Right.
Evidence of meeting #44 for Public Safety and National Security in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was security.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #44 for Public Safety and National Security in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was security.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:55 p.m.
As an Individual
I think that is something that really, in the future review of the architecture, should get serious consideration.
3:55 p.m.
Special Advocate, Kapoor Barristers, As an Individual
Just on that point, I view this committee as not engrafted upon the others. This is a different kind of animal. This is our only universal review. From that perspective—
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
3:55 p.m.
Special Advocate, Kapoor Barristers, As an Individual
That's right. What I mean to say by that is that we shouldn't necessarily be approaching this in a relative way. We should treat this as sui generis.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Tony Clement Conservative Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON
Monsieur Portelance talked about how detailed reviews would not necessarily be the purview of this committee. You'd have the review agencies, but this would have a different kind of function.
Again, I'm groping in the dark a bit, because of course this doesn't exist, and we've never been part of the U.S., U.K., or Australian experience on this. My question is, if it isn't detailed review—and I get that—and if it isn't operational review in real time—and I get that too—how do we make this substantive and useful?
4 p.m.
As an Individual
My comment about detailed review is that if you look at the sheer complexity of an organization like CSIS, for instance—and Anil talked about some of the challenges in terms of getting to the bottom of issues—and multiply that by 17 agencies, I cannot imagine a world where this new committee has an ability to really do detailed review on an ongoing basis.
I see a bit of a tiered approach. The existing review bodies do detailed review. It's part of a larger plan, larger architecture. This committee starts to concentrate on what I might call strategic issues: the co-operation between agencies, the gaps, the funding. There will be circumstances where a major event is an opportunity for this particular committee to weigh in, like an Air India event or a Parliament Hill shooting event, where the committee will want to satisfy itself that organizations are working effectively and that there weren't any gaps. For the day-to-day review, in terms of the sheer magnitude and complexity, I simply cannot see a world where this committee gets down in the weeds. For that, a relationship with the existing review bodies would seem advisable.
4 p.m.
Conservative
Tony Clement Conservative Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON
I think I've actually exhausted my initial round, if that's okay, Mr. Chair.
4 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant
Sure. I'm going to take a bit of the time left over from that to ask Mr. Portelance a little bit more about CBSA, and the fact that, as Mr. Clement mentioned, it is the body without a direct-line review body. Do you think this precludes that and makes it unnecessary? Or do you think it would be necessary to have a CBSA review agency?
4 p.m.
As an Individual
I do believe there's a need to bring greater public confidence in terms of the activities of CBSA. I've made a couple of comments.
Oftentimes, people mix the CBSA in the same conversation with CSIS, the RCMP, and CSEC. The first thing you have to recognize is that CBSA is not what I would call a tier one national security organization. It doesn't collect intelligence. It doesn't generate intelligence. It is a user of intelligence that is developed mostly by CSIS, the RCMP, and so on.
When you look at the CBSA, you find that it has a number of review and oversight bodies and so on. When I moved from CSIS to CBSA in 2008, the most striking difference was the public exposure to activities of CBSA. You can't hold anything back from an ATIP standpoint because, frankly, it doesn't meet the test. Everything you do is quite exposed.
I think the one area that is worthy of consideration is around public complaints. The public complaints that are generated are currently investigated within the CBSA. I've always thought that an organization like the public complaints commission of the RCMP would likely be the right sort of review body, but I think the right way to do this is to look at everything the CBSA does and really focus on the one area.
The last point I'll make is that some of the initiatives I've seen in the past had the CBSA looking far more like a CSEC organization, with that kind of review requirement. It just isn't. It isn't a tier one national security organization.
November 22nd, 2016 / 4 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will continue along the same lines. The question is for the two witnesses. I will start with you, Mr. Portelance, since you already have some momentum.
I don't want to misquote you. You talked about misalignment, to the effect that the committee of parliamentarians could practically delegate to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, some parts of the mandate, given the lack of access to information. With that in mind, we shouldn't forget about the Privacy Commissioner's report, which states that, as a result of Bill C-51, the majority of agencies involved in information sharing are not subject to review. One example is the Canada Border Services Agency, but there are others, provided they are open to the public, as you say. However, there is nowadays also an issue related to information sharing. The committee of parliamentarians should be looking into that, right?
4:05 p.m.
As an Individual
I would say that's a good example. Information sharing among all agencies, whether they play a lead role or a supporting role in national security, could be part of the annual mandate the new committee gives itself. The committee could carry out an annual study, for example, on information sharing, volume, quality and elements that cause problems, such as compliance with privacy requirements.
It is true that existing review agencies have no horizontal capacity, and that will always be a problem. For example, when the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, shares information with the Canada Border Services Agency, SIRC does not have an opportunity to continue its review to determine what the Canada Border Services Agency—
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Allow me to interrupt you before Mr. Kapoor answers.
I would give a very specific example of a recent situation, which was exposed after access to information requests were filed. I'm talking about consular services, which share information with CSIS on Canadians detained abroad. Consular services don't come to mind when we think about intelligence gathering and the protection of public safety. Nevertheless, they can play a role that could require the intervention of this kind of a review committee.
4:05 p.m.
As an Individual
I completely agree. That is why I said in my opening remarks that the organizations to be scrutinized by the new committee should not be limited to those listed. That is because it may potentially be discovered that an organization not on the list is receiving information.
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
At the same time, if I may, I would say that we should not limit ourselves to the information based on SIRC, as other organizations will also be covered by the committee of parliamentarians. So the committee will need to have access to that information.
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
Thank you.
Mr. Kapoor, do you want to add your thoughts to that?
4:05 p.m.
Special Advocate, Kapoor Barristers, As an Individual
I agree with Luc that there has to be this cross-agency review. That's the beauty of this particular committee. If the committee were minded to take a look at information sharing across the suite of intelligence agencies, they would have to do so with regard to their capacity, but I think that as a matter of principle they ought to do so.
The other area that's very important, I think, is deconfliction between the RCMP and CSIS. It's important that this committee have an understanding of that and how those mandates converge in the counterterrorism effort and where maximum efficiencies can be obtained.
I think those are areas that right now are really beyond any kind of review mechanism. This committee can perform a salutary service by doing that.
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
I want to touch on another comment that you also made about the access to the media, the chair having a public role, and the trust deficit that exists. When the U.K. chair was here, he talked about the fact that they elect the chair. With regard to the relationship with the media and with other parliamentarians and with Parliament as a whole, and despite the fact that it's not a parliamentary committee but a committee of parliamentarians, as we've been told, that relationship is nonetheless important.
What are your thoughts on proceeding that way? I know that we keep talking about the growing pains and how we can't get tomorrow to where the U.K. is, but that being said, it's hard for me to see a reason why we should wait.
What are your thoughts on that?
4:05 p.m.
Special Advocate, Kapoor Barristers, As an Individual
Do you mean in terms of...?
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC
In terms of having the members of the committee elect the chair of the committee.
4:05 p.m.
Special Advocate, Kapoor Barristers, As an Individual
I don't have a strong view on that one way or the other. I suppose the benefit of having the chair elected is that the person has the confidence of the committee members and isn't someone who is parachuted in, but you guys all know each other and like each other, so....