Public Safety Committee on Nov. 23rd, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order.

Thank you to colleagues for coming in.

Before I call on Mr. McGuinty and Madame Marcoux, I want to update members on some developments with respect to our agenda.

The first development was that Justice Bastarache is willing to come before the committee. As of Friday he was willing to come before the committee on the 7th. Now that date has been moved up to December 2. I propose giving him the full two-hour slot to be able to talk about that report on the RCMP.

The second thing I noticed while we were voting or doing QP, I'm not quite sure, is that the fiscal update is scheduled for November 30. I will take guidance from colleagues as to whether we just cancel November 30 outright. Both developments will make some serious dents in our previously agreed-upon agenda. Prior to Wednesday, I would appreciate the subcommittee communicating with me as to how we want to proceed. I'll probably reach out to each one of you and try to reorder the agenda so that we have a fully productive period of time from today through to the end of the session.

With that, I'm going to welcome Mr. McGuinty and Madame Marcoux to the committee to present their report.

Mr. McGuinty, given our long-standing friendship and your superior knowledge of parliamentary procedures, I found this report utterly...well, I was going to say “unintelligible”. I'm rather hoping you can explain it to me, because I've given a couple of shots at trying to understand what was being recommended in this report. There are so many deletions in the report that it makes it very difficult to follow the narrative.

For the sake of the chair, Mr. McGuinty, I'm rather hoping you give us the dummies' version of your report.

Thank you.

[David McGuinty, Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'll do my very best to try to accommodate you and other colleagues.

Good afternoon, colleagues. Thank you for allowing us to be here.

We're very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians' 2019 annual report and a separate special report, both tabled in Parliament on March 12 of this year.

By way of background, the committee met 25 times between February and August of 2019. It heard from 48 senior officials from government and civil society, and it relied for this work on over 30,000 pages of classified information.

Turning now to our first review, “Diversity and Inclusion in the Security and Intelligence Community”, this first-ever review provides a baseline of where the S and I community is in terms of diversity and inclusion for women, aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities. Our review shows that the representation of these designated groups is lower than in the overall Canadian public service, particularly for members of visible minorities. Perhaps more troubling, rates of harassment and discrimination remain unacceptably high.

The leaders of these organizations are all committed to fostering more diversity and inclusion in their respective workforces. However, sustained leadership, an overall commitment and greater accountability throughout the security and intelligence community are paramount to ensure these organizations are inclusive and truly reflect Canada's diversity.

The committee recommended that a review be undertaken in three to five years to measure progress. We also recommended that data collection and analysis be improved and that a common set of performance measures be developed.

Let me now turn to the review examining the threat of foreign interference in Canada and the government's response to that threat.

The committee agreed to focus its efforts on traditional person-to-person foreign interference. We did not examine questions surrounding electoral integrity, did not review cyber-threats and did not examine foreign acquisitions of Canadian business under the Investment Canada Act.

The review concludes that there is significant and sustained foreign interference exercised by a number of foreign actors seeking to covertly and inappropriately interfere or exert influence in Canada. It also found that the government's response to this threat was done on a case-by-case, even ad hoc, basis and that our engagement with other levels of government and the Canadian public was limited.

Therefore, the committee recommended that the government develop a whole-of-government strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resilience. We were actually fairly specific in our recommendation about what such a strategy should include. It appears at paragraph 297 of the report.

The committee further recommended that the government support this strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination.

I will now turn to the focus of the third review in the committee's annual report: the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA.

The committee conducted the very first independent review of CBSA's most sensitive national security and intelligence activities, including surveillance, the use of confidential human sources and joint force operations.

Overall, the committee found that CBSA's authorities are clear, well governed and supported by several statutes. However, CBSA does not have ministerial direction for its conduct of national security and intelligence activities. This constitutes a gap in ministerial accountability. The committee recommends that the Minister of Public Safety issue formal direction to CBSA, consistent with the practice at CSIS and the RCMP.

NSICOP also prepared a special report on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. During a 2018 review of DND's defence intelligence activities, DND provided the committee with an internal directive that gives guidance to troops and employees on how to manage the collection of Canadian citizen information. This is known as the CANCIT directive.

The committee decided to conduct a special review of the directive to understand the legislation that governs the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information about Canadians by DND, and to assess whether the implementation of the directive gave rise to legal and operational risks.

The committee concluded that the CANCIT directive was not clear enough and recommended that DND work with the Privacy Commissioner to review all of its defence intelligence directives.

The committee ultimately formed an opinion that DND defence intelligence activities conducted as part of overseas operations may not be in compliance—may not be in compliance—with the Privacy Act. The committee referred this matter, as a result, to the Attorney General, pursuant to its obligation under section 31.1 of the NSICOP Act. It reads as follows:

The Committee must inform the appropriate Minister and the Attorney General of Canada of any activity that is carried out by a department and is related to national security or intelligence and that, in the Committee’s opinion, may not be in compliance with the law.

The committee also calls on the Minister of National Defence to ensure DND complies with the letter and spirit of the Privacy Act in all of its defence intelligence activities, whether they are conducted in Canada or abroad.

In 2018 NSICOP recommended that the government give serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority for the conduct of defence intelligence activities. In 2019 the committee went further, calling on the Minister of National Defence to introduce legislation to govern defence intelligence activities. In response, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Public Safety have both been mandated to develop a framework governing defence intelligence.

Thank you very much for your attention, colleagues. Those are my comments.

Mr. Chair, if we're not able to answer detailed questions during this session, we would be pleased to provide written responses to you for the committee. I also want to note that this is a 182-page report, plus the special report on DND and the Canadian Armed Forces. We would welcome good comments, feedback and positive criticism on how we can do our work even better for the committee, for parliamentarians and for Canadians.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. McGuinty. Indeed, my initial—I hope constructive—criticism was ameliorated somewhat by your timely intervention.

With that, I'm going to ask for Mr. Kurek, Mr. Iacono, Madame Michaud and Mr. Harris for six minutes each, starting with Mr. Kurek.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. McGuinty, for coming before the committee today. Certainly it's been enlightening as I have gone through the information, the reports that this committee has provided to Parliament and the important work in ensuring that there is oversight in Canada's national security infrastructure.

To come to my first question, you've omitted three areas with regard to studying foreign interference. They are election tampering, foreign investment reviews and cyber-threats, which I believe your committee will be delving into this year. That's my understanding. I'm wondering if NSICOP will be looking into the security of our elections and foreign investments in the upcoming studies it has planned.

[David McGuinty]

There are a few things.

The important thing, I think, to remember first off is that NSICOP is not so much an oversight committee as it is a review committee. In this we differ from our American counterparts and are more in line with our other Five Eyes partners, whether that's the ISC in the United Kingdom or the New Zealand model. It's a little different in Australia. I'll just point out for listeners and viewers, and for Mr. Kurek's benefit, that it's more a focus on review than it is oversight.

The question of cyber-threats is exactly what the committee is seized with now, Mr. Kurek, in this particular round of reviews. This cyber-threat review is very considerable. I think we've already received roughly 18,000 pages of documents on this front. We'll be evaluating the cyber-threat question and the government's ability to respond to that threat.

We're also now delving deeply into the security and intelligence activities of the Global Affairs department, something that has never been done before. We try to pursue some of these reviews in areas that have never been reviewed before, such as the Department of National Defence, the CBSA and, of course, GAC.

What was your other question, sir?

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

It was whether the committee will be looking into the security of elections and foreign interference and whether those two issues will be covered. Just the election side, I think, is....

[David McGuinty]

Thank you.

As committee members may know, in 2019 cabinet passed a directive creating a five-person committee to be seized with activities during the 2019 election and basically be the recipient of information. This is a committee chaired by the Clerk. It was to be seized with this information that was coming in from different information providers and to make a determination as to whether a certain threshold was crossed, applying a certain test as to whether this five-person committee led by the Clerk ought to communicate with Canadians something untoward or something inappropriate that might have been going on during the election.

A report was just completed by the former deputy minister and clerk, Jim Judd—I believe he was a clerk—and he has made that report public. That report is now still with the members of NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. The unredacted version is with us. We are considering it now, and we'll have more to say about it in due course in commentary to the Prime Minister in terms of how this committee is structured, its mandate, etc.

We won't be looking so much at the electoral integrity, but I can send you more information, Mr. Kurek, on the details of the examination on cyber-threats if that would be helpful.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Sure. I would appreciate that.

Mr. Chair, how much time do I have?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have a minute and a half.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Okay.

Certainly the official opposition has been seized with the issue of Huawei. I have a couple of questions that I'm trying to meld into one.

Very simply, Mr. McGuinty, given this report and the work this committee has done, do you believe that Canada should exclude Huawei from its 5G Network?

[David McGuinty]

That's not a question I am able to answer, Mr. Kurek, on behalf of the committee. It is not something the committee has examined. It's not a review that we have undertaken.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Sure.

[David McGuinty]

We have, of course, in our review had a lot to say about foreign interference, and we would commend to you those particular pages that set out in great detail what we believe is happening.

I wish I could give you some indication, but the committee has not pronounced on this question.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

I appreciate that.

There are two countries specifically named in these reports, Russia and China, two countries widely reported to have acted against Canada and our allies. Experts who have appeared before this committee have suggested that China is a more complex actor, while Russia is more blunt and overt.

Does Canada have different strategies to deal with both of these foreign state actors and their involvement and possible threats to Canada?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We're unfortunately going to have to leave that important question there. I think Mr. McGuinty has already indicated that he is in no position to answer that kind of question. Possibly he is, in which case he could work an answer in during the next round of questions.

Mr. Iacono, go ahead for six minutes, please.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to the committee.

The NSICOP report addresses foreign interference and the security risks it poses. The committee stated that foreign interference would slowly erode the foundations of our fundamental institutions, including our system of democracy.

Can you tell us how foreign powers such as China and Russia, which are named in the report, are able to destabilize our democracy? What methods do they use?

[David McGuinty]

Thank you for your question, Mr. Iacono.

About 20 pages of the report provide a detailed description of incidents, approaches and specific cases in Canada and abroad. I cannot speak to anything other than what is in the report. A lot of the information is classified, apart from what appears in the public report. I suggest you go over the case studies in the report to see how foreign actors are behaving; a fair amount of detail was provided, at least, as much as possible. I can tell you, though, that the committee determined foreign interference was a huge problem for Canada, as it is for other countries.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you.

The dangers associated with foreign interference can give rise to fear and paranoia among Canadians. The dangers can even provide the basis for made-up conspiracy theories, which are increasingly prevalent of late. The theories are circulated on social media, by both Canadians and Americans.

Can you tell us how the government should educate Canadians on the issue?

[David McGuinty]

The first thing I should make clear is that cultural and ethnocultural communities are themselves targeted by foreign actors. They are often victims in Canada, and the Canadian government has a duty to protect those people—let's not forget.

In our report, we recommend a whole-of-government approach. That means doing a full review of how we conduct ourselves, how we respond, how our various levels of government work together, as well as how we work with Canadians, universities, the political class and politicians. Twice in a row, Mr. Iacono, we recommended that when politicians, including members of Parliament, are elected, they be given an in-depth briefing on the risks of foreign interference.

The report contains a series of recommendations on how the government can make improvements. We learned a lot by studying Australia, which has made significant strides on the issue, perhaps because it has more victims than other countries. I'm not sure. The committee recommended that Canada take a close look at the Australian model.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Could you tell us more about that?

My next question is about that very topic. You mentioned Operation Fox Hunt, and the efforts being made by the FBI in the U.S. and by Australia.

What should we, as a government, do first to make up for lost ground?

[David McGuinty]

Canada should move swiftly to adopt a more centralized and coordinated approach, in conjunction with the national security and intelligence advisor to the Prime Minister, for one.

Canada should take an in-depth look at Australia and the centralized working group it recently established within the government. It is not the committee's job to determine where such a central entity should fit into the government, but it could fall under the Privy Council Office and operate in conjunction with other key players.

Regardless, a tremendous amount of work needs to be done given how tremendous the risks are. The committee is in full agreement with what we have said. All parties and both houses of Parliament want to see the government take swift action on the issue.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Iacono.

Ms. Michaud, you may go ahead. You have six minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I was glad to hear you confess that you weren't entirely familiar with the findings in the rather lengthy report. I have to say that I wasn't either. It's quite technical.

I am eager to hear Mr. McGuinty elaborate on the issue. I appreciate the work he's done.

I want to discuss diversity and inclusion in the security and intelligence community.

In the past few weeks, we have seen many news stories about harassment, racism and sexual violence, mainly in the RCMP, but also in the prison system. According to the correctional investigator's latest report, those same issues arise among security officers and inmates.

You may have taken a close look at that. Are there any specific cases you can share with us?

You committed to conducting another review in three to five years to measure progress. Could you please tell us more about the cases you examined in producing your report?

[David McGuinty]

What a question, Ms. Michaud.

Do we have a half-hour, Mr. Chair?