Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am here to address the committee's expressed interest in learning more about the passenger protect program.
I am joined by Brion Brandt, who is our director of Security Policy. As you are aware, for decades terrorist groups have targeted civil aviation. As a result, countries around the world have enhanced security and Canada has been a leader in improving security. We have pioneered such initiatives as passenger-baggage match, and advanced explosives detection techniques.
One recent initiative, regarded with interest by other countries, is to provide non-passengers—workers, if you will—with secure ID, in the form of the Restricted Area Identity Card that contains biometric identifiers and is backed up by a rigorous security clearance process.
The diversity of initiatives to secure civil aviation reflects an approach that stands the best chance of success: layered security. Each layer adds something useful to make the whole better than the parts. Together, security layers have contributed to a situation in which security is adapting and improving, and public confidence in civil aviation and passenger numbers are growing once again.
The passenger protect program responds to a recent trend, confirmed by current intelligence, of efforts by terrorist groups to place operatives on board aircraft for the purpose of bringing the aircraft down, or using it as a weapon. In 2004, terrorists in Russia who boarded two aircraft caused the aircraft to crash, killing 89 people. In 2006, British authorities disrupted an alleged plot to use passengers to bring down multiple aircraft, using improvised explosive devices. That was last August.
The risk associated with this disturbing terrorist trend is acute, unless it is mitigated by several means, including passenger assessment. Fortunately, careful passenger assessment is more practical in aviation than in urban transit, for example.
The Passenger Protection Program will apply to flights within Canada, and to flights originating in, or destined for, Canada. Inside Canada, the program will apply to the same commercial flights for which passenger screening is required currently, that is to say in the 89 currently designated airports. These flights warrant greater attention because of their size and access to airports in larger cities. The program will also apply and add additional security benefit to flights to Canada from foreign airports, which in some cases may not have comparable screening programs.
For the first time ever, the program will require air carriers to check passenger ID on Canadian domestic flights before boarding. Until now, ID checks on domestic flights were voluntary and not always applied by the various airlines. The passenger protect program will formalize this good security practice.
Like many other aviation security programs, the passenger protect program requires a partnership between government agencies and air carriers. Transport Canada, using information from the RCMP and CSIS, will provide air carriers with a list of individuals who, if they attempt to board a flight, may pose a threat to that flight.
The list will be dynamic. As required by law, each name must be reassessed every 30 days. Names can be added on an urgent basis in response to a specific threat situation. Many countries and even private companies use watch lists, because they work.
One unfortunate result of the terrorist use of passengers to carry out attacks is the mistrust created between passengers, resulting in several incidents where individuals were asked to leave an aircraft on suspicion that the posed a threat. The proposed program will offer passengers on flights to and from Canada, and within Canada, additional assurance that fellow passengers do not represent a threat.
The challenges that face the passenger protect program mirror those that face other watch-list programs. The people who pose a threat may try to travel under an assumed identity to avoid detection. We must remember that the individuals we are discussing are few and far between.
Creating a false identity and evading detection require effort. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies may be able to defeat efforts at evasion, and these detection efforts can result in stopping the individual from boarding an aircraft. We should also remember that the perpetrators of 9/11 and the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, all travelled using their own identities.
The passenger protect program faces other challenges as well, in particular, avoiding mistakes. Transport Canada has worked over the past two years with the aviation industry, civil liberties groups, and community organizations to design a system that reduces the likelihood of a mistake being made. The key here is to have a list that is clearly focused on aviation security, therefore minimizing the risk of a mistake. It must be limited in size and scope--enough to do the job and no bigger.
At the same time, the system should permit the rapid resolution of cases in which your name is similar to the name of someone on the list by letting you provide additional data points--date of birth, home address, passport number--on the spot, at the airport, prior to boarding, to clear matters up. If you face repeated name-match issues but are cleared through an ID check, we will work with you before your next trip to minimize repeated inconvenience.
Permit me to spend a few minutes describing how a potential no-fly situation will be handled. Whether check-in is via Internet, kiosks, or at the counter, air carriers will now allow printing of the boarding pass when there is a name match with the specified persons list. Passengers refused a boarding pass at a kiosk or off the Internet will be directed to the airport counter where an air carrier agent will request government-issued identification to determine whether the name, date of birth and gender match those of a listed person.
When an individual presents government-issued identification with name, date of birth and gender not matching those of a specified person, the air carrier will issue a boarding pass.
When requesting government issued identification, the air carrier must ask for either one piece of government issued photo ID that shows the person's name, date of birth, and gender, or two similar pieces, at least of which one shows the person's name, date of birth, and gender. One of those two pieces does not have to have a photo.These pieces must be federally, provincially, or territorially issued identification. This is the identification we would request for meeting the requirements.
The program will apply to persons who appear to be 12 years of age or older, so young children are excluded from the requirement to have government issued identification.
If an individual presents government issued identification with name, date of birth, and gender matching those of a listed person, the air carrier will inform the person of the delay in processing and will call Transport Canada. In addition, the air carrier will ask whether the individual has ID that provides additional data, as we just discussed.
When an air carrier calls Transport Canada about a possible match on the specified persons list, a 24/7 operations centre, staffed by Transport Canada personnel, will receive the call. The officer receiving the call will have the task of verifying whether the individual is in fact the person on the list . The air carrier will provide Transport Canada with the data obtained from the individual.
Transport Canada will assess the data. If the data demonstrate that the person has been specified, the TC operations centre will inform a senior official.
A decision will be made at that time, based on the ID information provided, and any additional up-to-date information available to the department, on whether to issue an Emergency Direction to the air carrier, instructing them to deny boarding to the individual.
Transport Canada will inform the air carrier of its decision.
When an emergency direction decision to deny boarding has been made, Transport Canada will notify the RCMP national operations centre immediately to inform them of the presence of the specified person at an airport.
The RCMP will inform police located locally about the individual who is to receive an emergency direction denying boarding. Air carriers may also contact police and/or security personnel located locally.
The air carrier will inform the person that an emergency direction has been issued denying boarding, and will provide information from Transport Canada concerning the reconsideration process.
Police and/or security personnel will respond as appropriate to the situation, such as security assurance or execution of a warrant of arrest. This is a key point. Passenger protect's objective is to keep an individual who threatens a flight off the plane. This individual may be subject to arrest, but that decision is within the mandate of the police, not Transport Canada.
If, despite the program design elements that I have just outlined, a mistake occurs, Transport Canada is establishing an Office of Reconsideration, staffed by individuals who have had no previous role in creating the watch list and supported by independent experts, so that an individual can provide additional information to challenge the Transport Canada decision.
The Minister of Transport will consider advice from the Office of Reconsideration. The reconsideration process offers a low cost and quick approach to challenging a decision to deny boarding, based on the list.
In moving forward with passenger protect, we are making use of the provisions of the Public Safety Act, approved by Parliament after considerable debate, including creation of a watch list to protect air passengers. The proposed program also contributes to the objectives of the security and prosperity partnership endorsed by Canada, the United States, and Mexico to develop equivalent approaches to aviation security, including in the matter of passenger assessment or no-fly programs.
Passenger protect would enable us to use Canadian standards in judgments, and scrupulously respect Canadian laws including the Privacy Act, while at the same time engaging our partners in dialogue in the development of separate but comparable programs to improve aviation security. Developing appropriate security programs is always complex and often controversial. We must develop programs that enhance security while respecting privacy and efficiency.
Thank you for your time. We both look forward to your questions.
