Public Safety Committee on Nov. 30th, 2017

[Vincent Rigby]

Are you talking about the entire bill right now?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Yes. Has any thought been put into the approximate cost of the full implementation of this bill?

[Vincent Rigby]

Of the total costs, I don't think there has been.... I could turn to my colleagues, but these are still early days. We'll want to have the legislation actually passed and become law.

We certainly looked at some preliminary cost estimates for specific measures, but I couldn't give you a grosso modo figure for the entire bill and its implementation at this point.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Can you provide those figures you have to the committee at your convenience, please?

[Vincent Rigby]

I can certainly look at getting you some answers, absolutely, sir.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you.

Specific to CSIS, clause 99 of the bill includes new language that prohibits CSIS from detaining an individual. Could you help us understand the justification behind that reduction in power?

[David Vigneault]

Thank you for the question.

Actually, we do not have the power and we never had the power of detention. This is a power that is reserved only to the police. The way we deal with threats, essentially, is that we investigate, we collect intelligence, and we inform our partners. With the legislation that previously allowed us to undertake threat reduction, we can take some measures to reduce a threat, but those measures prohibit any detention. We thus do not have and we never had any power of detention.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Okay. Thank you.

This question is for Justice and Public Safety. The other day at the committee we discussed changing terminologies. Can you help us to understand the necessity to change the terminology in section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, from “is likely to prevent” a terrorist activity to “is necessary to prevent” a terrorist activity, and how that change is anticipated to impact or affect our ability to make preventative arrests?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Is that to Mr. Breithaupt?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

I don't have the list of who is from Public Safety or Justice.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We'll go with Mr. Breithaupt.

[Douglas Breithaupt, Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice]

Thank you very much for the question.

Yes, Bill C-59 would propose to revert one of the thresholds to what it was before former Bill C-51. There are two thresholds: that the peace officer have, first, reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist activity may be carried out, and second, reasonable grounds to suspect that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions or the arrest of the person is, as it currently reads, “likely to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity”.

This bill proposes to change that phrasing to “be necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity”. This would restore that particular branch of the test to what it was originally, with the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001, and that's attached to the branch of the test that's “reasonable grounds” to suspect. It would require the police to present evidence of a greater link between the conditions to be imposed on the person or the arrest of the person and the prevention of terrorist activity.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

What we've done has in effect made it more difficult to have an impact on national security by going back to even before Bill C-51. Is that what you're saying?

[Douglas Breithaupt]

It is an increase in the threshold. This tool is available for use. It hasn't been used to date, but it may very well be used in imminent circumstances, in which case there may be a closer link between the necessity of using the tool to prevent the terrorist activity from being carried out.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Okay. Thank you.

I just have to comment that it is problematic to me that as our threat to national security increases, we would actually go backwards on our ability to protect ourselves from it.

Again, maybe the same individual can respond to the significance of changing the word “sharing” to “disclosing”?

In discussing this previously, we were having some conversations on sharing information, what it means to disclose information, and whether that's just a cosmetic change in language. Do you see a substantive shift in how that can be carried out?

As we know, the sharing of information is absolutely critical between departments and agencies for national security, as well as with our allied partners, but in-house, in Canada, it's absolutely critical. Do you see this as being a substantive change that's going to make it more difficult or easier to share information?

[Vincent Rigby]

Perhaps I can tackle that one, Mr. Chairman.

I don't think it's just cosmetic. I think it's actually quite important. As the minister suggested, moving from “sharing” to “disclosing” is also making it clear that this is not about collection. This is about disclosing information, and sometimes I think within the definition of “sharing”, it can be implicit that there's a collection dimension as well, so we wanted absolute clarity in that regard.

Also, disclosing makes it very clear that it's from one body, one organization, to another organization, so there are certain requirements on the disclosing organization or agency now in terms of the information they give to another agency or organization.

Absolutely, I hear you in terms of the sharing of information being extremely important. Indeed, I think the amendments that are being suggested now within the act are still aimed—while protecting privacy, protecting rights, and so on—at making sure that those organizations have the information they need to respond to threats.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Motz.

Mr. Dubé, you have seven minutes.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to quickly go back to Mr. Rigby and Ms. Beauregard on the subject of the no-fly list. I have two questions for them.

First, why is it so difficult to determine the costs of setting up the system?

Second, if the bill is passed, the legislation will be in place, but the money will not always be available. From what you are saying, I get the impression that we will not be seeing the money in the next budget. Does that mean that we will have to wait for the next budget cycle before the technical system can be implemented?

[Vincent Rigby]

Thank you for your question.

At this point, I wouldn't want to disclose the costs, just because we're still having those discussions. For me to provide an estimate right now, which would subsequently have to be revisited, I don't think would be in anyone's best interest.

As I said before, it's a very ambitious, highly technical fix in terms of the IT, so we're having to cross a lot of t's, dot a lot of i's, and work with a lot of other agencies and departments in terms of bringing those costs together. We do have an estimate right now. We put that with the government, and we are waiting for a response in that regard.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

So, essentially, we are waiting for a reply from the Department of Finance in order to find out what will be possible in the budget. Is that what you are saying?

[Vincent Rigby]

We're certainly in discussions with the Department of Finance right now with respect to the ultimate cost, yes.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Vigneault, I would like to ask you about the unselected datasets. It is about the kind of net that can affect a number of people while you are conducting your activities. One of the justifications in the bill is that the Minister and the new commissioner are going to determine whether or not it is appropriate to gather and keep that data.

How do you go about distinguishing between the datasets? For example, the Minister or the commissioner could decide that one dataset is appropriate, because it relates to someone who poses no threat but who may have had a conversation with a suspect you are targeting. How do you distinguish that dataset from the other information about legitimate associates of the person who may be a threat too?

Put in a better way, how do you go about distinguishing between the other data and the unselected datasets that affect people who have nothing to do with the suspect?

[David Vigneault]

Thank you for your question, Mr. Dubé.

My answer comes in two parts.

First, as I briefly mentioned just now, a number of measures already allow us to collect, use and keep information. It starts with the Minister, who will determine the category of information we can use. That category is reviewed by the commissioner. So a quasi-judicial review is conducted by the Intelligence Commissioner. If the information affects Canadians, the Federal Court will decide whether it is absolutely necessary for CSIS to keep and use the information. The Federal Court will apply the privacy test to determine whether to let us use the information. The system to be put in place by Bill C-59 includes criteria that allow us to use the information.

Second, I understand that people are very interested in our use of the information, but, for an intelligence organization like CSIS, it is absolutely critical to have information. Let me give you a specific example. Having a bigger dataset allows us to characterize threats and to say with whom such and such an individual is in contact, and whether or not that constitutes a threat. Often, it allows us to establish that there is no threat. Having that dataset means that CSIS does not investigate innocent people.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

When you accumulate datasets, one of civil society's great concerns is that the data can deal with all kinds of information that is not essential to your work and that can interfere with privacy. In that sense, it may also include what the bill calls unselected data.

Technically, how do you proceed? If the court determines that you have the right to collect that information because the target is legitimate, how do you go about distinguishing the legitimate target from the unselected data that will inevitably be collected? Has a system been put in place? Perhaps my level of understanding is not as high as yours, but, when you are collecting datasets, the net is clearly cast very wide and the information is not automatically relevant to the investigations.

[David Vigneault]

Absolutely. If the bill is passed, the unselected data will be separated out. Only the designated people will be able to have access to that information. There will be no question of taking a dataset and mixing it in with our threat-related data. Unselected data will be segregated. Designated people will be able to make requests to use it. Each time that is done, the activities will be reviewed to make sure that our procedures and our implementation comply with the spirit of the law.