Evidence of meeting #61 for Public Safety and National Security in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Director General, Intelligence and Targeting Operations, Canada Border Services Agency
We haven't been able to identify any increased costs that would be incurred by the CBSA as a result of the implementation of Bill S-7.
Conservative
Ryan Leef Conservative Yukon, YT
On the investigative hearing section, do you see a benefit where the agencies tasked with dealing with investigative hearings...where information potentially coming out of those hearings about past terrorist behaviour and potentially future engagement of Canadian security and terrorism behaviour would benefit the CBSA?
Director General, Intelligence and Targeting Operations, Canada Border Services Agency
Yes, absolutely, in a couple of ways that I can think of. First of all, CBSA issues lookouts, which are warnings or red flags concerning an individual. If you are the subject of a lookout and your passport is swiped when you enter Canada, you are automatically referred to a secondary examination. It's not a final judgment. It's an indication, often based on intelligence information, that this is an individual who needs to be subjected to a closer examination before being admitted to Canada. The kind of information you are talking about that we frequently receive from our intelligence counterparts can form the basis of a lookout.
The other way that information received from our partners helps us to do our job is in our role as the hub for the security screening system for the Government of Canada. Applicants for visas to Canada, whether as temporary or permanent residents, go through a system at the centre of which sits a CBSA unit that, after consultation with our security intelligence partners, comes up with a recommendation on admissibility or inadmissibility. Obviously, intelligence information received from our partners helps us greatly in making those recommendations.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you very much, Mr. Leckey.
Now we will move back to Mr. Garrison for five minutes.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, BC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
If I understood Mr. Leckey correctly, he offered to send us information that might answer the question about the relationship between the amendments in Bill C-45 and Bill S-7. To be more specific, I would be interested in not only your assessment of that relationship, but also a bit of speculation that has been done on this side that it may in fact have an impact on the ability to collect pre-departure information earlier, and therefore provide a capacity for instituting at least some form of exit controls. If you are willing to get that back to us, that would be greatly appreciated.
Director General, Intelligence and Targeting Operations, Canada Border Services Agency
Yes, I have made a note of that request and will certainly respond to every aspect of your question.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Just as a reminder, it's to the clerk of the committee, and we will circulate them.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, BC
Thank you very much.
I believe we're going to go back to Mr. Scott, then.
NDP
Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON
I wonder if you could give me a “dummies” guide to exactly how it would work. You went over it fairly clearly and quickly at the beginning as to how it would work when an investigation by the RCMP or CSIS has identified an individual, say, a young person, they believe is intending to leave to participate in some offence abroad. The name is known, but they are not actually tracking the person. They don't know where the person is, but they think he may be looking to leave the country. In terms of that set of facts, what happens? What goes to you, and what does CBSA do with that information? Or what will you be doing with it in light of this new offence?
Director General, Intelligence and Targeting Operations, Canada Border Services Agency
I'll give you a couple of examples of what might happen in that scenario. If CSIS or the RCMP tell us they are interested in a certain individual who may be a terrorist target, who may be planning to leave the country to conduct terrorist activities overseas, they can come to us and make an individual request. For example—I'm just taking this as an example of one type of information we hold that they don't necessarily—they can ask us for that individual's travel history. At the moment, travel history means half of your travel history. We only know when you enter the country. If you have entered the country from a variety of foreign countries nine times in the last three years, that can be an important part in helping them to build their investigation.
NDP
Director General, Intelligence and Targeting Operations, Canada Border Services Agency
Yes, that can often be important, too.
Also, if they have immediate suspicions that the individual may be on the point of leaving, and we're at an airport and they're not, they may be able to ask us if we can identify an individual in those kinds of cases. Where we don't have authority at the moment, as I explained, is to actually intercept, arrest, or conduct a search.
NDP
Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON
Right.
Monsieur Giguère, is there anything you wanted to add to that?
Executive Director, Risk Management and Foresight Division, Program Branch, Canada Border Services Agency
Only to say that since we do not know in advance that a person is about to leave on a plane, we will not have a systematic way of monitoring that, so we would have to rely on precise information given by law enforcement authorities or CSIS.
NDP
Craig Scott NDP Toronto—Danforth, ON
I'll go back to my earlier question.
It seems fairly obvious how a no-fly list, if it were changed in its orientation, could become a useful tool that's outside the scope of your role. It seems you do know a lot about the advance passenger record information system. You said something very interesting, that as long as the wheels are on the ground and the information is available, one could actually figure out.... You could let the RCMP know. They could actually enter the plane to grab somebody before the wheels are up. Is that right?
The question is, why does the system we have now mean that the information for departing planes isn't generally available until after the plane departs? Is it simply standard procedure, or are there real logistical barriers to having that information before the plane is in the sky?
Director General, Intelligence and Targeting Operations, Canada Border Services Agency
At the moment it is simply a matter of standard procedure. We receive passenger data wheels up, after the plane has left. This means that on a trans-Atlantic flight, for example, we have six or seven hours to examine passenger data and to identify anyone on board who may represent a threat, terrorist or otherwise, who would then become subject to secondary examination on arrival.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you. We'll leave it at that.
Our time is up. We want to thank you for coming. We appreciate your comments and your testimony.
We are going to suspend now and wait for our next witnesses to take their place.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
I call our meeting back to order.
We're on our second panel today. We're continuing with our consideration of Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act. We welcome our guests from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We have Mr. James Malizia, assistant commissioner, national security, criminal investigations and protective policing branch. As well, we have testifying for the Toronto Police Service, Inspector Stephen Irwin, with the intelligence division.
I understand you have brief opening statements before we proceed into a round of questioning.
Mr. Malizia.
A/Commr James Malizia Assistant Commissioner, National Security Criminal Investigations and Protective Policing Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for inviting me here to speak about Bill S-7, the combatting terrorism legislation. I appreciate the opportunity to provide answers to your questions about the implications for law enforcement arising from this bill.
The RCMP believes that Bill S-7 contains important tools that could enhance our ability to detect, prevent, deny, and respond to terrorist threats. With terrorism, even more so than with other forms of criminal activity, it is imperative that we work to prevent attacks before they occur.
Canada's national security remains a key strategic priority for the RCMP. We have had a number of successful prosecutions under the Anti-terrorism Act since its inception in 2001. The three most commonly used Criminal Code provisions have been section 83.18: participating in the activity of a terrorist group; section 83.2: committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a terrorist group; and section 83.19: knowingly facilitating the activity of a terrorist group.
Radicalization of Canadians to criminal extremism is a continuing challenge to our society, and the RCMP works assiduously to counter the extremist message through our outreach efforts with a number of vulnerable communities across the country.
The proposed new offences of leaving or attempting to leave Canada to participate in the activities of a terrorist group will assist law enforcement to stop the activities of prospective terrorists at an earlier stage of their preparations, before they leave Canada to join a terrorist training camp or do harm elsewhere.
This will provide law enforcement with a preventive tool consistent with Canada's counterterrorism strategy. We understand and appreciate the responsibility these amendments entail for law enforcement with respect to subsection 6(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—the right of Canadian citizens to enter, remain in, and leave Canada.
Concerns have been raised about the potential for abuse of the investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions provisions as a way of compelling individuals to testify or otherwise give information. It has been argued that these are unnecessary instruments because they were never previously used.
We recognize that the investigative hearing provision is likely to be used in rare situations where we know a witness has critical information, but who is unwilling to cooperate with police. For instance, they may not want to assist the authorities, or they may be involved in or aware of a terrorist plot.
Current RCMP operational policy describes the steps, controls, and accountability processes in place to ensure that powers assigned to peace officers are used lawfully and appropriately.
With respect to the investigative hearing provision, the RCMP had previously written into policy a number of safeguards for its use, and we believe there is considerable oversight built into its prospective use.
Should the provision be reinstated by Parliament, the RCMP will expeditiously update its policy and continue to emphasize its potential impact on the rights and freedoms of Canadians, and insist that caution and discretion be exercised when considering its use. Training will also be updated accordingly. Our centralized oversight of national security criminal investigations at national headquarters would ensure vigilant responsibility and accountability over these powers.
The recognizance with conditions provision allows a person to be detained for a maximum of 72 hours, potentially a critically important time period necessary to prevent a terrorist activity from being carried out. As with the investigative hearing provision, a number of safeguards are linked with its use, including Attorney General consent, judicial authorization, and annual reporting.
In summary, the various proposals for change provided by this bill since the statutory reviews of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001 are welcomed by the RCMP because procedural rights, appeal rights, and accountability to Parliament have been enhanced, all contributing to public assurance about these measures.
Preserving the open court system and trial fairness is a fundamental dimension of the democratic traditions that we all cherish in this country.
The words of the International Jurists Commission in their 2009 report on terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights are significant to bear in mind when states invoke new anti-terrorism laws. An effective criminal justice system based on respect for human rights and the rule of law is, in the long term, the best possible protection for society against terrorism.
Again, thank you for inviting me to participate in these important hearings.