Public Accounts Committee on Nov. 27th, 2012

[The Chair, NDP, David Christopherson]

I'm terribly sorry, but we're way over time. I wanted to give that exchange an opportunity, but maybe you could give your answer in something else.

Madam Biguzs, you mentioned in a response to Mr. Byrne that you could provide some information, but you said you couldn't give a timeframe. You said “at the soonest available opportunity”. I would ask that you mull that over during the course of the meeting and come up with a timeframe you can commit to and then see whether the committee accepts it. Leaving it that open is not all that helpful.

[Anita Biguzs]

I take your point.

[The Chair, NDP, David Christopherson]

Thank you so much. I appreciate that.

Mr. Aspin, you have the floor, sir.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Welcome to our guests. Thank you for being with us to enlighten us on such an important topic.

I'd like to return to the matter of safety management systems and continue the discussion started by my colleague Mr. Dreeshen.

These safety management systems intrigue me. Basically, it's a very proactive approach. Mr. McDonald, could you provide us with an example, and maybe an elaboration, on how this type of approach will strengthen the culture of safety?

[Gerard McDonald]

I'm sorry...?

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Could you provide us with an example and perhaps further elaboration on how the safety management system approach will strengthen the culture of safety?

[Gerard McDonald]

Essentially what it does is force the companies to constantly, from day to day, look at their safety issues to ensure that they're meeting the regulatory requirements or, indeed, exceeding the regulatory requirements. What we do is go in and verify that they have the systems in place to show us that they're doing that.

As Mr. Eley pointed out, it's a much more proactive system. Instead of waiting for Transport Canada to find some flaw in their system, the safety management system actually forces them to go out and look for the flaws, to look for the deficiencies in their system, and also to develop plans to rectify those flaws.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Very good.

What would be the next steps for SMS implementation? Are the stakeholders supportive of this approach?

[Gerard McDonald]

With respect to SMS—safety management systems—right now, obviously, operators can apply them on a voluntary basis, and we support that very much, but they apply to air carriers of 20 passengers and above, which we classify as the 705 carriers. The next step for us, which we're assessing right now, is whether or not to introduce a regulatory requirement for SMS in the smaller carriers, the 10- to 20-passenger operations, and the 0- to 10-passenger operations, the air taxi operations.

What we're trying to assess first is industry's capacity to implement those types of systems. Obviously, a smaller company doesn't have the same resource base that an Air Canada might have to implement the system. We're also assessing what our resource requirements are or would be to oversee an introduction of those regulatory changes, should they be brought about.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Where do we stand on safety management systems internationally? Are we at the forefront in the world? Are we in the middle of the pack? Are we trailing? Could you give me a relative idea of where we stand?

[Gerard McDonald]

I'll let Mr. Eley handle that one.

[Martin Eley]

We were certainly at the forefront in introducing the concept. We slowed things down a bit in 2009, as a conscious decision, to make sure that we were ready for the initiatives that Mr. McDonald just described, but we're doing a lot of work with those other authorities. They're learning from some of the things that we learned along the way. We're also learning a lot from where they are.

I would say that we're with the pack. In some areas, we're ahead, and in some areas we're not as advanced, but we're certainly in the lead group. There's no question about it.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

You mentioned that this safety management system basically started with the chemical industry in terms of its initiation. How widespread is it in the aviation industry?

[Martin Eley]

In areas where we haven't regulated SMS to date, we find companies that are already doing it, particularly those in Canada. There's a lot of work in the energy sector. You can't get a contract in the energy sector unless you have an SMS in place, irrespective of our regulations; it's very much that certain sectors of the industry, outside of aviation, require that of their aviation components, whatever we do. It's very much present in a lot of our industry, even where it's not regulated.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

But how prevalent is it worldwide in terms of other countries? Could you give me a feel for that?

[Martin Eley]

I think the energy sector is one of the leads, and worldwide you will find the same thing, so for Canadian companies working on contracts in other parts of the world, exactly the same requirements are in place. More and more businesses.... The medical industry is moving into that area. Many in industry realize this, and a lot of the literature talks about the “organizational accident” and dealing with all those little things so that they don't become an accident. That really is the culture that's spreading to many, many industries. I would say that SMS is a worldwide phenomenon in many industries.

[The Chair, NDP, David Christopherson]

Thank you.

Your time has expired, Mr. Aspin.

[Jay Aspin, Conservative, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, NDP, David Christopherson]

We'll move on.

Now Monsieur Giguère has the floor.

[Alain Giguère, NDP, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to talk about inspection and risk characterization at Transport Canada. The Auditor General had already said that in a majority of cases, inspections do not indicate the scope of the records reviewed in the company or, most importantly, whether the findings could have a significant impact on safety. How can we hope that a situation will be remedied if the dangers observed are not included in the report?

I would like to make an important comment. I do not want to ambush you, but from the research I did, I have files on an airline company whose flight authorization was suspended because of a problem that was two years old. It took the department two years to realize there was a major risk.

Can you answer the question, please? How can a situation where there is a risk be remedied if the dangers observed are not reported?

[Martin Eley]

There was a mention in the introductory remarks today about some of the work we're doing in the enforcement area. That's precisely to make sure that our enforcement tools are properly aligned with our inspection tools so that when we see a risk, we will have consistency across the country in how to address that risk. We've not necessarily had that ability in the past. We certainly have that ability today, because we're seeing the information across the country on a regular basis.

We have enhanced monitoring, the inspection programs we talked about from a planning point of view. If we see any sort of risk in a company, we have clear guidance on stepping up to enhance monitoring, which may expedite a solution, or it may expedite some sort of enforcement activities.

I believe we already have some tools in place. There will be more work done between now and the end of this fiscal year to address exactly that issue, to make sure we are consistent in the way we deal with that.

[Alain Giguère, NDP, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Doing inspections is a good thing, but if the inspector goes somewhere and has not been told about the relevant risks, the inspector does not know what specific points to inspect. This is particularly the case in the files that I have: there were inspections, but because he was not told there was a major risk, he continued to authorize the company to fly for two years, when there was a significant danger. That is the problem.

On page 21 of your report, you listed 10 of the key hazard areas. Your department has no complaints office. A passenger, a crew member, a ground mechanic, a NAV CANADA staff member or someone working at an airport may observe a danger or a risk relating to a company, and your department has no complaints office. In saying this, I am relying on the documents you provided to us. An inspector is not told there is a risk that he or she should examine more closely in the next inspection. That is problematic.

That is what happened in the cases I referred to. There were official complaints made to a high-ranking employee in your department, and that official did not put them in the file. As a result, your inspector went out and did not see anything. It was not until two and a half years later that you decided to say that what had happened in 2009 was unacceptable, to the point that you withdrew the flight authorization. That is a major error.

Why do you not have a complaints office? That in itself would mean that your inspectors, who test an adequate number of cases, are interviewing the right people to reach the right conclusion from the right information that they have received.

[Gerard McDonald]

Mr. Chair, I don't know the specifics of the particular company that the member is talking about, but I would point out that in addition to interacting directly with inspectors, we have at least two ways in which the public or a member of a company can advise us of issues in the system.

One is our civil aviation incident reporting system. That number is widely available through our website and is made available to industry in general. That's how an issue can be reported to us. We have a system in place to make sure it is followed up on.

I would also point out that the Transportation Safety Board of Canada has a system called Securitas, in which incidents in the aviation industry—or anywhere in the transportation industry, for that matter—can be reported to the Transportation Safety Board. The identify of the plaintiff is guarded. It is not revealed to Transport Canada. That information is passed to us by the TSB, and we take appropriate action to follow up.

[The Chair, NDP, David Christopherson]

We'll go over now to Mr. Saxton for the end of our natural rotation.

You have the floor, sir.

[Andrew Saxton, Conservative, North Vancouver, BC]

Thank you, Chair. My question is for Transport Canada.

In response to recommendation 5.63, you indicated that by July 2012, all current inspectors would have been given surveillance procedures training.

I'd just like to ask if this was done.