Thank you very much, Chair.
I want to assure you that I will remain studiously within the rules throughout this committee, which, I think, members would acknowledge that I have some passing familiarity with.
In terms of the points of order that have been raised regarding relevance, it's important to clarify for Mr. Angus, who may benefit from this reminder, that what we're debating right now is a privilege motion. We are not debating the programming motion, which the government put forward to try to ram through legislation and limit debate and opportunities for members to represent their constituents.
We are debating a motion that deals with the privileges of members. Discussions about the nature of privilege, where it applies and how it applies are centrally relevant. They are not just related to the topic; they are the topic itself.
In fact, the points I have been seeking to make through a couple of interruptions have been to respond to previous points of debate that this member has brought forward under the guise of points of order. He continues to provide me with additional material that requires a response, which may have the effect of requiring me to speak longer than I had otherwise intended. I will nonetheless aspire to be as brief as my constitution allows.
Mr. Chair, the point that I had been pursuing was around the question of whether freedom of speech for members is a contingent right or is a right as such, regardless of circumstances. There are two ways of speaking about rights—well, there are far more than two, but one simplification in terms of ways of looking at it....
What is a right? A right is something that is due to someone in virtue of justice, what justice requires ought to be due to them. There are some rights that flow from contingencies or circumstances such as a right to wages. Someone has the right to a wage if they engage in a particular task. Then there are rights that are not contingent. They are absolute. They are things that everybody should have a right to by virtue of being a human or by virtue of who they are.
In the case of privilege, we're talking about rights that are contingent in a sense. They are contingent on someone's being a member of Parliament, but they should not be contingent on any other circumstances.
Is the freedom of speech that members of Parliament are supposed to have, which is central to privilege, contingent on the activities the member has undertaken in the past or the kind of riding they represent such that someone could be denied their freedom of speech if the contingent factors were such that other members thought they didn't merit the right to speak? Is that the nature of privilege? Is that the nature of freedom of speech, or is freedom of speech something that should, in fact, be available to all members of Parliament? It shouldn't be contingent on the peculiarities of circumstance.
In preparing for today, I pulled some documents regarding parliamentary privilege off the parliamentary website. They do underline the supremacy of the doctrine of free speech for parliamentarians in Parliament, the absolute importance of that and, I think, the non-contingent nature of that right.
I think this is well established. For instance, this is from Marleau and Montpetit's House of Commons Procedure and Practice, chapter 3, “Privileges and Immunities”, which notes:
The rights, privileges and immunities of individual Members of the House are finite, that is to say, they can be enumerated but not extended except by statute or, in some cases, by constitutional amendment, and can be examined by the courts. Moreover, privilege does not exist “at large” but applies only in context, which usually means within the confines of the parliamentary precinct and a “proceeding in Parliament”. With the role of the courts to uphold the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as the Canadian Bill of Rights, Members must avoid creating unnecessary conflicts with private rights and thereby having issues of parliamentary privilege brought before the courts.
Proceeding from there on the issue of freedom of speech, House of Commons Procedure and Practice notes the following:
By far, the most important right accorded to Members of the House is the exercise of freedom of speech in parliamentary proceedings.
I was even struck by this because I might have supposed that the right to vote had a greater or at least comparable status, but House of Commons Procedure and Practice does seem to say that the importance of the protection of speech is the most important right: “By far, the most important right accorded to Members of the House is the exercise of freedom of speech in parliamentary proceedings.”
Chapter 3 goes on to say the following:
It has been described as:
...a fundamental right without which they would be hampered in the performance of their duties. It permits them to speak in the House without inhibition, to refer to any matter or express any opinion as they see fit, to say what they feel needs to be said in the furtherance of the national interest and the aspirations of their constituents.
I find that to be an important and even beautiful passage. It goes on:
Much has been written about this over the centuries in Great Britain, Canada and throughout the Commonwealth.
The following paragraph, which I'll skip, references the Australian tradition and some quotations. Then it reads:
The statutory existence of parliamentary privilege in relation to freedom of speech dates from the adoption of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Though meant to counter the challenge of the Crown, it also prohibited actions of any kind by any person outside the House against Members for what they might say or do in Parliament. Article 9 of that statute declares that “the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”.
