Mr. Chairman, committee members, thank you very much for having us. My name is Micheal Vonn and I'm a policy director and a lawyer with the B.C. Civil Liberties Association.
These prepared remarks are meant to complement those of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group. I'm going to be discussing the passenger protect program, and my colleague Mr. Tassé is going to be discussing secure flight.
I'm looking forward to perhaps endeavouring to sort out some of the Byzantine elements of which list constitutes what kind of restriction. Let me just give you a brief overview of where we are with the Canadian no-fly list.
Passenger protect, as you've heard, was coming into force in June 2007. The regulatory impact analysis statement of the identity screening regulations of that piece of legislation explicitly cites the push from foreign governments in developing this program, specifically noting that this program was supposed to be a significant step towards achieving the goal of developing a comparable approach to passenger assessment, which the security and prosperity partnership had identified as a significant goal. Passenger protect was meant not only to dissuade the U.S. from its repeated threats, starting in 2005, to impose the U.S. no-fly list on all Canadian air flights crossing into U.S. air space; it was also meant to curtail the domestic use of the U.S. no-fly list by airlines in Canada.
The B.C. Civil Liberties Association wrote to Transport Canada in 2006 regarding this use by Canadian airlines, most notably Air Canada's U.S. no-fly list vetting for domestic flights within Canada. A response came back, and this is the quote:
Transport Canada has no regulatory or legislative authority in place to prevent Air Canada from taking this action. However, we are of the understanding that once the Canadian program is in place, Canadian air carriers will be in a position to end this practice.
Not only do we submit that it is relatively unthinkable that Transport Canada has no authority to prevent passengers on domestic Canadian air flights from being subjected to a watch list of a foreign government compiled on the basis of secret information, but, further, that the practice of vetting domestic passengers against the U.S. list has indeed not stopped with the introduction of our own program. We have, as it were, the worst of both worlds.
While the passenger protect program is by no means as notorious as the U.S. counterpart, it is nevertheless deeply flawed and very likely unconstitutional, in our submission. The program is ostensibly built on the 2004 amendments to the Aeronautics Act that were introduced via the Public Safety Act in 2002. The key provisions are entitled “emergency directions”, and those provide authority to the minister, or the minister's delegate, to make an emergency direction when the minister is of the opinion that there is an immediate threat to airline security or safety. An emergency direction lasts for 72 hours.
Of course, the program we are discussing right now is called a no-fly list. If you are wondering how a person is vetted months or years in advance as being, as per the legislation, an “immediate” threat to aviation security, it was explained to me thus: a person is considered a generic threat, and then they become an immediate threat the minute they try to get on a plane.
If you find that definition strained or rather semantically bizarre, I suggest that it is the kind of rhetorical round peg trying to be smashed into a square hole that is the signature of passenger protect. It seems infinitely more likely that one of the reasons we cannot notify people about their inclusion on the specified persons list is that it does not accord at all with the notion of the 72-hour provisions in the Aeronautics Act that provide for immediate threat.
The Public Safety Act was certainly debated, but there has never been any parliamentary debate on the creation of a Canadian no-fly list. Regulations were passed and guidelines were drafted so that the program that is supposedly authorized on the basis of emergency directions looks somewhat like--you heard the outline--an advisory group represented by Transport Canada, CSIS, and the RCMP that reviews names submitted by the RCMP and CSIS for inclusion on the list. This list is nowhere accounted for in the statute.
Passengers are required, as we've been told, to show government-issued ID to find out whether they have a match on this list. If a match is made, the airline staff must immediately inform the minister's office, or their delegate, who decides whether to issue this emergency direction.
That person who it has been decided will not board an airplane has recourse to the Office of Reconsideration, which uses independent external advisors, although I should just note that the person has no immediate recourse, of course, for getting on the plane. The Office of Reconsideration has external advisors for the review of this application, and they make a recommendation to the minister. Bare-bones outline--you've heard that.
Since its inception, there have been serious and persistent concerns about the legality and practices of this program. To begin with, the legislative scheme itself does not add up to the program. There is no provision for a list, as I've highlighted. There is such a profound disconnect between the enabling legislation, the regulations, and the actual program that it purports to authorize that numerous legal opinions maintain that the program may not even be found to be prescribed by law for the purposes of the charter.
Even if this vague and disjunctive legislative scheme were to be found prescribed by law, there are yet other charter hurdles to pass, including the one that I'm going to suggest is the primary one, which would be section 7 of the charter.
Concerns about procedural fairness include the minister's discretion, which is virtually unfettered. The audit by the Privacy Commissioner's office found that these unsurprisingly—and we've heard this before—were decisions that were not reviewed, but rubber-stamped. We've been told that the deputy minister, who is the delegate, now has the entire file. It still just strains credulity to believe that this entire file is going to be reviewed while the airline is on hold for the decision.
The criteria we've heard discussed is not only non-exhaustive, it is vague, and quite frankly, legally non-binding. There is no legal status to the “guidelines” for criteria for the advisory group.
Various charter rights are at issue. These have been hinted at, but the central one, as I say, is section 7--“life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. The implications of being denied the ability to get on an airplane are always deeply serious, but nowhere more dire than the implications that have been suggested: when a person who has been unaccountably labelled a security threat is stranded in a foreign country and denied the ability to board an airplane to come home to Canada.
The passenger protect program is being legally challenged right now, as you've heard. The challenge is a very telling snapshot of the problems with this program. The challenger did apply to the Office of Reconsideration, and those independent reviewers agreed with the assessment that this is probably not a legal program. They were concerned about the discretion that was unfettered; they were deeply concerned about the vague, selected, and incomplete evidence that was provided in terms of the application of those decisions, and the independent reviewers did recommend to the minister, as per the legislation, that this name be removed. That decision was undertaken to not do that very thing, so it was summarily dismissed.
In conclusion, let me just state my main points in this very brief submission. The government has repeatedly failed to produce one shred of evidence to support the proposition that no-fly lists increase aviation safety or security. The current system was effectively implemented through stealth, never debated, never spelled out, nor seemingly even envisioned in the enabling statute. The legislative misfit of this program is so pronounced as to make it doubtful whether it is even prescribed by law for the purposes of the charter, and even in meeting this hurdle we have serious charter considerations.
It has long since passed the time to end the silent bureaucratic implementation of security programs that so deeply affect the rights of Canadians. This matter is even more pressing than I'm suggesting because of the even more invidious rights violations that are on the horizon due to secure flight.