Public Safety Committee on March 23rd, 2015

[The Chair, Conservative, Daryl Kramp]

Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Segal. That obviously will give us a little bit more time for Q and A.

Ms. Vincent, you have the floor, please.

[Louise Vincent, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the committee for giving me this opportunity to share my point of view and that of my brother, my sisters and my mother.

Why am I appearing here before you? My name is Louise Vincent, and I am the older sister of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent, who was murdered on October 20, 2014, five months ago, by Martin Couture-Rouleau. That man, in the name of a religion he completely misunderstood, ran my brother over from behind with his car, robbing him of an opportunity to defend himself.

I am here to talk about what I see as the positive aspects of Bill C-51. What I notice and what everyone has probably noticed is that information is now moving extremely quickly. That's not necessarily a positive thing. It's probably too quick, leading to tremendous risks of radicalization. People probably have a propensity for, or a sensitivity to, something we have not yet understood. For the time being, I think that an initiative like Bill C-51 is necessary if we want to maintain our country's democratic values.

Another significant problem must be pointed out. Various government organizations must stop operating in silos. Major companies have understood that. The successful ones have stopped working in isolation. It's an important management concept. I believe that information sharing is important.

From what I understand, Bill C-51 would facilitate cooperation among various police forces and would help identify individuals who may be trying to hurt our country more quickly. Moreover, the threshold of evidence must be changed. According to Bill C-51, focus should be shifted from “will commit” to “could commit”, and I think that's very important. That's why the RCMP could not obtain a warrant from the attorney general, despite all the information it had gathered and all the testimony from Martin Couture-Rouleau's family. The RCMP did its job and built a case, but unfortunately, the burden of proof was not met. That's unacceptable.

It should be much easier to obtain monitoring tools, such as electronic bracelets. The authorities should also be able to freeze financial assets. That way, the assets of someone who may be planning to finance terrorist activities could be frozen.

Had Bill C-51 been in force on October 19, Martin Couture-Rouleau's family would have still informed the RCMP, but the organization would have had more information. The RCMP received information much too late. It would have known that radical imams had visited the mosque attended by Martin Couture-Rouleau. It would have probably been able to prepare even more material for the attorney general who, with a lower burden of proof, would have agreed to issue a warrant. On October 20 of last year, Martin Couture-Rouleau very likely would have been in prison, and my brother would not be dead.

I am hearing many people say that they are worried about freedom of expression. I also want to keep my freedom of expression. I would absolutely not be in favour of something that would take away our freedom of expression. Considering that there are 40 million Canadians, does it make any sense to say that every one of them would be spied on?

I have spoken to officials, and they told me that, last October, 90 radicalized individuals had their passports confiscated. They were supposedly being monitored, as were another 130 people who still had their passports. That's 220 people. But when I asked why Martin Couture-Rouleau had fallen through the cracks, I was told that not everyone could be monitored 24 hours a day.

To those who are worried this kind of legislation would increase monitoring, I would say that would be impossible, as the numbers don't really add up. All I ask is that police forces—the RCMP and the SQ—could at least monitor. That is what makes sense.

I have noted a few things. I feel that, when people read a text like Bill C-51, which is lengthy, they often skip over the “whereas” parts. They may seem to be a bit boring, but they are important.

Advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not affected. In fact, lines 29 to 31 on page 3, state the following, and I quote: “For greater certainty, it does not include lawful advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression.”

Bill C-51 does not impede freedom of expression. That right is protected by the Constitution of Canada. I have no doubt that the Quebec charter would still apply and would protect my privacy. I myself am a Quebecker.

I will skip some of the bill. On page 6, it is stated that Bill C-51 does not affect the disclosure of information under other acts of Parliament. I feel that disclosure of information and freedom are there. That's clear. I don't think our leaders would impose on us something they would not like to have imposed on them. I am sure that all of our leaders and ministers care about freedom of speech and want Canada to have certain values when it comes to that. I think they're the first to defend that right. If they were to take it away, they would be the first to pay the price.

For those who have concerns, there is something else I have noted. Nothing has changed in terms of what happens after the investigation, once a police force submits certain information. The judge must ensure that the recommended measures are proportional to what the individual is accused of.

On page 49, we can see that there are watchdogs everywhere. Nothing is easy or automatic. If a situation is encountered, the minister has to be asked for permission and then a judge has to be asked for a warrant. An order is always required.

On page 50, it is specified that the judge must assess the threat before issuing a warrant.

Nothing is easy. A case has to be prepared and presented. I find that the process is still very cumbersome in this regard, but I am prepared to accept it.

In closing, I will quickly show you some documents to give you an idea of what a hate crime that stems from radicalization can do. I have not brought all the documents, as there are too many. There are many signs, boards and tributes across Quebec. I have brought only a small number of them.

We have received some letters written by hand and some in other formats. The Royal Canadian Legion wrote to us, the Saint-Jude parish wrote to us in French and in English—they absolutely have to be bilingual—the President of RTO/ERO wrote to us, as have schools and students.

We have a lot of hand-made cards. I have here a card from a school. Schools have written to us, but I did not bring everything. We have heard from students and teachers. There have been little inscriptions. Mothers have written to us. We have 22 books like this one, hand-made.

There are lists with hundreds of people's names. Police officers and firefighters have written to us. We have been invited to participate in various events organized by firefighters. People from Saskatchewan, Quebec and Manitoba have written to us.

My mother insisted that I be very careful with this document, and you will see why. Prince Charles wrote to her. I have his signature. He wrote the letter in French. He also sent my mother flowers. His assistant also wrote to my mother. People from Westminster Abbey, the Association nationale des femmes de militaires, the United States Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, the Michigan American Legion and AMVETS of Michigan have written to us. It's very simple, but it's there.

In addition, Al Cameron, who takes care of veterans through the organization Veterans Voices of Canada sent us a flag. He called it a flag of remembrance. He will always remember Patrice.

[The Chair, Conservative, Daryl Kramp]

Madam Vincent, excuse me, I'm going to ask you to close, if you would.

[Madam Louise Vincent]

I was finished, but what I wanted to tell you is that it didn't touch only a family. It didn't touch only a province. It touched the whole of Canada. It touched the world. We received comments from Thailand, Australia, everywhere, so Bill C-51 is important.

Patrice Vincent must not have died in vain.

We need that.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Daryl Kramp]

Thank you very much for your personal testimony and for being here today. It is deeply appreciated.

We will now go to Mr. Leuprecht, for 10 minutes.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

Monsieur le président, merci de l'invitation.

Security is like the air we breathe: you don't realize that it's gone until it's too late. I think part of the discussion that we have about security policy is so difficult because we've all been to schools so we think we understand the education policy and we've all been to the physician so we think we understand health care policy. For most of us, the worst that's ever happened to us is that we got a speeding ticket from someone on the highway. I think people have a very profound and inchoate misunderstanding of how our security agencies operate, their legislative framework within which they operate, and the accountability and the review structures that are in place. Having this discussion is so important because it elevates the level of the debate.

I'd like to point out some of what is the hypocrisy of some of the critics, perhaps some of the ignorance of some of the professionalism of our security agencies and those who work in our national security system, and the accountabilities that are in place. By hypocrisy I mean that it is those people who complain bitterly about the bill who will also be the first ones to ask why the state did not do more when it is their kid that leaves for abroad, or it is their kid that is injured or killed in an attack. We need to strike a balance here.

I think there is also a naïveté about the rapidly changing security environment, because in Canada for a long time we've lived far away from the shores of instability and political violence. I think that has profoundly changed as a result of globalization and two revolutions. One is the transportation revolution. The other is the communications revolution that brings all this instability immediately to our shores. The propositions that have been put forward in this bill many of our allies already have in one instantiation or another in their systems. We can show that democratic countries can handle these types of powers and reconcile freedom and security. The Nordic states have not turned into police states simply because they adopted certain disruption provisions for their security police, as they call them.

The institutions of the modern state are not well matched to the flows and to the movements of a globalized 21st century world, in particular, the illicit ones. The flows and movements are global and yet they have institutions that are still in a 1648 statute of Westminister type of framework. One of the challenges is how to reconcile the institutions we have with the flows and challenges we face. I would submit that we would need to ask, as in any type of security environment, three basic questions.

Who is it that is threatening our existence or that we are trying to address with regard to these laws?

What is our goal? Do we want to eliminate terrorism? Do we want to contain terrorism? Do we want to destroy groups that use terrorism tactics, or do we want to reduce the vulnerabilities and the effects of terrorism? I think it is this latter one that we are trying to aim for.

How much are we willing to spend?

I think there are a couple of answers here. One is that we are celebrating the 800th anniversary this year of the Magna Carta. What we all appreciate is living in a limited state where we clearly put constraints on state intervention. The state, under the preamble of section 91, also has an obligation for peace, order, and good governance in this country. We need to reconcile the limited state and the freedoms that it provides with the ability of the state to protect its citizens. We also need to make sure that the treasure that we spend is appropriate. In that regard, I much prefer to ensure that our security agencies have the right tool kit than simply putting more money into agencies that we have without giving them the appropriate tools to deal with what's.... I think making sure that our agencies have the appropriate tools is less of a threat than putting more money into these agencies, because ultimately, these are powerful agencies. I think we need to have the right balance here.

I would like to draw a clear distinction between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, two concepts that are confounded in this debate. Anti-terrorism is about actions taken to prevent, deter, or reduce the impact of terrorism and terrorist acts. Counterterrorism is the kinetic actions taken directly against terrorist acts. I think we fall short in this country with regard to the latter. Let me give you some examples. You've already heard some. We have youth leaving this country to go fight with ISIS, and apparently we have a security intelligence service that cannot even under strict reading of the current legislation tell the parents that their children or their child might be up to no good. We have innocent lives lost, as we've just heard. We have individuals who can board planes and are on the terrorism watch list because they do not under current legislation pose an immediate and direct threat to airline safety. You might have already flown next to a terrorist. We cannot stop foreign terrorist fighters from boarding planes back to Canada. This bill would address that by allowing some security agents to be placed on planes with them and other measures.

Concerning consular officials, when somebody shows up at our embassy in Beirut saying, “I have lost my passport and I need a travel document back to Canada”, well, Canadians regularly lose their travel documents. When somebody shows up at the embassy in Beirut with a bullet hole through their shoulder and is looking to return to Canada, well, Canadians often fall sick on their travels and they go to their consular officials, but when we have somebody who apparently has lost their passport and shows up with a bullet hole through their shoulder and the consular official is asked to provide an emergency travel document and that consular official can't even call CSIS to tell CSIS that somebody who might be a suspected foreign terrorist fighter is returning to Canada, that in my view is wrong. We need to share that type of data.

We need to protect Canadians, but we also need to protect Canadian interests, and we need to protect Canadians from themselves. These youths are some vulnerable individuals in our country. I have teenage children. We know that teenage children at times make poor decisions. The state has a certain obligation, I think, towards individuals to make sure that they don't harm themselves.

We also need to make sure that we don't inadvertently export terrorists or provide terrorist financing or material support from Canada to other countries because we don't have the adequate means to contain them.

I hope I have made a case for there being operational requirements to have a more diverse and a more nuanced tool kit than we have now, which is essentially surveillance on the one hand and powers of arrest on the other hand.

I also think that Bill C-51 makes an important contribution to Canada's meeting its obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1624, 2178, and 2195. These are resolutions that are adopted under chapter VII of the United Nations charter. That means they are legally binding on all member states. These resolutions include such things as preventing radicalization leading to politically motivated violent extremism, prohibiting incitement of terrorist violence and recruitment for such purposes, disrupting financial support for terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters, and interdicting travel by foreign terrorist fighters. I hope I've demonstrated that we fall short on at least some of those.

I want to make two very short propositions as to what I think might be changed in this bill.

I think we need to expand the remit of SIRC to be able to follow intelligence once SIRC hands that intelligence over to one of, depending on how you count them, the about 15 other security agencies. The problem with SIRC right now is that once the intelligence is handed over, SIRC can call the RCMP or CBSA and tell them they would like to know what happened with that intelligence, but it turns out that SIRC does not have jurisdiction, and so the RCMP and CBSA just tell SIRC that unfortunately they are not going to answer that particular question.

I think that SIRC needs to be able to follow the intelligence. I'm not proposing a super-SIRC. I'm not suggesting that SIRC should have remit over national security investigations. But I do think SIRC needs to be able to follow the bread crumbs and make sure that intelligence is being handled by other agencies, once it is handed off, within the confines of the law in which it was collected and under the mandates and conditions under which that intelligence was shared with other agencies.

The other proposition I have is that review in and of itself I think is not the problem. CSIS is the most reviewed intelligence security service in the western world and therefore, I think we can safely say in the world as it is. I think the challenge is that Canadians are asking what the government can do to assure them that their rights and freedoms have not been violated. That means that it's not the challenge of review; it's the challenge of demonstrating to Canadians that the review mechanisms that we have in place are effective at making sure that agencies operate within the confines of law and within the constitutional and charter constraints that are being placed upon them.

To that effect, I would submit to the committee to consider adopting a version of the British system, whereby opposition parties can put forward a list of members and the Prime Minister can pick from that particular list. Those individuals would then be security cleared to a top secret clearance. They would be sworn in as privy councillors. We would set up a separate parliamentary committee that would allow the members of that committee to read the commissioner of CSE's report, to read the SIRC report, and to debrief with SIRC and with the commissioner.

I know that some members of the government will say that this is not a good idea because loose lips sink ships, but I think we have very experienced, very mature legislators among the people who sit in Parliament, and by Parliament I mean not just the House of Commons but also the Senate, so I would enlarge the list to be able to include members from both Houses of Parliament.

I think that this type of debriefing with the commissioner and with SIRC in an all-party committee is the sort of conversation that Canadians need to see happen in order to be assured that their rights and freedoms are not being violated. By virtue of their being cleared and sworn in as privy councillors, these people wouldn't be able to talk about anything that happens within that committee anyway.

In closing, let me say that these propositions are not costly, and they would require only minor legislative changes.

I would also like to remind the committee that we are not just making legislation for today, because inherently, as a result of the globalizing dynamics that I described, I would submit that both our legislative framework and the way our agencies operate are already behind the times. The bad guys are always quite happy to exploit vulnerabilities. We saw this amply during the late 1980s and early 1990s with the way Sikh extremists exploited vulnerabilities in Canada's security system.

I would say that we are also making legislation here for tomorrow. We are also making legislation for circumstances in which, in the unlikely event that Canada should find itself faced with a major calamity, we would not need to operate by orders in council, but would have robust legislative frameworks in place for agencies to deal with the calamity.

Let me end with this particular quote: the terrorist only has to be lucky once; the counterterrorist must be lucky every time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Daryl Kramp]

Thank you very much, Mr. Leuprecht.

We will now go to our rounds of questioning.

Mr. Norlock, you have the floor for seven minutes, sir.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you to the witnesses, thank you for attending today.

Mr. Leuprecht, the powers that are provided to CSIS in this legislation are not uncommon among our allies. I wonder if you could comment on the value of CSIS having these additional tools or powers, with the understanding that their main role will continue to be information gathering, but with the additional power to disrupt a threat, provided they have the permission of a judge.

When you are answering that, I would like you to compare, and I think you alluded to this in your preliminary remarks, the extent of the powers CSIS already has compared with those among our allies. You mentioned the Nordic nations. In other words, if the average Canadian out there listened to some of the witnesses, this act, if enacted by Parliament, would be the end of freedom as we know it in this country, and so I'd like you to compare this act with similar acts in Europe, because I know that you are aware of the legislation in western European countries.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

I think Canadians have a profound misconception of what disruption constitutes. CSIS being able to talk to parents to tell them that their child is up to no good is a disruption power. It's something that CSIS is currently not allowed to do. CSIS trying to find a way to cancel the plane ticket of someone who is looking to leave the country is a disruption power. This is not a fundamental undermining of collective freedoms and whatnot.

On the disruption powers that are so controversial, essentially the ones that require judicial authorization, I have two remarks to make.

One is that CSIS will, I think, be very apprehensive and reluctant to use them to begin with, because CSIS knows full well that these are controversial, and the last thing CSIS wants is lots of national attention, some national inquiry about the way it used these particular powers. I think it will use them as a measure of absolute last resort when there is no other way to avert an incident.

I might also point out that I think Canadians have a rather imperfect understanding at times of the mechanisms already in place. When CSIS goes out to get a warrant, first it has to get approval within CSIS. Then it goes to an interdepartmental committee, which vets the particular warrant. Then it goes to the minister, who has to sign off on the warrant, which is important, of course, because of ministerial responsibility and responsible government. Then it goes to the judge.

Before the judge signs off, in many cases the judge will send it back saying, “I want certain changes made”, “I want more evidence”, or whatnot. The judge can impose certain conditions on how the operation is carried out. In many cases the judge will even ask CSIS to report back on how things were done, to assure the judge that everything was done in accordance not just with the law but with exactly what was authorized by that particular judge. We now have some very competent judges in this country with regard to the national security framework that is in place.

I would also say with regard to our European allies that one of the challenges here is that we have been very privileged in not having had to live with the challenges we are discussing and are facing, and that they have had to do so for decades, if we look at Germany, France, Spain, or the United Kingdom. From a policy analysis perspective, I think there is some policy learning that can be done from the experiences our allies have had with some of the powers we are adopting here, which they already have in legislation and with which they have ample experience.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much.

Law enforcement has indicated that lowering the threshold for recognizance with conditions will be of assistance to them when attempting to prevent terror attacks from happening.

You mentioned the judicial authorization that is required. Can you comment on the lowering of the threshold for preventative arrests, once again comparing it to other legislation that you may be aware of?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Let me preface this by saying that I am no lawyer and I am no law professor. There's a reason I decided to study political science instead.

The challenge right now is that between surveillance and arrest, we don't have a whole lot of in between, because for powers of detention and recognizance and peace bonds, in the way the legislation is currently written, the evidentiary threshold is very similar to that of powers of arrest, that is to say, it is a very high bar to cross.

What's being proposed is to do what our European allies have done, which is to provide a tool kit that, with a lower threshold of evidence, would allow us to impose conditions and limit people's mobility, limit the ability to go on the Internet and whatnot, limit the ability to communicate with others, without actually having to lay a charge and then hope to convict them.

There's another reason I think this is important. What this does is it gets us into the preventative realm. I think we need to do a lot more on prevention than simply charging people. There's another reason we need to do that. A national security investigation is very expensive and lengthy. Then we have an expensive and lengthy trial. If we lock people up, it costs us somewhere between $40,000 and $100,000 a year.

Wouldn't we all be better off if we were to save some of that taxpayer money and impose conditions on individuals who may be up to no good without actually having to charge them? Then once that recognizance or once that peace bond expires, allow them, provided they realize their actions may not have been particularly prudent, to go free, hopefully having learned from their mistakes.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much.

It's very much as we do in domestic disputes in this country with peace bonds between partners who may not be getting along too well. We make them keep the peace and be on good behaviour.

I wonder if you could make a comment on the legislation as it relates to.... You mentioned the interruption provisions of the act, but it does state clearly in the act that the activities would have to be “activities that undermine the security of Canada”.

We have heard, and we're going to hear some more, from organizations in Canada whose members believe because they go out and demonstrate against someone cutting down a virgin forest, a white pine, or something else, they're going to be arrested and thrown in jail, under this act.

[The Chair, Conservative, Daryl Kramp]

Sorry, but the time is up now. Your response potentially could go to another member of the committee at some particular point, but we'll have to see where that takes us.

We will now go to Madam Doré Lefebvre, s'il vous plaît.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the three witnesses we have heard from during the second hour of this meeting. Their testimony has been a major contribution to Bill C-51.

I would like to thank Ms. Vincent in particular for joining us today.

I'm sure things have been difficult for you and your family since the events of October 19. That's why I wanted to extend my sympathies to you.

[Madam Louise Vincent]

Thank you.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

The events that took place in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu have touched us all. We have talked about them a lot. I am very touched by the fact that you are here and that we are able to meet with you. Rest assured that, regardless of our political opinions on Bill C-51, we are all aware of the terrorist threat and we are all trying to come up with the best possible response.

Thank you for sharing your story and your point of view with us. I think that was really important.

[Madam Louise Vincent]

Thank you.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

If I may, Mr. Chair, I will yield the floor to my colleague Mr. Scott.

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Thank you.

I'd like to add as well, Madam Vincent, that I think some of your analyses of the bill is in the spirit of exactly what this kind of committee should be doing, and I hope that continues at the amendments phase.

I want to double-check a couple of things quickly with Professor Leuprecht.

You brought up oversight and review issues towards the end. In your testimony in November on Bill C-44, which is a bill that goes much less further than this bill does in terms of new powers, you said it committed “one sin of omission”. That was your language. “Many more expansive powers for security intelligence should be balanced with robust parliamentary accountability...”.

I was there in that committee with you. Certain questions were asked about the Belgian model. I just want to make sure so that everybody is clear that you're as concerned about the need for the balancing of expansive powers with robust parliamentary accountability for this bill as you were for Bill C-44. It's more or less a yes or a no.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Yes, with one qualifier that we should not confound review and oversight. Oversight is the politicization that we get from the United States with active involvement in ongoing cases. I think Canada is well served not to get involved in that.

Yes, a more robust review indeed is something that I support.

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Great, and the Belgian model is something that people can look at because you described it quite well at the time.

The second thing is that you indicated very well in the information sharing provisions of the new act within Bill C-51 about how important it is for there to be no silos for review agencies. Let's mix oversight and review here too, but review agencies, whether it's SIRC, the CSE commissioner, or the RCMP review body, I'm not sure if you're aware but the CSE commissioner wrote to say that he does not understand why of the 17 agencies listed in this new act he, as in his office of the commissioner, is the only review agency that is written in as allowing to share information.

I am wondering if you have the same concern. Is there any reason that this sharing of information would be written in as these 17 agencies plus whatever the minister adds by regulation, but only the CSE commissioner has been written in, so that in fact, the opportunity has not been taken to add sharing of information among review agencies.

Is that a concern for you?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

It concerns me, but perhaps for a slightly different reason than it concerns you.

We always think about review as simply trying to make sure everything is on the up and up and everybody does everything right, but as the commissioner and SIRC will tell you, it's like peer review; it's trying to make people better at what they do, looking at their methodology, looking at their professionalism, and looking at their training. That, I think, is a matter that is regularly missed in this discussion.

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

I agree with you. I've made that point many times in the last few weeks. It's not just about protecting civil liberties. It's about actually making services more effective in what they do. I do agree.

I assume you're concerned that those agencies have not all been added in in information sharing.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

There certainly are improvements to be made.

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Great.

Turning to Master Segal, in your presentation you indicated that you felt there may be some excesses and slightly overwrought provisions. I am wondering if there are any you might want to identify. I'll mention a couple. One is that the information sharing act precludes anybody engaging in civil proceedings if in fact information has been shared in good faith and has resulted in harm. The cases that we know, the Arar case and the current case being brought against the government might well be excluded under that provision.

Would you consider that an excess?