Evidence of meeting #126 for Public Safety and National Security in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was india.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Nathalie Drouin  Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council Office and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office
Michael Duheme  Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
David Morrison  Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Daniel Rogers  Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Tricia Geddes  Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

—I apologize—providing sensitive information to The Washington Post that you did not provide publicly to anyone else?

11:40 a.m.

Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council Office and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office

Nathalie Drouin

We did not provide any classified information to The Washington Post.

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Sensitive intelligence was provided to The Washington Post that was not provided to Canadian journalists. Is that correct?

11:40 a.m.

Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council Office and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office

Nathalie Drouin

I think I have explained already what the purpose was of the conversation we had with The Washington Post, and the parameters of the conversation were discussed among ourselves.

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

I appreciate that. It would seem like a leak because it wasn't provided to Canadian journalists and the Canadian public. In fact, the Canadian public would not be aware unless they read The Washington Post and subsequent Canadian reporting on what was included in The Washington Post. From my perspective, that certainly seems like a leak, and it certainly is concerning that it was done without the knowledge of Canadian officials who are reporting on this, Ms. Drouin, but I appreciate your perspective on that.

To the commissioner—

11:40 a.m.

Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council Office and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office

Nathalie Drouin

I'd like to give my colleague the opportunity to respond.

11:40 a.m.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

David Morrison

Can I just address this same issue?

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Sure.

11:40 a.m.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

David Morrison

Within our strategy we were talking to different audiences, so we deliberately chose, as Madame Drouin said in her introductory remarks, a credible internationally read newspaper that would carry our side of the story. We chose a journalist who has a long record of background in this particular issue—he had written on it a number of times before—and through The Washington Post we were speaking directly to our friends in the United States and the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and we were also speaking directly to Indians.

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Mr. Morrison, just on that, then, the leak—or the non-leak—was an effort to get the Americans on board for the Canadian perspective. Was it an effort, then, in other words, to have American elected officials, those in the President's office, for example, read The Washington Post and be further compelled to back up Canada in this regard? Was that, in other words, in plain language, what the objective was?

October 29th, 2024 / 11:40 a.m.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

David Morrison

What I would say is that we approached this whole series of events, including the approach that we adopted in going to Singapore.... We were talking to our closest allies, who share similar concerns, from the beginning.

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Thank you, Deputy Minister.

To the commissioner, in your original press release you mentioned that, in February 2024, the RCMP created a multidisciplinary team to investigate and coordinate efforts to combat this threat. Who initiated that multidisciplinary team, and who were the members of it? Were they beyond the RCMP? Did they include members at this table today, for example?

Commr Michael Duheme

There were two teams that we initiated. One was for all the extortions and harassment that we're seeing, predominantly in Alberta and in Vancouver, as well as in the greater Toronto area. We had a coordination team out of B.C. that was looking after that, but we also felt the need to put a team together to look at violent extremists and foreign interference, which involves several government departments that are part of this task force.

11:45 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Who initiated that?

Commr Michael Duheme

I believe Deputy Commissioner Flynn initiated that.

11:45 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Okay. There was not a direction from anyone at this table or in the Prime Minister's Office to engage in that.

Commr Michael Duheme

Oh, no.

11:45 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

Was that team central to the subsequent events we heard about over Thanksgiving?

Commr Michael Duheme

I would say that there were already independent investigations going on before this team was created. That was more to bring a whole-of-government approach to what we're seeing intelligence-wise on the criminal side.

11:45 a.m.

Conservative

Raquel Dancho Conservative Kildonan—St. Paul, MB

I have a few final seconds.

Was February 2024 the first time a whole-of-government approach was taken?

Commr Michael Duheme

It was, yes, of this size. Other than that, there's daily work with the service and other government departments on an ad hoc basis when required.

The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon

Thank you, Ms. Dancho.

We'll go now to Mr. Dhaliwal for five minutes.

Sukh Dhaliwal Liberal Surrey—Newton, BC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As you know, Mr. Nijjar was my constituent. He was assassinated in a sovereign, religious place for the Sikhs. It was clearly an attack on Canadian sovereignty, as well as on Sikh sovereignty.

Mr. Rogers mentioned earlier that Pierre Poilievre will not do the whole clearance thing. What I'm hearing on the ground is that Mr. Pierre Poilievre is not doing the responsible thing and taking the clearance. Not only that, but we heard extensive calls for the Conservative Leader of the Opposition to do the responsible thing and get his clearance.

Can you explain to this committee why it would be the responsible thing for Mr. Pierre Poilievre to get the clearance?

11:45 a.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

I would say that the responsibility of the service is to do everything it can to protect public safety and reduce the threat of foreign interference from India in Canada. From our perspective, if a leader chooses to take a clearance, we will provide the information I spoke about earlier. We will do everything we can to enable that information to be provided and to allow for the best decisions to be made in the interests of Canadians within that party. If a leader chooses not to get a clearance, we continue to evaluate other mechanisms available to us in order to help reduce that threat. This can include threat reduction measures or others.

If a leader chooses to have a clearance, we can have a broader conversation with them about the details of the threat and certain types of intelligence.

Sukh Dhaliwal Liberal Surrey—Newton, BC

Thank you.

You mentioned threats, particularly from India.

What are some of the specific indicators of foreign interference by India that CSIS identified, and what steps is CSIS taking to prevent foreign interference in Canadian political processes and protect Canadian citizens?