Natural Resources Committee on Feb. 24th, 2009

[Dr. Michael Binder]

I just want to add that we've already acknowledged we can report better and we acknowledge we can do a better job of explaining what's going on. The one thing I need to emphasize is that there's a difference between something inside the facility and what is happening in the environment. We impose on the licensees, they have to measure and report the impacts on the environment, and that's really the trigger when we get really concerned.

So if you actually get into Ottawa measurements on the impact on the Ottawa water concentration, on air, on land, etc., those are the things we really should explain better.

We tried in this chart of water. Even after the spill you can see that the level of measurable tritium in the Ottawa River was way, way, way below the California standard.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Mr. Cullen.

Now to the government side, to Mr. Hiebert, for up to seven minutes.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Binder, the question we have is the question that Canadians want answered, and that is, to what degree is there a risk to the public or the environment?

On a number of occasions you've said in your report that there was low safety significance. So you didn't choose to mention the events that happened in December. Then later you mentioned there was no risk to health and safety or the environment. And then speaking of what happened just this past weekend, you again said there was no risk to the health and safety of the public, the workers, or the environment.

I want to unpack that a little bit. What do you mean when you say that the level of risk to the public was low or of no significance, or that there was no risk to the public?

[Dr. Michael Binder]

In any industrial project, from petroleum to coal mines, you name it, there are what are known as “planned emissions”. In our business it is controlled, it is monitored, it is measured. In other words, we set the boundary of what is acceptable in the operation.

These boundaries are set by the international scientific and medical community. It's the health community that tells us what is an appropriate level; it is not us. We adopt these, we put them in place and we impose them, and then we add some more safety factors to them.

For example, the real or true impact on the health of the public and the environment is yet another measure, and it's called millisievert. If the allowable health impact is one millisievert, all of our standard behaviour is that as long as you are below that level, there are very low risks to health.

I don't know, Dr. Thompson, if you want to add to that.

All our operations in Canada are based on this particular health-related standard.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

In the chart you provided to us, it states that the regulatory limit is one millisievert, which is the safe level below which you want to have operations maintained. On the same graph, you also indicate that the maximum potential exposure from the recent events was 2/10,000 of one millisievert. For those of us who aren't technical, can you explain the difference between one millisievert and 2/10,000? On the scale of a swimming pool, how much are we talking about in terms of 2/10,000 of one millisievert?

[Dr. Michael Binder]

I don't know how to explain a 2/10,000 percentage more strictly. It's minuscule, that's all I can say. And it has no impact. There is no known empirical health evidence of an impact of that concentration on the health of human beings, animals, air, you name it.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

And that's why you've stated categorically that there was no risk to the public, there was no risk to the people who live near the Ottawa River or work near the Ottawa River, because it was so minuscule.

[Dr. Michael Binder]

Correct.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

All right.

Now, there has been some question as to when this was reported. Could you unpack the process that AECL and CNSC have in their reporting mechanism for these kinds of things?

[Dr. Michael Binder]

Well, the moment something happens.... First of all, everybody should know that there are all kinds of bells and whistles and triggers and indicators measuring things that might happen. If something gets triggered, operators go in and try to find out what's wrong.

If they suspect, let's say, a leak, as happened on December 5, they go in. We have staff on site; we are on top of the operators like a wet blanket. We monitor what they do. The operator there phones our desk inspector, if you like, and informs him the very next day that something is going down. And our people go in there and together they observe what's going on.

If they break a particular threshold—in this particular case, 10 kilograms of heavy water leaked—they absolutely have to submit a formal written report to us. That report is filled out, and if it's deemed to be significant, the licensee has to appear in front of the commission in a public hearing to explain the significance of the event. This is public and people can intervene and comment, etc.

So the problem has been that the two sides have decided that something is insignificant because of the relatively minuscule amount of water. We've agreed that we can do better. Since they report to us, we might as well report to everybody that it has happened--and we are looking into improving our reporting requirements.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

So are you telling us that in the past these sorts of incidents were not reported because they were considered so minuscule, so insignificant?

[Dr. Michael Binder]

The minuscule and the small incidents were not reported. But for significant incidents, for example, a trip, or if our Pickering nuclear plant shut down, they have to come to us and explain why.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Right. But in terms of the leaks that we have been referring to, they were of such small significance that under the previous standards that you had voluntarily adopted, they were not worthwhile reporting--

[Dr. Michael Binder]

To the public.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

--to the public, but you've gone above and beyond the expectations or the requirements of the law to provide that additional information even though it's insignificant.

Is there not a risk here of creating some unnecessary concern by the public in reporting these insignificant leaks?

[Dr. Michael Binder]

Well, that's the other side. In fact, we have some advisory committees who keep telling us, “Don't tell us all the routine stuff. We're not interested in the routine stuff.” So you get caught as to what it is that you report. And we are working with the industry now as to what would make sense. Every time we say there is a leak, people don't believe that all of a sudden everything stops and....

And by the way, as an aside, regarding the leak last weekend, on Sunday, my understanding is that the machine was not shut down. It happened somewhere outside the core, and the production of isotopes continued.

So here your point is well taken. What is the balance? What should we report to the public without raising unnecessary angst?

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Just briefly, my colleague from the opposition raised the question of becquerels per litre and he said that California's limit was 740. Dr. Thompson said that our limit has never exceeded 20. Is this a safe standard?

[Dr. Patsy Thompson]

Mr. Chair and members of Parliament, the standard that Canada has adopted, the 7,000 becquerels per litre, is based on recommendations from the World Health Organization. It is a safe standard. The dose associated with this level of tritium in drinking water.... If someone were to drink 7,000 becquerels per litre every day for a full year, it would not result in a health risk that would be measurable. This is a level deemed safe by the World Health Organization, which has been adopted by Canada.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

But you said the measurements were at 20.

[Dr. Patsy Thompson]

That's right, so the CNSC does not use 7,000 as its limit for regulating the industry. The regulatory framework is based on the public dose limit but also on action levels and administrative levels, and the requirement for operators to take all reasonable precautions to operate and maintain their plants well. In the history of the CNSC, facilities we regulate have released tritium into the environment, but in drinking water supplies we have rarely seen levels of tritium above the 10 to 15 range. There are some levels at 17, but usually--

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

So we're well below that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Mr. Hiebert, your time is up.

Now we will go to Mr. McGuinty of the official opposition for up to five minutes.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for joining us today, Dr. Thompson and Mr. Binder.

Mr. Binder, I want to go back to your comments about being surprised. You said you were surprised about the interest in what you called a so-called leak, and then you called it a leak. Do you think it's wrong for Canadians to be surprised or interested in the fact that the reactor that supplies more than half of the world's medical isotopes is leaking?

[Dr. Michael Binder]

Obviously now, as we've admitted, Canadians want to know. We will gladly share with them more information.

What was surprising, again, is that the leak was inside the machine. None of this went outside to the river, etc., and that's why we took a decision not to go public with this. And by the way, as an aside, a couple of weeks later it would be reported to the advisory committee, the AECL heads there, as part of their procedures.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Mr. Binder, on December 10, 2007, the government registered an order in council, which was only published and made public for the Canadian people on December 26, the day after Christmas 2007, splitting or in fact giving your Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission a dual mandate. On the one hand, you're in the business of nuclear safety, and now, on the other hand, to read from the order in council, you must take into account “the health of Canadians who, for medical purposes, depend on nuclear substances produced by nuclear reactors”.

There was no debate about this, no tabling of legislation, nothing in the House of Commons, nothing at this committee.

Last night, Linda Keen, on cbc.ca, the CBC's website, is quoted as saying at 11 p.m., through her first interview since her firing by the former minister, that she feared for the safety of Canadians for two reasons, one because in the second phone call she got from Minister Gary Lunn she was ordered to restart the NRU. She was ordered to start it up even though, acting within the four corners of the statute that empowers your commission, her advice was that this was unsafe.

The second reason she gave was that Canadians should fear nuclear safety in this country because of the dual mandate that you must now execute on, given to you by the Government of Canada or the Conservative government with no consultation, no parliamentary debate, no committee debate, which now compels you, as Canada's top nuclear safety regulator, to balance the production of medical isotopes with nuclear safety.

First, is she wrong? Secondly, is there another nuclear safety commission anywhere in the world with this dual mandate?