Public Safety Committee on Oct. 29th, 2024

[Nathalie Drouin]

I will go back to what I have said before. India says that we have not shared any evidence with it. It also spreads the idea that the reason we have violence in Canada is that we are not taking extreme violence seriously.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

Thanks, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We're going now to Madame Michaud.

Ms. Michaud for two and a half minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

According to the special report on foreign interference by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, after the People's Republic of China, “…India emerged as the second-most significant foreign interference threat to Canada’s democratic institutions and processes.”

The report goes on to state:

While India’s foreign interference efforts have slowly increased, it became clear…that its efforts had extended beyond countering what it perceived as pro-Khalistani efforts in Canada to include interfering in Canadian democratic processes and institutions, including through the targeting of Canadian politicians, ethnic media and Indo-Canadian ethnocultural communities.

Mr. Duheme, you said that when you realize the evidence gathered indicates that the life of an individual living on Canadian soil is in danger, you need to meet with that individual.

What kind of protection can we provide that individual? Is the RCMP authorized to provide protection to those people?

That leads me to another question.

Do you only meet with individuals whose lives are in danger? Do you also meet with individuals suspected of being involved in foreign interference activities?

It's often said that people could have been involved in foreign interference activities without realizing it. Politicians, in particular, are mentioned. I'm thinking of a context where a politician on a parliamentary mission abroad goes for a drink with a colleague from another country and communicates information about Canada to that colleague without realizing that it's privileged information, for example.

In that case, do you meet with individuals suspected of having collaborated with India, for example, or do you only meet with individuals whose lives might be in danger?

There's a debate about the names of those involved, about whom the Prime Ministerspoke. The Leader of the Opposition does not want to get his security clearance to warn those who might be involved in foreign interference activities. Could the leader of the official opposition warn them, or could you do it?

I apologize if my question is a bit long.

[Commr Michael Duheme]

I'm going to start by responding to the question concerning the duty to warn people when their lives are in danger.

The role of the RCMP isn't necessarily to provide these people with protection, but rather to make them aware of the threat. I come back to the idea that the threat is imminent and credible. We're going to make some suggestions. For example, we might suggest that those individuals vary their daily routine. We might also provide them with some cybersecurity tips, if necessary. There is no one-size-fits-all approach here. However, we're trying to make people aware that they need to change their routines.

In response to the second part of the question, I'd say that it would be better to ask CSIS. As you just said, the RCMP will commit to intervening in foreign interference when a crime is committed. As to whether we can disclose information indicating that person xand person y met, for example, I believe that CSIS would be best placed to implement mitigation measures or meet with the individuals in question.

If there's any time remaining, I would ask Mr. Rogers to provide more clarification.

[Daniel Rogers]

CSIS can hold that kind of meeting to advise individuals who might be victims of foreign interference.

We do that and have done it many times over the last number of years. I will also just add to what the commissioner said. We've done that with partners and community groups, not just individuals. Where we see there might be groups of individuals who could be the target of a particular government's foreign interference strategy, with Public Safety Canada, the RCMP and others, we can engage them.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Ms. Michaud.

[Commr Michael Duheme]

The person initiating the discussion or the Canadian elected official, if you will, isn't always aware. CSIS or intelligence teams sometimes have a more global view of that strategy. That's why it's important to advise people where possible.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. MacGregor for two and a half minutes, please.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'll turn a question to the Department of Public Safety, because the RCMP, CBSA and CSIS all operate under your ministry's wheelhouse.

This committee has been looking at the previous issue of how a couple of Egyptian nationals were able to come into Canada. There was that foiled plot in Toronto, which was thankfully stopped before it could be executed. We now have a situation in which a foreign government is actively collaborating with a criminal element named the Bishnoi gang.

I know your department is still doing some internal investigations into how IRCC and the CBSA coordinated and what went wrong, but what are some of the added challenges when a foreign government is working in criminal activity? Does that inform how your department has to look at some of the people who might be coming from India?

We don't want to put anyone under the spotlight, but we have previous experience whereby someone got in who shouldn't have been here. I'm just wondering if you can comment on that.

[Tricia Geddes]

If the question is whether we are in a process of continuous review and understanding how these threats need to be properly identified through a security screening process, the short answer is yes.

You properly referenced that we and IRCC are engaged in a “lessons learned” exercise to ensure that we have a really good understanding of some recent cases. Part of that process, though, will involve looking at other recent cases and other threat actors, and how we can ensure—while no system is ever going to be perfect—that the system is as robust as it possibly can be. We're engaged in that process right now.

I wouldn't say it's new. This is continuous engagement we're undertaking with IRCC and, as you pointed out, all of the agencies that report to the Department of Public Safety.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Very quickly, Commissioner Duheme, from the RCMP's perspective, a lot of collaboration is required among various police forces around the world. What are some of the added challenges you're now experiencing with the involvement of the Bishnoi gang?

[Commr Michael Duheme]

We had good working relationships with the Indian National Investigation Agency. It was actually here in Canada over the years to understand our judicial process, and we sent a team over there. Obviously, with what happened, we have to rebuild those relationships because we have things in common.

When I think of violent extremists, they're not only here in Canada but also in India. There are common interests there, and we want to renew those relationships so that we can work together for a common cause.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

We'll go now to Mr. Motz for five minutes.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you very much for being here, witnesses.

Commissioner, I specifically want to thank you for the work you and your members have done on this file. You didn't give it up 11 months ago and longer. Thank you for the work you've done to bring this as far as you have. I wish you the best in continuing to work on it.

I have a question. When you're dealing with sensitive national security information—this is not necessarily for you, Commissioner; maybe this is more for Ms. Drouin—who can declassify that? Who has the authority to do that?

[Nathalie Drouin]

The owner of the intelligence products. For example, let's say you have something that has been published or released—

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Okay. That's all I need. That's the standard in the intel world. The owner can release it.

Now, you are a consumer of that. You don't create your own intel. As the national security and intelligence adviser to the PM, you're the consumer of intelligence. Is that right?

[Nathalie Drouin]

That's right.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Who do you get to authorize the release? You don't call it sensitive or classified information, but I read the National Post article. I'll tell you what: That's pretty sensitive information. It's pretty classified information.

Someone above you, the owner of that intel, had to give you authority to release it to The Washington Post, did they not?

[Nathalie Drouin]

As I said many times, we have not shared classified information with journalists. I can add that what we discussed with the journalist was exactly what we told all your leaders when we briefed them.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Is that including Mr. Poilievre?

[Nathalie Drouin]

Yes, that includes Mr. Poilievre.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you.

I don't want to play semantics, but I would consider that some of the information you gave would not normally have been made public under different circumstances. Commissioner Duheme has made that very clear. It could impact the criminal investigation and jeopardize the lives of many individuals.

Commissioner, you stated very recently—I don't know the exact time, but within the last week or so—that you would have concerns if the six diplomats were to be replaced. Does that remain your position?

[Commr Michael Duheme]

Yes, my comment was that I have concerns considering how the Government of India operates, but I also shared in that same interview that I'm not familiar with the background process that's in place when a diplomat or consular official is appointed to a country.

Perhaps Mr. Morrison would be better placed to explain the checks on the security side.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

I'm just going to ask you, Mr. Morrison, do you share those same concerns? What does that look like for Global Affairs?