Thank you, Chair. I will be sharing my time with Mr. Norlock.
I'd like to thank the panel for being here.
First off, all of us understand that this is not 1984. The world has changed, and so must CSIS.
But I'd like to set the record straight about what was said at a previous committee--not this committee, but the Afghan committee--with respect to dealing with issues in Afghanistan. I would ask the press and anyone at home who has an interest to go to the blues from May 5, where the CSIS people appeared here. Prior to 17:15, they will find that one of the members of the panel, Mr. Dosanjh, asked the CSIS representative a hypothetical question. He persisted in asking the question, even though the member from CSIS said he didn't like to answer hypothetical questions.
It went on and on, and finally, I think, people will find that Mr. Dosanjh said:
But if you try to seek similar evidence from sources not tainted by torture and you're unable to get that because you're in a battlefield in a country torn asunder by war, but you have this nagging feeling that something may happen to our forces, you indicate that if you try, but if you can't find it, you do act on that original information if you think the lives of our troops are at risk.
I don't think there's a Canadian out there who would expect CSIS or anyone else to ignore the information if people's lives are at risk.
My friend talks about whether we have arrangements with NDS. We have 143 Canadians killed in that country. Surely he wouldn't expect CSIS not to seek the information they can, not from torture, but to deal with colleagues around the world. I would hope that SIRC, in doing its job, overviews and oversees those kinds of situations.
I wonder if any of you would like to comment on what I've just said here.