Public Accounts Committee on June 22nd, 2006

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Professor Malloy, if that were the case, would you suggest that we have our own resources and we send an audit team there? Is that your suggestion? I am just trying to conceptualize it.

[Jonathan Malloy]

It would have to be quite an unusual situation, so I'm not sure exactly what I would advocate in that regard.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

This is why academia and practicality sometimes are on a collision course.

Professor Franks wanted to say something.

[Prof. C.E.S. (Ned) Franks]

If I may, Jonathan, I'll add to what you said there.

In Britain the Auditor General actually sits almost as a member of the committee; they'd be sitting right over there. The Auditor General's office also prepares the list of proposed questions for the committee and prepares the reports of the committee.

We have a different relationship in Canada, which I think is correct, that whatever preparation for questioning is done by the staff of the committee. Reports are drafted by the staff of the committee.

I think that area should be strengthened. Many of the reports of the Auditor General are not of direct interest to the committee and they are not investigated. On the other hand, say the committee wanted to get into this area of deputy ministers and seagull missions; they might want to commission a report of their own.

It seems to me that's the area where the interests of the committee and the Auditor General can diverge.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Finally, I know that the committee audits the Auditor General. How do you propose we ensure that the conflict is minimized? We have a wonderful Auditor General at the moment, but five years from now we may not, I don't know.

From a theoretical perspective, how would you suggest we ensure...? You can't have zero risk, but you can minimize that risk.

[Jonathan Malloy]

The answer in some ways is fairly practical. In terms of keeping the relationship on a professional basis, which is my understanding of what the relationship is here, it's quite possible to rely on the Auditor General in the sense I'm talking about. But also, she, in her office, is responsible to this committee. It's quite possible to keep those two relationships going at the same time.

I admit, it is in some ways more of a theoretical concern, but the larger issue is that this is a committee of the House of Commons. The committee, not the Auditor General of Canada, should be in the driver's seat in terms of setting its agenda and using its resources the way it wants.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

We'll go to Monsieur Sauvageau.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you, gentlemen. I have several questions for you.

I've been a member of this committee for a few years now and I've had occasion to get frustrated. I'd like your remarks on this subject to go on the record. They'll be interpreted in one way or another by the committee. However, there's nothing unusual in that.

I read in the material distributed to new MPs that committees in general had a mandate to conduct investigations. The word “investigation ” appears in the manual that new MPs receive from the House of Commons. In his opening remarks, Mr. Malloy used the words “inquire and investigate”. I take that to mean that committees can conduct inquiries and investigations.

In my opinion, this committee has all too often limited itself to following up on the Auditor General's reports.

In your opinion, is it the primary role of this committee to follow up on the Auditor General's report, or can the committee also decide on its own to inquire into certain matters?

I'll give you some examples later.

[Jonathan Malloy]

This committee is free to do those things. It historically has not initiated large investigations of any sort. Indeed, to do so would largely duplicate the work the Auditor General has done.

The role of this committee, and its contribution separate from the Auditor General, is to act as a forum for the discussion of the Auditor General's findings. It's a chance for different parties, from the public service and elsewhere, to give their version and to have their say. To have it examined in a parliamentary setting like this, in a public forum--that's something the Auditor General can't do.

So the committee is free to do its own investigations. However, I think that quite often would duplicate the role of the Auditor General.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Sauvageau, with your permission perhaps I'll get a response from Mr. Williams, as a former chair, on that issue.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

With your permission, I'll clarify my question. Mr. WIlliams can then venture a response.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Sure, and then we can go to Mr. Franks and Mr. Williams on that. It's a very important issue that you've raised.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

I'll give you two examples. I believe the committee's primary role is to follow up on the Auditor General's reports. However, if it did nothing more than that, the committee would always be reactive, never proactive. If the committee could occasionally, not regularly...

Let me give you an example. The federal government shelled out $16 million to host the World Aquatic Championships in Montreal. The Auditor General has yet to audit this expenditure. The entire board of directors was relived of its duties. A suicide has even been reported in connection with this matter and the expenditure of $16 million.

I asked the committee to begin an audit of sorts, to obtain internal documents from the Department of Canadian Heritage. I was told that this was not... Perhaps the committee could simply go over some of the material and steer the Auditor General in the right direction on this file. Far be it for me to do her job.

Consider a second example. We learned through the Department of Public Works and Government Services that the government has 450,000 surplus feet of leased office space. If we apply the rule of three, that would mean that $210 million is being spent, or wasted, each year by the federal government to lease unnecessary space. The Auditor General has yet to investigate this report. Should she look into this matter in three years and table a report six months later, that means the committee would have to wait four years before it has a chance to ask some questions and an additional $840 million would be spent. Why couldn't the committee take a proactive stand?

That's what I'd like to discuss with you, and with Mr. Williams as well.

[Prof. C.E.S. (Ned) Franks]

You have been proactive as a committee. The study of ministerial responsibility done last year was largely independent of the Auditor General's report. It was done primarily as a result of dissatisfaction in the committee with what it had found in its investigation into the sponsorship program. So there's nothing preventing the committee from doing that.

I will leave the aquatic centre aside because I know too little about it. But office space is an issue on which you have a report by the Auditor General. You have had a preliminary look at it. My view is that you should make a report as a committee saying you are not satisfied with the government's way of controlling office space costs, and then ask the Treasury Board and the Department of Public Works, or whoever, to respond.

You are perfectly entitled to carry on from that over the years and, if you're not satisfied with the government's response, produce another report, as I understand the committee has done with the report on ministerial responsibility and accountability. I think you're already on the route you're suggesting.

[John Williams, Conservative, Edmonton—St. Albert, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, my appreciation to our witnesses for coming here this morning. Of course, we've had a long association with Professor Franks, and we welcome also Professor Malloy and Mr. Dubrow.

As to our role as the public accounts committee, I saw it as a committee that exacted a political accountability. There are basically three different kinds of accountability. There is administrative accountability, where employees are held accountable by their employer or someone more senior to them for their performance of their job. There is legal accountability, where people may end up being charged and have to defend themselves in a court of law, and of course out of the sponsorship scandal we got Mr. Guité, who had legal accountability, and the others as well. But there is also political accountability, which is that you can't put governments in jail; therefore, we are the political accountability mechanism for government, which we deal with in the court of public opinion. I think the people spoke in the last couple of elections, and the results are where they are.

As to us investigating issues such as the aquatic centre in Montreal, these are potentially--and I really don't know all the details--highly charged issues. I see legal accountability here, administrative accountability, and political accountability. But we should not confuse our role with the other two of legal and administrative accountability.

We deal in the court of public opinion. We don't always deal with facts, as we all know. Politics is a rough game. It can be push and shove, and the person whose opinion gets traction is the one who wins. It's not a balanced process like we have in a court of law, and it's not a fair and reasonable process as we have in administration.

So to answer Mr. Sauvageau's issue, if a committee feels that there has been some serious wrongdoing and a waste of taxpayers' money, or whatever else has gone on, we should be passing a motion to have the Auditor General investigate.

She is our eyes and ears. She has a 600-person staff and a $65 million budget, give or take. We could never supplant that resource and the non-partisanship and professionalism that she brings to the investigation.

If we were to do it, if we didn't hire the Auditor General, we'd have to hire somebody else. Therefore, on this notion that we as a committee do investigations, it would still be done by professionals.

We try to be non-partisan, but politics are partisan, and Parliament is about partisanship. Therefore, to me, it is far better, when you're talking about the accountability of the administration, that coming to this committee the Auditor General brings issues to the fore of senior management, who should exact their administrative accountabilities. I say “should” because if we take a look at the issue in the firearms registry and the non-reporting of funds, I don't think there was any administrative accountability. But then it comes to us, a different forum, a different kind of accountability, where we take it and go public with it, in essence, and we use it for the objectives we all have.

Therefore, I appreciate Dr. Franks' point that we could use resources to go into the areas that are perhaps a nexus between the administration and the politics and the policies. That's an area into which the Auditor General will not go. It's getting too close to policy, too close to politics.

It would be fraught with danger if we were to go into that area as a committee, because nobody sitting at this table is non-partisan. You end up with the dominant side winning the day. Therefore, I would be very, very reluctant to go down that road unless it was very, very carefully thought out so as to ensure that the public accounts committee didn't lose its way, lose its credibility, and destroy the effectiveness we have.

In a majority government, we still have to enjoy, in essence, the confidence of the government as well. I'm a great proponent of having government report to Parliament. And we are supreme, we are farther up the food chain than government, but unfortunately, in many ways, as we all know around this table, when the government speaks, Parliament quite often ends up listening, rather than the other way around.

That's a more philosophical and deep problem, and it's not going to get addressed here, Mr. Chair.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

I have a tremendous amount of respect for Mr. Williams, the long-time chair of this committee. However, I would like to mention one small thing. When he says “the committee must”, with all due respect, that's his interpretation. He did not write the book on committee rules of procedures. I think it would be preferable to say ”the committee should” or “in my opinion, the committee must”. I say this with all due respect, Mr. Williams, and I had to muster all of my courage to say that to you.

However, having said that, I agree that we're conducting a political audit of sorts. We have neither the authority nor the resources that the Auditor General has. I will concede as much. I do not have Mr. Williams' experience or that of the other two experts who are here today to enlighten us. I'll admit to that as well.

In my opinion, following up on the AG's reports must be the committee's first priority. Nevertheless, I'm convinced -- unless someone can convince me otherwise and that won't be easy, although I'd like to think that I keep an open mind -- that on occasion and exceptionally, the committee can and must call in witnesses, if only once or twice, before referring some matter to the Auditor General.

For example, the Department of Canadian Heritage awarded $16 million to a particular organization. Certain internal, external and legal audit reports are not available or cannot be accessed readily. A special request must be made under the Access to Information Act.

As I see it, we should hold one or two committee meetings to see if indeed there is a problem or whether the media is really to blame. If we do discover that there is a problem and that we have neither the resources nor the mandate to resolve it, then the committee could recommend that the Auditor General conduct an investigation.

Should we be content with merely saying that we heard there was a problem and therefore ask the AG to resolve it? I'm not saying the Auditor General is at fault because studies are one or two years in the making. That's a very normal timeframe. In two years, the committee could revisit the issue.

All I'm asking is whether this once, the committee can and should undertake this kind of study.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

We'll invite a comment from Professor Franks and Professor Malloy. I think you have the gist of Monsieur Sauvageau's point. He's basically saying that if we do see a grievous offence involving taxpayers' money.... Now, again, this is an issue of resources. We can't send Brian to Montreal to investigate the $16 million. It would require substantially more resources than we have now, a different framework.

Then you're following up on Mr. Williams' point. You're getting into this--

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Maybe I can try this in English. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I never said that. I don't want to say that.

We have some internal-external reports in Heritage Canada available now--not in Montreal, not in Saskatchewan, but in Ottawa. We can take the report of the heritage minister and do the follow-up here in the committee.

It's one example.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Perhaps we'll invite a comment from Professor Franks or Professor Malloy.

Do you have anything to add on that?

[Prof. C.E.S. (Ned) Franks]

I'll try to answer. “Non-partisan” perhaps isn't the right word to describe the committee, because unlike professors, every member of Parliament pretty well is a partisan animal--and that's very important. That's how people vote and that's how people understand Parliament.

The reason the committee has an opposition chair is the theory that an opposition member like Mr. Williams, when he was the chair, has a stronger motive for investigating and being skeptical about government than does a government member. The reason the members are in proportion to voting strength in the House is so there's a good balance on the committee between the government side and the other sides. So there is partisan motivation.

The issue, it seems to me, is that I believe the focus of the committee should--this is a should not in the imperative but in the conditional and the subjunctive--look at the administrative side of government, not the political decisions, not the decisions of ministers, because they're perfectly adequately looked at through question period and other committees.

One of your jobs is to preserve the autonomy of the public service so that it is accountable to the rules and regulations and statutes that govern it, which I think has not always been the case.

To do that, it seems to me, the committee has to work as a body that agrees. I thought the strongest part of the work the committee did last year on responsibility and accountability was that ultimately it was a unanimous report, including the government members, the parliamentary secretaries, and the opposition. I thought that was a wonderful achievement, a tremendous thing to have done.

I'm hoping--and I believe it's possible--the committee in future will strive for that level of agreement between the members from the different sides on its activities and what it does. That does not mean every member or every party's wishes will be achieved; I think the government will find it doesn't like what the committee does, but it's up to the committee itself to work things out so there's an agreed-upon decision. It seems to me that is the way the committee will be effective in ensuring responsibility and accountability.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Professor Franks.

Anything to add, Professor Malloy?

[Jonathan Malloy]

On this issue, especially the situation you gave of having a timely investigation of facts and then referring further to the Auditor General, hypothetically that could work. I think, as I said before, that sort of fact-finding investigation quite often will duplicate the work of the Auditor General.

The independent contribution this committee can make, as Mr. Williams was saying, is particularly in the political examination of things in a public forum. It will ask questions that would be inappropriate for the Auditor General to ask. In a situation like this of investigating facts, the committee can't necessarily play that public forum role until it has the facts, which are best gathered by a competent non-partisan authority like the Auditor General.

Generally, when political committees--not just this committee but any parliamentary committee--get into fact-finding, they quite quickly get into acrimonious exchanges, just about finding the basic facts, and usually not much work is done. It is usually better to wait for the Auditor General to establish the detailed information, which can then be examined and discussed in a more partisan forum such as this one.

As I said, the committee could use more resources I think, perhaps in terms of digesting Auditor Generals' reports and preparing MPs better for questions and that sort of thing--that's not to say the staff doesn't do a good job now. As I said, the fact-finding investigations would be much more exceptional cases. In most cases it would simply duplicate the work of the Auditor General and not really make an important contribution to accountability.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Is there anyone over here who has any other issues they want to probe?

Mr. Fitzpatrick.

[Brian Fitzpatrick, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

On the firearms issue, an overarching concern I have on the way that matter unfolded is the Treasury Board. I see the Auditor General involved when the train gets off the tracks, but I see it as the Treasury Board's role to make sure the train stays on the tracks and to sort of police the Financial Administration Act and the Treasury Board rules and guidelines, and so on.

If they do a really good job, it seems to me, the Auditor General comes up with reports that basically say things are being managed correctly, and so on. When she comes up with reports that are highly critical of what's happened, something in the system has broken down. So in that sense, I see Treasury Board being the proactive agent in this process and the Auditor General being the reactive agent in the whole thing.

I liked the suggestions of Professor Franks about developing a stronger relationship with Treasury Board and maybe having them more accountable to this committee and responsible to this committee for what's going on.

I was far from impressed. I really thought Treasury Board helped senior bureaucrats in the government find ways to circumvent their own policies in an indirect fashion and by extraordinary means, and so on, which I found just astounding. That certainly shouldn't be the way Treasury Board operates.

I just want to make that comment. I think those are two excellent points, and I hope we as a committee can follow up on those recommendations and pursue that, because I think that's pretty important. If the Auditor General is treated in isolation from Treasury Board and there is no connection between these things, I don't really know where we go.

I was going to ask Professor Franks his thoughts on what kinds of duties and responsibilities we should be looking at in terms of the accounting officers with this board. Can you give us some specific suggestions?