Public Safety Committee on Oct. 20th, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you, Mr. Barrette.

Mr. Dubé, you have the floor.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us.

My question is for Mr. Peschard and Mr. Barrette.

Reference was made to the McDonald Commission. Following that commission, it was decided to split the powers. As a result, we have the RCMP on the one hand, and CSIS on the other. Many people, myself included, argue that because of the powers included in Bill C-51, that separation is being eliminated, despite having been conceived for a very specific reason. Since your organization has been around for a long time, you've probably seen things progress, or regress, in that regard. I'd like you to give us more details about this situation.

[Dominique Peschard]

The fact that CSIS can take preventive action, even unlawfully under the legislation resulting from Bill C-51, does indeed bring to mind the actions of the RCMP. In fact, it's exactly why intelligence work was separated from police action at the time. The problem is that CSIS does not seek to gather evidence that will lead to criminal charges in a context where the accused will be able to defend himself in a fair and impartial process. Instead, things are done clandestinely.

As a result, people are sometimes subject to these police actions, as they were in the 1960s or 1970s, without being aware of it, and are then unable to contest the actions. The data banks of certain organizations can be destroyed, activities can be sabotaged, etc. Action is taken against individuals in the dark, as part of a framework that doesn't keep them informed, even after the fact. The rights of these people are infringed, but they have no way to challenge it. That is not an acceptable way to protect our country.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I'd also like us to address these organizations' duty to prove they need such powers.

In your view, have these powers been proven necessary, or, on the contrary, were the provisions that existed before Bill C-51 sufficient to ensure public safety?

[Denis Barrette]

The state's surveillance and investigative agencies will always tell you their toolbox isn't full enough. That's normal. It's as old as the hills.

In my opinion, the proof has not been made, and it's up to those agencies to provide such proof. We must always ask—and this brings me back to the same question—whether an investigation would have been impossible without the anti-terrorism measures in Bill C-51, and in which respects these measures are helpful.

This is just one example among many. We must never forget that the context of Bill C-51 is terrorism and national security. National security is based on secrecy being maintained within surveillance agencies and the police. Consequently, the debates take place behind closed doors, because not only national security, but also, international relations, are involved. The information is from the outside. We're not arguing that it's improper for Canada to get information from other countries. We can't criticize that, since it's a normal procedure, and is bound to increase.

As we saw in the Maher Arar inquiry, the problem is that this information is often obtained through torture, or is erroneous. In fact, the two are often combined. Since the information is obtained through torture, it is often incorrect. This is why we often end up with investigations built on rotten foundations. It goes without saying that the results of those investigations are invalid. In short, the way investigations are conducted needs a thorough overhaul.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

That's very interesting, and I appreciate your answer.

I don't want to interrupt you, but time is precious.

Mr. Foura, I'd like to ask you a question. I must admit that I feel we know very little about the American experience in fighting radicalization. You mentioned your visits. Perhaps you could describe in a bit more detail the work being done in the United States, and whether those initiatives are successful or not.

[Lamine Foura]

It's important to understand that in the American model, the federal government does not intervene that much with respect to security. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was created soon after September 11, 2011. Its role with respect to security is mainly a policy role.

In the United States, working group was created to bring together most federal institutions involved in security, and programs have been developed. So there is no direct intervention in terms of preventing radicalization. The working group developed programs with the help of researchers, and the programs are included in kits. The objective is to identify where receptiveness to these programs is particularly strong.

For example, there are training kits concerning Daesh's discourse. It's a presentation that is two and a half hours long, and in which the federal government simply provides the information to organizations. That's what I find interesting. Instead of creating an institution, such as a centre, the government takes care of developing and identifying training courses about the religious or political discourse of Daesh, intended for Americans. Here in Canada, we could have training for Canadians. And the kit is made available to, say, a sports team or athletic club, which can use it and present it independently. It can also be useful to parents.

For example, there's a slide that shows the major social networks like Twitter and Facebook. Everyone knows those. Then, other, less famous platforms, used more often by these groups, are presented in turn. This training and these tools are offered to stakeholders on the ground.

In the United States, far more work has been done on content orientation than on direct intervention.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

One last question, if I may.

You spoke about the importance of the network, but also a fear of criminalization, when a radicalization problem is reported. Some people say that increasingly broad and vague definitions in Bill C-51 risk undermining anti-radicalization efforts because of that very fear of criminalization.

Do you agree?

[Lamine Foura]

Very much so.

We are talking about countries that practice torture. So there's a major risk of loss of confidence. Relying on information from countries we know very well—countries from which immigrants come, and which use torture to get information—reduces confidence in the Canadian justice system.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you very much.

We will continue with Mr. Mendicino.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Mr. Foura. You've spoken at length about the importance of building trust between the community, conventional law enforcement, and the broader national security community. We've heard evidence, in the context of this tour, that there are two demographics within many communities that are often not fully empowered and engaged, when it comes to counter-radicalization. Those two demographics are youth and women.

I wonder if you can take a moment to talk about how we can fully engage those two groups. I think there is an important sentiment here that if we don't get them involved in this initiative, then we will not succeed.

[Lamine Foura]

Thank you very much. That's a very good question.

They are really the two most important groups. Young people generally trust their mothers more. There's a much stronger bond. In any case, in certain traditions, the mother is a very important symbol. This means she can be a bond of confidence. Women and youth play an especially important role.

Let me come back to the effort. In the work I do as an engineer, when transformations are made within my company, all the transformation programs not integrated with day-to-day activities fail. When it comes to preventing radicalization, the programs must not come from the outside; they must be integrated into young people's daily activities.

Young people will not want to take part in an activity if they're told it's an anti-radicalization activity. It won't interest anyone. However, if the tools are designed within the communities themselves, and the communities are given the means to integrate them tools in people's sporting, cultural or social activities, engagement becomes a natural process. The youth will then consider it their project, rather than a project that comes from the outside.

That's the essential element that gives us the certainty we can engage women or youth in a project.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

You mentioned sporting activities in your introductory remarks, and I had taken that down. Do you see a way of marrying sporting activities with other community role players, including law enforcement and police, in a way that is constructive?

[Lamine Foura]

We've already done that. Games between young people and Mounties have already taken place. The youth who play are generally talented at soccer. This gives them power. They realize they're people like them, who can discuss with them, score points against them, win the game, etc.

Let's come back to the question of trust. A few years ago, because of what happened in several documented cases, it was very difficult for me, as a leader, to tell the community we were going to invite someone from the RCMP. Since the events of 2005, I feel there's been a change of attitude or policy. I could call up some people from the RCMP tomorrow, and they'd ask me to organize a soccer tournament and make a lamb roast afterwards. That type of preventive activity is done today, but it can't be perceived as spying.

CSIS plays a negative role in this area. The powers it's obtained under recent laws enable it to interview people. But the people don't know how to react, because they don't know whether they have the right to refuse. This can sometimes break a young person's trust that took a year to build. Their interventions, which are sometimes not particularly normative, structured or open, can cause problems.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Let me pick up on that, and let's return to women and the role that mothers play in the community, which is, of course, vital. How can we fully engage women in a positive way, as role models, as individuals who can ensure that we are reconciling culture and identity, which are core to one's ethnicity and culture, with broader Canadian values?

[Lamine Foura]

It's exactly the same thing. Unfortunately, we haven't yet launched an initiative of this kind. In the case of young people, some of our initiatives have had positive effects, but it's exactly the same thing.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Sorry, if I could interrupt, what would an initiative look like in your eyes? Give me your vision of what a positive—

[Lamine Foura]

Yes, I will try to give you a vision of that.

Generally, citizens, and members of cultural communities in particular, want an opportunity to protect the country's safety. That's what I sense. Moreover, these people are well aware that experience has shown that young people of all religions today are vulnerable to a discourse that is much more political than religious, and that presents our youth an ideal that doesn't exist.

So the parents are contacted, but they don't want to be snitches. They don't want to be dealers. They want the police to treat them as equals, and work with them as a team. We need to find activities that women would be interested in taking part in, so they can play a role as citizens and protectors of national security, along with a maternal role as protectors of their children.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Let me ask my last question to Monsieur Peschard and Monsieur Barrette.

One of the challenges on this file is coming up with objective metrics of success. How do we see that we're making progress in the prevention of radicalization? Could you offer a few brief words on that?

[Dominique Peschard]

It's not an easy question to answer.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

That's why I asked.

[Dominique Peschard]

It's not an easy question. I agree with Mr. Foura that prevention must be distinguished from deradicalization.

The metric of success is whether or not we have youth or other people getting involved in this sort of activity. We have to have measurements, at some point. But as an organization, Ligue des droits et libertés is one preoccupation and it's a question of trust and it was raised in relation with CSIS intervening in these kinds of processes, and it's a question of sharing of information.

We have a vast information sharing network, now, among all the agencies and police forces engaged in national security, and one of our concerns is that people who are targeted in one way or another for intervention end up in police files that are widely shared. It would be a disaster if youth who the police approached, or who had interactions with the police, ended up in police databases that would eventually be shared widely, especially, with foreign partners. These people could be stigmatized for life, and there could be very serious consequences, because it's very hard to backtrack once you have been put on these lists and identified as a threat.

That's one thing. One of our preoccupations is precisely databases, the sharing of information, and that could be one area in which, for example, if care were not taken, the results could be very disastrous for individuals and the youth involved.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you, Mr. Peschard.

I think we have about four minutes for a round.

Ms. Watts.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Thank you very much. I appreciate all of the comments.

I want to go back to some comments that you made, Mr. Foura, regarding transparency and trust and a neutral authority to evaluate all of the programs.

We were just at the Centre for Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, looking at some of the things they have undertaken.

Explain to me what that would look like. From what I'm hearing, the programs are so vast that they start with the community centre in soccer games, and they involve engaging the community, engaging youth, and engaging the police. So the underpinning piece is not the de-radicalization of a youth or a child; it's simply being engaged in the community.

I hear, from what you're saying, that there are organizations that actually put programs out for the de-radicalization of youth.

Can you talk to me about that?

[Lamine Foura]

Let me share a few comments about the Centre.

The problem with the Centre—and we see it a lot with international travel—is that we talk about an experience or a situation that doesn't exist yet.

There are claims that cannot be made. I went to the United States. It has more than 10 years of experience with this. Americans have a lot of content on the subject, because there have been far more attacks on their soil than on ours. Today, they say they're learning. The Centre does a lot of international marketing, presenting vast experience, and I think it's very dangerous. In fact, I am somewhat critical of it.

For example, one factor that goes to transparency is that the Centre has not yet published the procedures to follow in handling a case. It talks about cases that have been referred to the police. One doesn't know if it's a second police office, or a prevention office. That also breaks down all the trust in this regard.

This is why I believe that, going forward, there must be centres that think about strategy. The Americans may have developed some content, but they're not doing that today. The real work, especially on prevention, must be done by integrating a culture of prevention.

It's an awareness thing. We need people to be aware that there is an issue with that.