National Defence Committee on Oct. 9th, 2025

[Tom Karako]

I think this was what I was alluding to in my prepared remarks.

Professor Lackenbauer explained very well the difference between denial and retaliation. The question is why. Why is it necessary to have that denial to thwart it? After all, why isn't the threat of punishment enough?

I think it comes down to what an adversary might think they can get away with beneath the perceived threshold of that big reprisal, of that big punishment, especially a nuclear reprisal. If an adversary thinks they can attack the United States and Canada with a fait accompli, a decapitation strike or even just enough to degrade our military capability, to keep us from projecting power and responding to something over there, they might want to do that in order to pen up our power projection forces that are resident in North America. That's why it's not enough to think of this air problem as a lesser included set of the big nuclear problem but as something different.

I think one of the other witnesses commented on the Operation Spiderweb phenomenon. What happens when a spiderweb or something much more robust is brought to bear on, say, bomber bases, aircraft or something like that. Since everyone else is quoting Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, I will as well. He said in the past that this comes down to what it is that an enemy might do to bring us to our knees. We don't want to be brought to our knees. We want to be able to deflect that kind of attack, so that every single day our adversaries wake up and think, “Today is not the day to attack.”

[Chris Malette, Liberal, Bay of Quinte, ON]

Dr. Rivard Piché, how can Canada ensure that NORAD remains relevant against non-traditional security threats such as cyber-attacks, as well?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

NORAD is part of the solution and a system of defence that we would need to defend Canada against threats that are really across an entire spectrum. We've been talking about nuclear conventional threats, but what I've been trying to highlight is the fact that we're also facing threats that are below the threshold, that are short of war and are often very hard to identify. Once they manifest, they are very hard to counter because we can't really pinpoint them, and we can't really pinpoint their effect. It's important when we talk about deterrence to also talk about deterrence by resilience. How do we actually safeguard our society and fireproof society and Canada as a whole to ensure that, if we're targeted by a hybrid threat or subthreshold threat, the effect is minimized as much as possible?

This is why we need to see investment upstream in society in addressing some of the themes that we've been talking about, and other themes like the contentious relationship with indigenous people, for example, in the Arctic. Our lack of awareness, our lack of engagement can be and has been targeted by adversaries in the past. That's why, when I talk about a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society approach to continental defence, we need to take those things into consideration. In the words of General VanHerck, it's about bringing us to our knees and really reducing and impeding on our will to fight. When you look at China's and Russia's strategy, ultimately the idea is that Canada would not want to fight them or would not want to counter them by affecting our will within the society.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you. Mr. Savard-Tremblay, you have six minutes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their very enlightening and relevant presentations.

Mr. Fergusson, you said that a credible defence involves not only integration into the missile defence dome, but also a new approach…

It looks like you're having trouble with the interpretation.

[James Fergusson]

I barely can hear it. I don't know why, unless I'm pressing the wrong button.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

The interpreter is very quiet.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Can you hear me okay now?

[James Fergusson]

I can hear you pretty well, yes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

That's a start.

What concrete capacities, such as sensors and interceptors, should Canada specifically fund between now and 2027 or 2030 so that integration into the ballistic missile defence dome can actually be achieved? Also, is that a realistic timeline?

[James Fergusson]

First of all, it's not realistic. Part of the reason it's not realistic is that there's too much on the plate. I have not seen, despite the rhetoric that came out of the defence policy update, any clear prioritization of limited resources—not just on the money side, because the money side is not the problem, but in terms of the limited resources National Defence has for implementing all of this. That's one of the problems.

In terms of what we can do, we have existing capabilities that we can put forward that will be very valuable in a variety of different ways. For example, we have three RADARSAT constellation satellites that provide some coverage, not just of the Arctic, the north, but on a global basis, because of orbital dynamics. We have this technology. The Americans don't. It's an important thing. Why are we not investing in putting up a 24-7 satellite constellation with the additional focus of an air moving target indicator? As was pointed out, 20 years ago National Defence tried to develop on RADARSAT-1 a ground moving target indicator. That's something we could do, and we could do it very quickly to fill the gap that exists.

We also have in space Sapphire, an optical sensor, which can be expanded and should be expanded. It's on the list. Again, it's proven technology. It's very good. It supports the American space surveillance network. You can put more satellites up and turn them to provide, potentially for the hypersonic level and certain ballistic missile levels, tracking and cueing of great value.

Those are the things we can do, and we can do them quickly, instead of, “Well, we're working down the road with new technologies and we'll get to them eventually.” As has been pointed out, it may be too late by the time we get to them.

What capabilities do we really have right now, in terms of a division of labour? This will be my last point.

We have the sense that the Americans can do everything. They can't do everything. They have limited resources. They have a lot more than we do, but they have limited resources. In negotiations and discussions with the United States, what particular technologies, including especially Canadian defence technologies and industries, can we exploit quickly with a division of labour with the United States to fill gaps for the defence of North America? That's a meaningful contribution.

Looking for advanced technologies down the road isn't going to get us very far, because we know one other thing: A lot of the time, these futuristic projects fail miserably at the end of the day. They cost a lot of money and they just don't work.

That's how I would answer that.

Thank you.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

You just touched on the matter, and you also talked about it when you appeared before the committee: You brought up the risk of a nuclear attack in space that would blind the North American Aerospace Defense Command. If I understand correctly, we're done for if we lose American sensors.

[James Fergusson]

That's correct. We could be blind.

I get a concern right now.... Tom mentioned the North Warning System. In many ways, that's a single point of failure. We don't have much redundancy, and we need redundancy in the sensors. It can't be just one thing, so that if one thing is taken out, we are blind. Space has to be integrated. Down the road, if we do proceed with the AWACS capability—and I think we're proceeding with it in conjunction with the United States—it will provide a valuable air-based sensor system to go with ground-based sensors. We have to avoid a single point of failure, because we could be in the dark very quickly.

In fact, let me be blunt: Against long-range cruise missiles in the Arctic, we are blind. We are in the dark right now—not tomorrow, but right now. We've been in the dark for a decade, and we're still not really moving along.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

That has the merit of being very clear. Thank you.

Ms. Rivard Piché, the first sites for the Arctic over-the-horizon radar project were announced in the summer of 2025, specifically in July. There are still constraints related to weather conditions, for example, because the frost will not make things easy. There may also be issues in terms of logistics or energy.

Could you talk a bit more about that? What should be monitored? What plan could help mitigate those problems?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

First of all, as you said, it's important to make sure that the sites are well located, given climate change, the temperature and weather events such as storms. We have to be able to make sure that we can use the new capacities to their fullest.

There's also the whole issue of protection. Once these sites are established, how do we ensure that they aren't vulnerable to the actions of other actors? That's where we need an answer. We need protection by the Canadian Armed Forces, but also a whole-of-government approach to ensure that the sites are well protected, as I said earlier.

I also think the issue of redundancy is extremely important. We can't just depend on one or two sites. It's important to have various systems in various areas of operation that will be able to provide that redundancy between the physical systems.

Finally, one of the very important things is establishing a clear list of Canada's critical infrastructure. That list, which would include the North American Aerospace Defense Command systems following the modernization, would make it possible to prioritize infrastructure so that it can be proactively protected. Yes, there's the idea of a protective dome across the continent, but the reality is that the territory is huge and the capacity is limited. In the event of an attack, it's important to know which sites will have to be protected first. From what I understand, the list hasn't been established yet.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Chair, do I have time for a quick yes-or-no question?

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Your time is up. Thank you.

Mr. Anderson, we're in the second round now. You have five minutes.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you very much.

For the benefit of all Canadians, I've talked to a lot of them and they feel that the problems in the world right now are over there. Ukraine has nothing to do with us, the Middle East has nothing to do with us, and so on. The problems in the South China Sea are all far away.

Dr. Fergusson, in some ways, this reminds me of the talks in Whitehall in the late 1930s. Would you say that over the past 10 years, the geostrategic situation in the world has degraded?

[James Fergusson]

No.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Would you say Canada's position within the geostrategic situation has degraded?

[James Fergusson]

It has degraded, yes.

We get so focused, particularly on the two wars going on right now and then discussions about China and the future and instability. The world has not degraded. It has not changed a great deal except for the empirical side of what's happened, but all these indicators have been there for well over a decade and a half. You can go back further.

What we've done, outside of rhetoric, is just ignore them. That's why we are so far behind.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Mr. Coates, how would you answer that question?

[Christopher Coates]

There were two parts to it: Has the world changed, and has Canada's place in it changed?

I would say, like Dr. Fergusson, that there have been indications, but the world is a worse place now than it's been in most of living memory.

In terms of Canada's place in it, it's bad and getting worse.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you.

Dr. Karako, how would you respond to that?

[Tom Karako]

I do appreciate Dr. Fergusson's candour.

We have gotten good at diagnosing the problem. We've figured out that the world has changed, and we have even begun to prescribe some solutions. We've said what we need to invest in and what we need to do differently to contend with these threats from major powers, but we've not yet begun to take our medicine, so we're not yet on the road to recovery. The sense of urgency has just not sunk in yet.