Public Accounts Committee on June 2nd, 2016

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Good morning. This is meeting number 17 of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Thursday, June 2, 2016.

Today we're conducting a hearing on Report 2 of the Spring 2016 reports of the Auditor General of Canada, entitled “Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the Citizenship Program”.

We have with us today from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Anita Biguzs, deputy minister; and Robert Orr, assistant deputy minister of operations. From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Brendan Heffernan, director general, Canadian criminal real time identification services; and Jamie Solesme, officer in charge, federal coordination center, Canada-U.S. From the Canada Border Services Agency, we have Denis Vinette, acting associate vice-president, operations branch. Finally, from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, we are honoured to have with us Mr. Michael Ferguson, our Auditor General of Canada; and Nicholas Swales, principal.

We will have an opening statement from each of our four witnesses. I will now ask Mr. Ferguson, the Auditor General of Canada, to proceed first.

[Michael Ferguson, Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada]

Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to discuss our 2016 spring report on detecting and preventing fraud in the citizenship program.

I'm accompanied by Nicholas Swales, the principal responsible for the audit.

In our audit we examined whether Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada had adequate practices to detect and thereby prevent fraud in adult citizenship applications. We looked at practices intended to ensure that citizenship applicants met the program's residency requirements, that they had no criminal prohibitions, and that they were permanent residents of Canada.

We looked at several important controls designed to help citizenship officers identify fraud risks, and we found that these controls were inconsistently applied. As a result, people were granted citizenship based on incomplete information or without all of the necessary checks being done.

To meet residency requirements, individuals sometimes use an address that is known or suspected to be associated with fraud. Although the department had a database to help it detect the use of such problem addresses, we found cases in which data entry errors and inconsistent updating prevented officers from having accurate or up-to-date information about these addresses.

In addition, even when information was available in the system, officers did not always act on it. For example, in 18 of 49 cases, citizenship officers did not carry out the required additional procedures when the department's database system revealed the use of a problem address.

Another method of simulating residency in Canada is by altering passport or visa stamps to reflect shorter or fewer trips, thereby increasing the number of days an applicant appears to have been present in Canada. We found that the department's practices for dealing with suspicious documents were inconsistent and that its guidance was ambiguous. As a result, some regions seized problem documents but others did not, creating a risk that fraudulent documents would continue to circulate.

The department's task is further complicated by poor information-sharing with the RCMP and the Canada Border Services Agency. Although each citizenship applicant undergoes a criminal clearance check early in the application process, we found that the department had weak processes for obtaining complete information about criminal charges.

We looked at 38 cases in which the RCMP should have shared information about charges with the department and found that it had shared the information in only two cases.

We also found that after the criminal clearance check was completed, the department had no systematic way to obtain information directly from police forces, other than the RCMP, on criminal charges against citizenship applicants.

With regard to investigations of immigration fraud by the Canada Border Services Agency, we found that the agency had not shared information with the department in 11 of the 38 cases we examined.

We also found that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada did not have in place all the elements it needed to successfully manage fraud risks in the citizenship program. For example, the department did not have in place a rigorous process to identify, understand and document the nature and scope of citizenship fraud risks. As a result, the department could not make informed decisions about which risk indicators it should use to detect or prevent residency fraud.

Furthermore, the department did not have a way to verify that existing measures to detect and prevent fraud were working as intended. As a result, several adjustments that the department recently made to its fraud control measures were not supported by evidence.

We made five recommendations to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and two recommendations to both the department and its partners, the RCMP and the Canada Border Services Agency. All three organizations agreed with our recommendations and have committed to taking actions to implement them.

Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Sir.

We'll now go to Ms. Biguzs and her opening statement. Thank you very much.

[Anita Biguzs, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration]

Good day, Mr. Chair.

I am pleased to appear before the committee to discuss the Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada.

As you've indicated, I'm here with several colleagues. From my Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, I have Mr. Robert Orr, assistant deputy minister of operations; from the Canada Border Services Agency, Denis Vinette, acting associate vice-president of operations; and from the RCMP, chief superintendent Brendan Heffernan, director general of the Canadian criminal real time identification services, and Inspector Jamie Solesme, officer in charge of the federal coordination centre, Canada-United States.

Let me open my comments, Mr. Chair, by saying that my department, IRCC, completely agrees with the Auditor General's report and recommendations. These will help us to continue to improve our processes, and departmental officials are already working quickly to effectively implement them. In fact, we have already made many improvements. We have introduced new procedures for dealing with applicants using addresses flagged as high risk. We have already provided better guidance to citizenship officers, and work is under way with the Canada Border Services Agency and the RCMP to improve information sharing.

Bill C-6, which is before Parliament now, also proposes amendments to the Citizenship Act that will include new authority to seize documents. We have a new framework in place as well to identify and manage fraud risks in the citizenship program.

I would like you to know that the department has thoroughly reviewed all cases that the OAG flagged to determine if fraud may have occurred. As a result of this review, the department has opened an investigation into 12 cases.

In addition to the controls examined in the Auditor General's audit, IRCC has several other fraud controls that are an integral part of the program. For example, all citizenship applicants aged 15 and a half and older must pass a criminal and security clearance check in order to be granted citizenship.

The immigration history of all citizenship applicants is thoroughly reviewed to determine if concerns, investigations or law enforcement actions have been noted in our Global Case Management System.

Applications with identified risk indicators are given closer scrutiny. Citizenship officers review CBSA information on passenger travel history and examine original documents during in-person interviews. Centres of expertise deal with complex cases to better detect fraud patterns and trends.

In addition, recent legislative changes have already strengthened our ability to deter and deal with fraud. These include increased penalties for fraud and the requirement that consultants be members in good standing of a regulatory body.

A new citizenship revocation model has also been effect since June 2015, which is more efficient and less costly to the government.

I'd like now to very quickly review four specific areas identified in the Auditor General's report.

The Auditor General 's report drew attention to cases of potentially fraudulent addresses. These are addresses known or suspected of being associated with fraud, based on information from the CBSA, the RCMP, or our own citizenship officers. The department has already issued better guidance to citizenship officers in inputting information into our databases so that these problem addresses can be identified more reliably and appropriate action taken.

It is also important to understand that having a problematic address does not necessarily mean an applicant is committing fraud. There is often a valid reason why many applicants would have provided the same address.

Second, IRCC has clarified the authorities relating to document seizure and provided detailed guidance to officers on the process to seize suspicious documents.

Recent changes to the Global Case Management System mean that citizenship officers now have access to Canada Border Services Agency's lost, stolen and fraudulent document database.

In addition, Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, which the government introduced in February, contains amendments that would provide new authorities for the seizure of potentially fraudulent documents.

The IRCC routinely receives information from its passport program and other government departments, such as Public Safety Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency, and the RCMP.

We are actively working with our security partners to ensure that the department has the most up-to-date information possible. We have engaged the RCMP to review the optimal timing for conducting criminal screening, while bearing in mind the need to process citizenship applications in a timely manner. We are also establishing processes for the RCMP to share information on criminal charges impacting citizenship applicants with the IRCC after the initial screening.

The IRCC and the CBSA have also clarified the legislative authority supporting the required information sharing needed by our department for Citizenship Act eligibility decisions, and will develop processes for sharing information on immigration fraud, and this will all be completed by December 2016.

Fourth, as part of its ongoing efforts to improve program integrity, the department developed a systematic, evidence-based approach to identifying and managing the risks of fraud. This includes establishing baselines and monitoring trends. Under this framework, the department evaluates risk indicators to verify they are consistently applied and that fraud controls are working as intended. This analysis will help us make changes, if changes are needed.

I would like to thank the committee members for your attention, and we will be pleased to answer your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

We'll move into the first round of questions. From the government side we have Mr. Lefebvre for seven minutes, please.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There's no doubt that when we reviewed the spring report, it came as a major concern.

I'll highlight a few of the statements from the Auditor General that came to light and pressed upon us the urgency of dealing with this matter very quickly.

He says with respect to checking the problem addresses that they found that, when information was available in the database, citizenship officers did not consistently act on it.

With respect to identifying fraudulent and altered documents, he said that, due to holes in IRCC's processes for detecting fraudulent documents, not only could perpetrators avoid detection and prosecution, but fraudulent documents may continue to circulate for use by other ineligible applicants.

With respect to obtaining information from the RCMP about criminal behaviour, the result, according to the Auditor General, is that the process for sharing information on charges against permanent residents and foreign nations was ad hoc and ineffective.

We have consistent statements from the Auditor General that there seems to be a human resources problem, that some of the employees at IRCC who deal with citizenship applicants are not competent. There's a lack of human resources, maybe there's a lack of technical resources, or there's a lack of financial resources.

Now, before I continue, what is the budget at IRCC and what was it in 2011 and in 2015? Can you answer that first question?

[Anita Biguzs]

Mr. Chair, the budget for the citizenship program on in 2015-16 was $62 million.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

What was it in 2011?

[Anita Biguzs]

I'd have to go back and verify that and provide it to the committee and to the chair after this meeting.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Here's why I'm asking that question. The report also notes that in 2012 the IRCC issued a public warning that nearly 11,000 persons were linked to residency fraud investigations. Then in 2014 we had the largest ever increase of Canadian citizens being accepted in Canada, over 260,000 people.

If the budget is cut, or there's not a budget change to deal with more of these applications, and we have a data problem, there are a lot of things that can fall through the cracks, as we say. That's why I'm asking the question whether we can determine what the budget was.

[Anita Biguzs]

Mr. Chair, my colleague has just provided the information that in 2013 the budget for the citizenship program was $50 million.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

With respect to these inconsistencies, how would you expect the increase in volume to affect IRCC's ability to detect fraud in the citizenship program?

[Anita Biguzs]

As I indicated in my opening remarks, we take the Auditor General's report very seriously. An action plan had been put in place by the department back in 2012, in the absence of what previously had been in place in terms of a risk framework and in an attempt to put in better fraud control measures.

I think, as with any system, improvements can always be made. Certainly the Auditor General's report has provided some very invaluable guidance to us in terms of the various measures we have to do. In terms of lessons learned that have come from this, our guidance to officers has had to be improved. We actually always do issue guidance to citizenship officers, but clearly, I think, issues have arisen in terms of consistency across the system. We do provide significant training to our citizenship officers. They have to go through level one and level two training. They have to pass an exam before they can render decisions in cases.

We have actually already taken on board the recommendations that have been made. We have in fact updated our guidance. We have issued new program delivery instructions. We've strengthened the guidance on, for example, problem addresses; how to identify fraudulent documents; issues around fraud controls, trying to make the procedures more consistent in terms of inputting addresses and making it clear that the officers have to use Canada Post guidelines in terms of inputting addresses; and enhancing the training we have.

The other thing, as I mentioned, is that we have developed a much more enhanced program integrity framework, which we are sharing with staff as well, that includes quality control and quality assurance processes. That will include our ability to do random targeting, to clearly outline roles and responsibilities, and to also make sure that we are doing regular anti-fraud quality assurance and quality control exercises—

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

That's great. So that's been ongoing from basically 2015-16, when you started this?

[Anita Biguzs]

With regard to the program integrity framework that I just mentioned, we did have one in place, but clearly it needed to be improved and strengthened.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Clearly, yes.

[Anita Biguzs]

We've taken on board the recommendations of the Auditor General in that regard. Moving forward, that's in fact what we intend to do—to have regular quality control and quality assurance exercises, to see if our risk indicators are appropriate, and to see if in fact we need to modify both our procedures and the training we provide to staff.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Here's my major concern. In the report you did in 2012, you issued a public warning that nearly 11,000 people were linked to residency fraud. Have you done another report? Have you done another investigation since 2012?

[Anita Biguzs]

Work is continuing in terms of the cases that were identified back in 2012. Many cases have been abandoned, dropped, or withdrawn.

[Paul Lefebvre, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Why would that be?

[Anita Biguzs]

In some cases, the conclusions were such that there were no further issues, so investigations were dropped.

With regard to the cases that involve a problem address, fraud is not necessarily being perpetrated. One of the issues in our programming is that when we have newcomers who come to Canada, oftentimes they actually reside in a temporary residence. This is particularly the case with refugees. Individuals will move into temporary housing, so you will see the same address recurring. That is why we do a comprehensive address history when an application comes forward, to be able to get to that very point.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

We'll now move to the opposition, and Mr. Généreux.

You have seven minutes.

[Bernard Généreux, Conservative, Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to come back to the issue of addresses.

In his report, the Auditor General, who is with us today, states fairly clearly that there are several shortcomings in the identification of these addresses.

Ms. Biguzs, in your report, you say that there is often a valid reason to explain why many applicants provide the same address. Could you explain how it is that applicants are identified at a same address? I am trying to understand how it can happen. What are the valid reasons that would explain that?

[Anita Biguzs]

Mr. Chair, as I was indicating in response to the previous question, it is often the case that when newcomers, particularly refugees, come to Canada, we work through settlement organizations. They have temporary temporary housing or apartments for newcomers until such time as they can find permanent accommodation in the locations where they are. We always ask for an address history when someone applies for citizenship, and that is for the entire period of residence of, in this case, six years. You will oftentimes see the same address as being identified because newcomers have gone into this temporary shelter, temporary housing, that is being provided by settlement provider organizations. It doesn't necessarily mean there's been fraud that has been committed, but it's a fact that you have a common address that is used for newcomers coming to Canada.

I don't know, Mr. Orr, if you have anything to add to that, but I think that's certainly a common reason why we would see the same address recurring.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Orr.