Public Safety Committee on May 5th, 2021

[David McGuinty]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Lightbound.

In the report, we tried to clearly convey what we heard from the security and intelligence community on this issue.

What surprised us the most in 2020 was the increase in the activities of ideologically motivated violent extremists, or IMVEs. The dynamics behind these activities don't seem to be slowing down. On the contrary, they seem to be moving faster and faster and involving more and more groups and participants.

We know that extremist dialogue isn't necessarily criminal. However, we also know that Canada has an increasingly broad base for recruitment. Extremists can look for more and more people who are susceptible to possible radicalization.

Our security and intelligence services are concerned about the situation in the field and about the increase in activity. We've seen it abroad, such as in New Zealand. Several of the incidents brought up in paragraph 35 occurred in Texas and in Germany, in two instances. There's also the issue of involuntary celibate groups.

These extremists are also posing a growing threat. We know that it's increasingly overlapping with other IMVE-type extremism. Of course, we saw a van attack in April 2018. We saw a stabbing in June 2019 in Sudbury. We saw another stabbing in Toronto by an individual motivated by the incel ideology in February 2020.

This is perhaps the most striking thing about this review for us, Mr. Chair, in terms of monitoring the trend. Mr. Lightbound rightly points out that it's a surprise to our security and intelligence community, but they are very much seized with this based on what we've seen and the information we've obtained.

[Joël Lightbound, Liberal, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Have you seen an acceleration as a result of the pandemic? I think that this was noted in your report.

People are spending more time online, and there are more conspiracy theories, for example.

Has this affected radicalization and the rate?

[David McGuinty]

For each of the five topics that we covered in the report, we tried to provide, at the end of a chapter, an analysis of what has happened since the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact on the five areas.

In that analysis, we know there has been a decrease in mass gatherings. We know there has been a closure of public spaces and limits on travel. These things may have had a bearing on driving activity further online.

This is something the RCMP is examining. They believe it could result in people looking for advice or information over the Internet and accessing what we call extremist echo chambers. We believe that COVID-19, more social isolation and more financial hardship during the restrictions have likely put more of this type of IMVE and incel activity online.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Lightbound.

Madam Michaud, please go ahead.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I also want to thank you, Mr. McGuinty, for joining us and for your work. It's very valuable. We greatly appreciate it.

In order to frame my questions properly, I first want to make sure that I understand the role of NSICOP.

Is NSICOP's role to take stock of the situation and the threats, and then make recommendations to the Prime Minister?

I gather that you aren't responsible for what the government does with your recommendations and for the solutions that it implements. Is that right?

[David McGuinty]

Yes, you're right. NSICOP addresses the major issues that it chooses. We have a very rigorous approach to selecting topics for review. We conduct the reviews, and the reports are then sent to the Prime Minister. The reports may be released to the public in the House of Commons and the Senate.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

You always talk about terrorism as the number one threat. You also talk about cyber threats, espionage and foreign interference, which are growing issues.

Do you see these new threats as a new form of terrorism? I'm thinking in particular of cyber threats, the situation on social media, and foreign interference with intellectual property.

[David McGuinty]

In the security and intelligence community, Ms. Michaud, risks are divided into five categories, as we outlined in the report. These include terrorism and cyber threats.

I don't know whether we can say that we're seeing terrorism shift online right now, if that's what you're asking. However, we know that the current situation surrounding COVID-19 seems to be driving a number of actors to speed up or increase their online activities.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

I'll come back to this, because it's worthwhile. In your opening remarks, you said that travel restrictions during the pandemic, for example, may have reduced terrorism or some terrorist efforts.

Can you tell us more about this?

[David McGuinty]

We clearly stated in the report what we heard from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP, and other agencies. We heard that the very sophisticated terrorist threats seem to have slowed down and that the risks are more associated with what we call soft targets, meaning public locations, places where people gather. Obviously, nowadays, this doesn't happen very often.

My colleague Mr. Jorgensen could elaborate on this, if that's fine with you.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Okay.

[Sean Jorgensen]

The only thing I'd add for Ms. Michaud is that the reduction in travel also means, of course, a reduction in air flights, which are, as you know, one of the key threat vectors for terrorism. We've also seen very significant reductions on immigration, with another vector, for example, into certain countries, being people illicitly coming into countries under the guise of immigration. There have been a number of restrictions imposed on the travel and movement of people that have in turn restricted certain activities of terrorist groups as well.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

I want to address the issue of the rise of the extreme right, including groups such as Proud Boys. Canada has listed Proud Boys as a terrorist group, although the group appears to have been disbanded. We aren't immune to situations such as the ones that occurred in the United States, and several experts have said so.

I'm thinking, for example, of networks such as QAnon. Statistics show that Canada is among the top four countries generating QAnon-related content on Twitter, along with the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. I think that more and more people are joining these types of groups that spread conspiracy theories. This is becoming worrying. Canada isn't immune to this.

In your opinion, is Canada prepared to respond to this very modern threat that hasn't really been faced in the past?

How should Canada prepare for this?

[David McGuinty]

There's work to do.

As of 2015, at least 100 white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups existed in Canada. The vast majority of these are ideologically motivated violent extremism groups. However, in our research—and this was also new to us—more recent estimates suggest that there are closer to 300 such groups across Canada. There has been a major increase in neo-Nazi groups—active and growing—and clearly, as you rightly point out, Madam Michaud, the threat of IMVE, ideologically motivated violent extremism, is growing around the world. It increased by 320% from 2013 to 2018.

It's a very serious matter for Canada, a very serious matter for our security and intelligence organizations, and it's a very serious matter for parliamentarians.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Madam Michaud.

Mr. Harris, you have six minutes, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to our colleague, Mr. McGuinty, for joining us today. It's a very interesting report.

You've called your report an update of a threat assessment first undertaken by your committee in the 2018 report.

First of all, I'm one of those people who's not very happy to have a committee such as yours—made up not of Parliament but of parliamentarians who report to the Prime Minister—that redacts the report, and we get to talk to you instead of your reporting to Parliament.

That being said, if you were doing threat assessments, shouldn't Parliament require that these agents table an integrated and unclassified, unredacted threat assessment to the members of Parliament and that it go to Parliament in the same way that it is done in the United States by the director of national intelligence there?

Is that not a proper method of ensuring that Parliament is aware of the threats to this country?

[David McGuinty]

Thank you, Mr. Harris, for the question.

I think committee members would consider that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians is a proxy group for the whole of Parliament, both the House of Commons and the Senate. They have been cleared to a sufficiently high level to be able to hear the classified information, for the first time in Canadian history, and to work on behalf of all parliamentarians to hear the information, deliberate in a completely non-partisan setting and then deliver up a report, which is classified, to the Prime Minister. From there, it goes through the normal Canada Evidence Act process of redaction, and then it's ultimately tabled.

We felt, as a committee, it would be helpful for Canadians—parliamentarians and Canadians writ large—to provide a single source of authoritative information on the threats to our national security, hence the update from the 2018 first foray into producing that assessment.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

We know that the redactions are those related to national security. Surely, if the redactions involve national security, then we're not getting the actual threat assessment. That would be my view, sir.

You referred to ideologically motivated violent extremism-inspired attacks. You mentioned the incel attacks and various other ones.

Would you include crashing through the Rideau gates with a heavily armed pickup truck and seeking to arrest the Prime Minister because of gun legislation that the person disagreed with, an ideologically motivated violent extremist approach, and something that would be considered a priority investigation, by the RCMP, for example?

[David McGuinty]

That's an excellent question, Mr. Harris, but it's not one that the committee turned its collective mind to.

The timelines for this report, I don't think included—and perhaps Mr. Jorgensen could confirm—that particular event.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Does it seem to you, sir, to fall into that category? I'm not asking for—

[David McGuinty]

It may very well—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I'm not asking for the CSIS assessment or the RCMP assessment. What would yours be?

[David McGuinty]

It may very well, but I can't comment with credibility. I don't have the information that backstops whatever investigation is taking place with respect to that particular....

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That would come under the rubric of a security threat of some kind to the country, if someone is trying to arrest the Prime Minister based on the activities that are publicly known. It's no secret. You don't need an investigation to know what was going on.

That would be a security threat to the country, would it not?

[David McGuinty]

I would think it would be a security threat. Our security intelligence folks would be paying very close attention to it, yes.