National Defence Committee on Oct. 9th, 2025

[Tom Karako]

That's Canada's choice. I would really foot-stomp what was said, I think, by Dr. Fergusson and maybe some other folks: You want lots and lots of sensors. You don't want to put all your eggs in proliferated LEO space. You don't want to put all your eggs in any one type. You want to have a diversity of sensor types so that if they can successfully blind one, you've still got lots more, like AWACS and the F-35 sensor package. You can't kill it and you can't even hunker down if you don't first see the threat.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

General Coates, when we were down at NORAD a few years back, I believe Admiral Gortney, who was the commander at the time, made a comment that instead of just sitting around all the time trying to shoot down the arrows, we should also be prepared to shoot the archer.

Knowing how our adversaries continue to proliferate in air-breathing missiles, whether they're hypersonic, superglide, cruise or ballistic missiles, do you feel, after being down in Colorado Springs for your term, that North America is prepared to also take out the archer?

[Christopher Coates]

Yes. Admiral Gortney, though, was also interested in trying to shoot those archers before they got in the air, or at least disable them. That could perhaps be done with cyber or perhaps it could be done in some logistical clever sense or even the way the Ukrainians managed through the Spiderweb.

We're moving down a path of being able to shoot the archers once they're in our periphery, but that's probably not sufficient to deal with the kinds of threats we're dealing with.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

At Colorado Springs, we had NORAD sitting in the middle office building. Beside it was NORTHCOM, and Space Command was right there. With Space Command leaving that facility and being transferred—where did they end up going? Was it Florida?

[A voice]

Alabama.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

It was Alabama.

I think you alluded to the idea that NORAD may become subservient to the U.S. Space Command under the golden dome rather than having that technology, capability and command and control under NORAD. Is that correct?

[Christopher Coates]

My view would be that as long as Canada demonstrates competency, willingness and leadership and leans forward by being an active participant, the system will ensure that proper collaboration tools are in place. I don't think it matters.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

General Coates and Professor Fergusson, you talked about our need to get onside with ballistic missile defence, but we haven't actually made the hard-core policy decision to put us in the room in the BMD part of NORAD.

Do we need to say that we are part of ballistic missile defence now and provide a location to put interceptors in Canada specifically looking towards the Arctic and the North Atlantic?

[Christopher Coates]

I think so, yes, for the reasons that Whitney outlined. It's about having a good, solid, Canadian narrative on what it is we intend to do as a nation to defend ourselves. On the one hand, it's necessary to achieve those benefits, but in addition it would be helpful for the practitioners and the “pracademics” who are involved to understand what it is that Canada intends to do.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Mr. Watchorn, you have five minutes.

[Tim Watchorn, Liberal, Les Pays-d'en-Haut, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here.

Mr. Karako, you talked about a limited area defence zone in your opening remarks. I'd like you to tell me more about that. In terms of Canada, what would you define as a “limited area defence zone”? What are the strategic locations? How would we defend those areas?

[Tom Karako]

“Limited area defence” is a term of art that has been used by NORAD for some time, and it has now been released in terms of the architecture for the golden dome idea. There needs to be a lot more information put out about the narrative for the United States regarding this as well.

I like to use the metaphor of the Super Bowl football game every year. Whenever something like that happens, there is a heightened air defence where you can't fly your Cessna over the Super Bowl, for instance. What I expect is you're going to see a number of Super Bowl-like bubbles that may change and may be altered over time. The NORTHCOM commander, who is going to have the lead on the golden dome, is going to have a lot of flexibility. The good news is that he is dual-hatted as the head of NORAD. Think of small bubbles, especially for aerial threats. You may have an underlay of additional ballistic missile defence interceptors at a couple of sites for hypersonic things, but, above all, for aerial threats, drones and cruise missiles, because their trajectory is not predictable, you have to have a smaller defended area.

That was connected to my comment that it's not just a narrative. Have the tough conversations that I think you're pointing to about what is most important for Canada in terms of command and control, political succession and military hubs. Begin to have that conversation to ask—no kidding—what is most important that absolutely must be defended to preclude our being brought to our knees.

[Tim Watchorn, Liberal, Les Pays-d'en-Haut, QC]

Thank you for your answer, which was very clear.

Ms. Rivard Piché, you talked about the possibility of attacks to test our defence capabilities. I would like you to tell me a bit more about that. What would be the nature of those attacks? Would they be cyber-attacks, other Chinese balloons or something else? How do you see that?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

I think that can be done in a number of ways. It's been seen a lot in Europe, with Russia. There has been an escalation in the grey zone over recent years. That involves trying new techniques, new measures to see if there's a response and what kind of response is given. We've seen drones, but we've also seen a number of incidents involving underwater cables, for example.

What's the response? That second example isn't necessarily military. The idea is to know whether there is a response, whether there's an understanding that it's a threat to national security, and whether there will then be a coordinated response to that threat. For example, in the incidents involving underwater cables, there was a judicial response: People were arrested, and there were criminal charges, among other things.

We see it in cybersecurity as well. People try to check where we see them, whether we see them or not, and that's when it can be dangerous. It also enables them to adapt. However, I think what's most dangerous right now, and what worries me the most, is the current escalation. These people have the impression that there will be no clear and definitive response to the progress they're making.

In the case of China, for example, the rhetoric has changed a lot in recent years, for reasons specific to the country, but also because there has been a very clear response to its role in the Arctic. China went too far, I think, with a very aggressive approach. It reviewed its diplomatic approach, because it realized that it was being excluded from certain forums.

[Tim Watchorn, Liberal, Les Pays-d'en-Haut, QC]

I see Mr. Coates nodding his head.

Thank you very much, Ms. Rivard Piché.

Mr. Coates, I'd like to hear your thoughts on this as well. How far will our adversaries go to make us react? How should we respond to those threats?

[Christopher Coates]

I think we've seen the Chancellor of Germany say in the last week that Germany is no longer at peace with Russia.

Our adversaries, China and Russia, don't abide by our arbitrary definition of what's peace and what's war, and they're in an escalating competition with us to achieve their objectives. What we would like to view as a nuisance is perhaps viewed by them as their actions, in terms of this escalation that Dr. Rivard Piché just mentioned. They are testing us at all times and trying to achieve objectives. They will keep going until they've have achieved these. Whether it's disinformation, foreign interference or cyber-attacks, we are in a competition that most Canadians are blissfully unaware of, and it affects every aspect of our society, whether it's military responses by NORAD or cyber activities.

In all respects, I think we have to really change our view of the “threat-scape” that affects us.

[Tim Watchorn, Liberal, Les Pays-d'en-Haut, QC]

Thank you very much.

Let's continue the discussion on cyber-attacks. I recently heard that we're being attacked every day by China and Russia.

Mr. Lackenbauer, how should we defend against cyber-attacks to ensure that we protect our interests?

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Mr. Lackenbauer will have to maybe respond with a letter on that one. I apologize.

Mr. Savard‑Tremblay, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Let's continue our discussion, even though it has been interrupted a few times.

Ms. Rivard Piché, I found it interesting that you told us we need to depoliticize the issue because it's currently tied to some extreme language on the part of the American president. However, this issue has taken various forms. In Ronald Regan's day, it was called “star wars”. I remember that when George W. Bush was in power, people said it was politicized because it was linked to the false war in Iraq. We forget that Mr. Bush was the most controversial president in the history of the United States at the time.

How is it that this issue is still being politicized? Why is it still associated with extremely controversial presidents? Is that by chance? I'm not sure.

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

I don't think that's a coincidence. I think it has more to do with our particular selection of cases. Decisions made under other governments have also been very controversial, in our opinion.

We're at a very unique moment. We realized that the alliance between Canada and the United States that we've enjoyed for 80 years may not be as strong as we thought. Canadians were extremely insulted, which led them to realize Canada's extreme vulnerability. The Canadian public has long assumed, with a certain degree of complacency, that the Americans would always protect Canada. The reality is that they will always protect themselves first and defend their own interests before ours.

We're at a time when Canada needs to reach its strategic maturity. We have to realize that we need to pursue and defend our own interests, that some of them are better protected through our alliance and co-operation with the Americans, but that, in other cases, we have to find other partners or develop our sovereign state capacities. This is a moment for us to reflect. That's what I'm trying to say.

National pride also shouldn't be allowed to stand in the way of national security. I think that's important. We were insulted, but we have to determine the best measures to put in place to deal with our real adversaries, who could one day jeopardize national security and defence.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

What do you mean when you say that pride shouldn't conflict with security? What I understand is that President Trump has been very clear. As much as he talks about the 51st state, he was very clear when he told us to defend ourselves because he wasn't going to defend the entire planet. There are sort of two narratives in one. In a way, pride leads to security in that matter.

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

It's possible to see things from that perspective, but it's also possible to realize that the military alliance itself hasn't been called into question. Military co-operation between Canada and the United States is still going very well. The North American Aerospace Defense Command hasn't been called into question. After this week's meeting between the Prime Minister and the president, there seems to be a clear willingness to work together to find a solution for the golden dome.

We'll have to prove that Canada can be an important and credible ally, but that it can also exercise its sovereignty. We have to make sure that the ability to control this new entity won't just be in the hands of the United States, but that we'll be able to defend ourselves in the event of an attack.

At the end of the day, we have to recognize that there's obvious value in a close relationship and an alliance with the Americans and that some of the capabilities we're going to need are going to be U.S. capabilities, such as the F‑35s and the Patriot systems, for example.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

I'd like to now go over to Mr. Bezan.

You have five minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Fergusson, you talked about the procurement system that we have and the political games that continue to get played with the F-35s, for example. We can't seem to make the decision to buy the only fifth-generation aircraft available to Canada to defend our sovereignty and work under NORAD. You don't think that the Defence Investment Agency will change things at all.

Do you believe that the Government of Canada should start using national security exemptions when it comes down to the importance of buying the proven stuff we need as it replies to continental security?

[James Fergusson]

Definitely. It's very simple. We know that if we want to stay in the context of NORAD, cruise missile defence, ballistic and the golden dome, I think it's the “maple dome” that we're going to get, whatever that means. This country—and it's not this government; it has been repeated governments—doesn't seem to realize that there are certain things about the defence marketplace that, in fact, don't give us any options. It's a function of decades of integration of our defence industries with the United States.

We talk about integration economically. We are integrated on the defence side as well, in particular, with the importance of American companies owning plants here as well as Canadian companies supplying.

If you look at key capabilities, where are they? Why are we going to try to reinvent the wheel?

Gaëlle mentioned Patriot. Well, that's a national security.... We don't have much choice about where we're going to go. The Europeans don't have anything, unless we want to go to the Israelis; they have something for us. We sort of know where these are. When it's very clear.... The F-35 was another example.

This is it. Everyone is buying this within the allied world. We are involved under consortium. The national security exemption is illogical, because there's nothing we can do to compete, particularly if, as everyone has said here, time is urgent. I see no reason why not to.