunications—telecommunications that not only allow us northerners to communicate with individuals within our communities, our regions and the rest of Canada and the world, but also the infrastructure that supports economic development and our Canadian Armed Forces when they are based in or come into our region, whether for their annual exercises, to respond and support search and rescue, or to also support our defence requirements for all-domain awareness.

In order for Canada to fulfill its sovereignty, it needs to know who is in our northern and Arctic spaces from seabed to space. This means being able to monitor in real time, but also to notify those coming into Canada's domain and, if necessary, to be able to deploy resources to defend or strike.

It also means infrastructure or assets to collect and process huge amounts of data from seabed to space in our marine environment, on the ground or in the air. We need fibre optic networks. We need fibre going into and through strategic routes of Canada's northern Arctic regions. Satellite, of course, also has a role to play, but nothing beats fibre with respect to being able to move large amounts of data, everything from regular telecommunications to photos, video imagery and audio. We also need strategic ground stations, and attached to those stations should be data centres in the Arctic, but that requires energy. Every second counts when you are monitoring and defending Canada's sovereignty. We need to be able to download that data and ideally understand what it means.

We also know that the future, as others have said, is now. We also need AI, sensors and robotics, from both unmanned autonomous aircraft—drones—to unmanned underwater vehicles that monitor or do more than protect, defend and strike in order to protect themselves, but also we need those critical infrastructures and assets.

Historically, Canada's investments in the north have been as cheap as possible and more often than not, not being cheap, have not even been meeting their objectives, because politicians and bureaucrats love fulfilling political objectives focused on the look and photo ops, rather than what's needed or necessary.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you for your comments.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their opening remarks.

We'll kick off our first round of questions with Mr. James Bezan.

You have six minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today. I think it's very important that we have these frank discussions. The threat environment, as Dr. Huebert laid out, is escalating and evolving so rapidly that it makes it difficult for us to keep up, especially when we're starting from behind the eight ball.

My first question is for Dr. Huebert and Mr. Shimooka.

Knowing that we have a limited amount of time to start playing catch-up, and that we know where the threats are, what's the first place we should be investing in to make sure we're meeting the mandate under NORAD and under Canadian sovereignty and ensuring that we have the defence and deterrence systems required? List your top three or four things that we need to do right now.

[Robert Huebert]

The first one is to recognize that in the new environment, we have to give decision-makers as much time as possible to know that the missiles and torpedoes are coming toward us. Under the traditional MAD system, or mutual assured destruction, the American president had approximately 10 to 15 minutes to make the decision to basically launch his missiles against the Soviets and conceivably the Chinese. That has been cut down even shorter.

We need to put our emphasis on systems that will allow the decision-makers...which means, within the context of NORAD, the Prime Minister, of course, but the president, most importantly. That means the sensor systems that are now being talked about in terms of over-the-horizon radars and in terms of many of these other types of very advanced quantum calculations...whatever you want to call it, golden shield.... I know that some people see a political terminology in it, but the reality is that it represents those sensors that tell us a hypersonic is coming, tell the president he can respond, and if necessary—

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

So you're saying, Dr. Huebert, on the concept of the golden dome, essentially add that into the NORAD mandate. We know that over-the-horizon radar is in the works, but the north warning system is supposed to age out this year. We don't have anything in the interim until we have over-the-horizon in place. You're also talking ballistic missile defence, I assume, as part of that.

Richard, you had talked about the F-35 and ongoing political interference five times over. How quickly do we need these F-35s and the infrastructure to support them so that we can do our part, as Canada, in the NORAD responsibilities we have in defending our Arctic as well as the coasts?

[Richard Shimooka]

Arguably, it's one of the two most major capabilities required for our north immediately. Given, if we have seen Chinese and Russian collocated drills just in the past six months here, our ability to provide an effective aerial defence in the north is a vital necessity. Given the age of the aircraft that we have currently, crew shortages due to this aging system and morale issues as well to some degree, I think it's absolutely vital that this capability needs to be replaced. I would say other areas, such as AEW or even having an effective patrol submarine would be effective, because that would allow us to have a greater deterrence in this area.

Just as a very quick point, I would say that we need to be faster at how we procure systems overall. That is the underlying issue across the entire system. It has taken basically 15 years to make a decision on the F-35 or on some of these other programs. It's really what's hamstringing the forces to actually deal with these issues. I'll leave it at that.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

Professor Hickey, you talked about hypersonics and the need to do more research here in Canada. You mentioned Valcartier as a location. Should the DRDC also be doing research on it out at Suffield, where we have a little bit of space? Which other universities and/or private corporations would have the capacity to develop and test hypersonics in Canada so that we have our own sovereign capability?

[Jean-Pierre Hickey]

I think the DRDC is well positioned at both Suffield and Valcartier to develop this. They have some efforts ongoing. We could also think of the NRC as being another potential site to be able to develop these capabilities. We don't have, to my knowledge, any hypersonics or anything coming close to hypersonics at the university level. There could be a couple of sites in Canada that would enable such capabilities, at least university scale, as we see in the U.S. or even in Europe.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

Madam Redfern, I appreciate your comments. We need to start thinking about infrastructure beyond ports and runways. As much as those are important, we have to think about energy, and I'm glad to hear you talk about SMRs as a way to provide energy for our communities in the north but also for our defence infrastructure.

You talked about fibre. With the grey zone tactics we're witnessing in Europe as well as in Canada, we're seeing undersea fibre cables severed accidentally on purpose or by others with the capability to go down and cut cables, as we're seeing often in the Atlantic Ocean.

You talked about sensors in the ocean to monitor that traffic. What's the redundancy we need, first, to ensure that we get fibre up there, and what other options do we have if they go down?

[Madeleine Redfern]

There are a couple of things.

One is there are already a number of existing fibre optic networks in the Northwest Territories, all the way up to Inuvik. You also now have fibre optic networks in and around Hudson Bay, with Nunavik. There are also other proposed fibre systems, but they are integrated with satellite. We definitely recognize the need and necessity for that.

With respect to the risks of cutting the fibre optic systems, that's why I'm very keen about, interested in and aware of Cellula Robotics and their underwater unmanned vehicles that can monitor that space. There are developments for batteries that allow up to 40 months of monitoring. Also, they can be weaponized. If there are incursions into our marine environment that have been identified as posing a risk to critical infrastructure, they not only can warn but also be deployed to strike.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

I'll pass it over to Mr. Watchorn.

You have six minutes.

[Tim Watchorn, Liberal, Les Pays-d'en-Haut, QC]

I want to thank the witnesses for joining us today. It's very important.

I'm hearing you talk about hypersonic missiles. As you know, the Government of Canada has made a major investment in defence.

Professor Huebert, Mr. Shimooka or Mr. Hickey, what are your thoughts on an investment in hypersonic missiles? Where could sites be located? What delivery systems should be involved? Where should we position them in Canada to ensure their effectiveness within NORAD?

[Robert Huebert]

One of the challenges we face right now, of course, is that we are so far behind in trying to understand the lethal nature of what the Russians and Chinese have been creating. We're still trying to go through the various infrastructure examinations of where they have to go.

We know that the high north has to be the location of some of the hypersonics in order to be able to respond, but it also runs into and goes back to the previous question about what systems. We also have to be talking about where we are going to be placing an air interceptor such as the F-35. I agree with Richard when he says it's the only real plane we should be looking at.

We also have to talk about having infrastructure that then can be looking eastward and where we can put the fuelling resupply equipment for these aircraft, because they have to be in the air.

We also need a higher capability to have our submarine assets going into what's called the GIUK gap, which is the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap, where we think the Russians will be coming in with this latest generation of hypersonics that are coming.

As well, we have to have the ability to be watching the Bering Strait. I don't have to remind this committee that the Chinese had four research vessels sailing up the Bering Strait obviously doing examinations for future submarine transportation routes, so we have to be watching that in that context.

I say those choke points are the most important to be covering.

[Richard Shimooka]

I think there are a couple of ways to answer this, and perhaps Dr. Hickey can elaborate or has a different view.

In my view, the challenges of hypersonics, given the threat actors that we face such as the Russian Federation and China, mean that it will be very difficult for us to do this alone. If we look at how the U.S. government is starting to develop its golden dome system, they are looking at multiple layers of sensors and capabilities at different orbital heights. A large portion of this is space-based, but there's not just that; there are also ground-based and sea-based systems.

The core part of that system is the development of new AI programs, which are basically taking synergistically all of this data and sifting through, developing a much more in-depth situational awareness that can allow us to deal with some of the inherent challenges, which Dr. Hickey outlined with the hypersonic systems, that make them much more difficult to detect than traditional ICBMs or other systems. They bring all that data in to provide a better ability to detect and target these systems with potentially new space-based, ground-based or air-based interceptors. To some degree in a NORAD context and in light of the negotiations that are potentially occurring right now in Washington, our response to this area would have to work with the United States given just the amount of assets they are willing to put into this problem set and maybe complement it or work through that system in order to provide a much more effective defence in this area.

[Tim Watchorn, Liberal, Les Pays-d'en-Haut, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Hickey, I have a question about engineering. I have a background in engineering. I'm curious about the technical options available. You said that there isn't much expertise in hypersonic technology at the moment.

What would you say if a group of academics set up shop in Valcartier to promote this technology? How long would it take to be able to manufacture these weapons at home?

[Jean-Pierre Hickey]

Thank you for your question.

On the one hand, programs in Australia and Europe have been in the works for decades. They have a clear head start on our programs in Canada. Given the threat posed right now, we need to move full steam ahead to catch up with our peers.

On the other hand, I believe that it will take time to train students and establish a research base in universities. At a number of Canadian universities, a few people are conducting research in hypersonics, but it's really quite limited.

If we want to develop this technology, we'll need to expand the research base, develop our capabilities and work with Defence Research and Development Canada, or DRDC, and other stakeholders in Canada to promote it. We need to invest in infrastructure that will support this research development.

We also need to understand the capabilities of our adversaries and how they develop these capabilities. We currently have no means of testing and advancing our understanding in these areas.