Public Safety Committee on Oct. 31st, 2024

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

By my understanding, both of you were born and raised in Canada. I've seen you both for decades work as activists for human rights of not only Sikh Canadians but also others. I know you've both been very active on indigenous rights. I know Balpreet Singh has done a lot of work with Jewish groups, Muslim groups, and other impoverished groups. I know you, Moninder Singh, have done a lot for indigenous groups.

When we talk about human rights, Balpreet mentioned a very important point. Sometimes governments trade off the human rights of another country versus trade. In this case, we're talking about the human rights of Canadians, not the citizens of another country. It's really appalling that it has stepped into not only another country, which we've always known, but now right here in Canada. For that, I acknowledge your courage and commend you for standing up despite that.

Moninder Singh, can you speak about the weeks and months prior to Hardeep Singh Nijjar's death? There were lots of rumours, and even after, about organized crime calling for a hit on Mr. Nijjar. In fact, I got my information from people like you, and others before the Prime Minister unveiled it in September. There was a whisper, as Balpreet Singh said, that there was Indian involvement.

Can you shed some light on what you felt, beyond what would go into a trial situation?

[Moninder Singh]

It's just my nature that I have to correct things. I've given nothing and done nothing for indigenous communities. They've provided us with everything in this country. I just want to put that out there. As much as we could do, we could never do enough to reconcile for what's happened here.

On the actual question, in the months and weeks leading up to Mr. Nijjar's assassination, there was a lot of information that was just in the community. He was warned days before by law enforcement that his life was at risk. He was supposed to be meeting with intelligence a day after he was killed for more briefings, as well. He was continuously warned for a year. We got our warnings in July 2022. He was the only one among the five of us who was repeatedly receiving those warnings. He kept saying the same thing from every stage where he spoke. He said he had the right to speak, and that he would not go silent. If people didn't like what he was saying, that was a different thing.

That happened right up until the day of his assassination. On June 18, 2023, at approximately 12 p.m., just a few hours before he was gunned down, he actually stated from the stage that he may not survive, that people should move on with the struggle. He said, “Don't go quietly. You have a duty to your people to speak out.” That's what we remember about him. One of the reasons I'm in this room is because of him. Many of us are here because that is the catalyst that brought us all into this space, and with the revelations that came out of that.

I think the community felt a bit helpless. When we look back at that moment, and we look at him, did we do enough to protect him? Did we do enough as a community? We have to get out of that. For a year, he kept getting warnings, but no one did anything. That's where we come back to the failures. We have one side of it. India will continue to attack, but are we in Canada prepared to thwart those attacks? At the moment, I would have to say no.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

You have 20 seconds.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Look, we're in the last round of questions, and I'm pretty appalled. I don't want to make this political, but three parties have asked questions about India's direct involvement in foreign interference, which is the nature of this study. However, one party has asked nothing about India's involvement and their role.

Does that alarm you? If you were white or a different colour, would you not expect to have the same level of respect...or if it was Russia or Iran? Do you feel offended? I personally feel offended.

[Moninder Singh]

I never feel offended. I just figure out how to move forward. I have to respect everyone in this room, as they are elected officials. Somebody elected them to be in this room. Our expectation, as people living in this country, is that it wouldn't be the case that racism and discrimination are at play here. I would definitely hope not. My mind isn't going there. My mind is focused on who in this room will help us in the future. That's what we're going to be working towards. The commentary here is momentary, although I will say that I ended my five minutes by asking you to please ask me questions about India, because I watched what happened over the last two days, and I don't think enough questions were asked about India by certain individuals in this room, specifically.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, gentlemen. That ends this round.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here. We appreciate your testimony and the risks you run on a daily basis. Thank you for your efforts.

With that, we will suspend and bring in the next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting back to order.

I would like to welcome, as an individual, Mr. Serge Granger, director of the school of applied politics, Université de Sherbrooke, by video conference. We also have Mr. Wesley Wark, senior fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation.

I now invite Mr. Granger to make an opening statement for up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Serge Granger, Director School of Applied Politics, Université de Sherbrooke, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me to this discussion on foreign interference.

I will break down the elements of the Indo-Canadian relations into three points. I will first discuss India's admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, its relative appreciation of Canada, diasporic specificity in Canada, and recommendations to limit foreign interference from India.

Originally created as the Shanghai Five, this Sino-centric organization was founded by China, Russia and the central Asian republics in 2001. Focusing on limited, unconventional security, the organization fights three “evils”: extremism, terrorism and separatism. This association of words is not accidental. This multilateral organization allows China to ensure the co‑operation of neighbouring and distant countries in the repatriation of people, be it Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han, posing challenges to national unity. India joined the organization in 2017, as did Pakistan, which is also struggling with separatist or secessionist movements. In the case of India, it has an endorsement to act with impunity when its unity is at stake.

The juxtaposition of the three evils links terrorism, separatism and extremism with a normative framework according to which any separatist impulse is extremist and terrorist. This substitution of rule of law to rule by law attempts to legitimize actions outside the normative framework of sovereignty. From guided missiles to selective assassinations, foreign interference is not new, but is intensifying. However, this association of terrorism with separatism is not found in the Canadian legal system, so the charges that can be laid in India cannot be applied to the Canadian case.

In terms of Canada-India relations, Professor Ryan M. Touhey points out that the first decades of Indo-Canadian relations were characterized by misunderstanding. Is this still the case? Despite the ambition of a Canadian Indo-Pacific policy, geopolitical issues, as Indian politicians point out, are hurting bilateral relations. These recurrent geopolitical problems, be it the nuclear bomb in 1974, Air India in 1985 or nuclear tests in 1998, do not erase the more structural issues, in particular the presence in Canada of movements that jeopardize Indian unity.

Since the imposition of a continuous voyage in 1908 preventing Indians from migrating to Canada, and thus to the British Empire, the Sikhs have initiated revolutionary movements to weaken the Empire, many of which are in the Vancouver area. The Komagata Maru incident in 1914, in which a boat of migrants from India was turned back by the Canadian authorities, increased Sikh activism. Since that time, the Sikh community in Canada has been the epicentre of Khalistan claims.

In terms of diasporic specificity in Canada, it will come as no surprise that Canada is home to the largest Sikh community outside India and makes up about half of the Indian diaspora in Canada. This specific reality in Canada breeds Sikh activism like nowhere else in the world. This party explains why India uses a strong discourse against Canada, as opposed to the co‑operative discourse with other partners, such as the United States or the United Kingdom. Moreover, the use of violence, sometimes even murder, is a tool of electoral repression in India. What is surprising is its export within the Indian diaspora in Canada.

Given Canada's specificity, we can expect moral support from Canada's partners without hoping for legal proceedings or sanctions against India. Among the 13 Indo-Pacific strategies identified, India is mentioned as a strategic partner several times, but for Canada it remains an uncertain ally.

To alleviate the problems associated with these political tensions and violence within the Indian diaspora, without pretending to say that this will eliminate foreign interference in Canada, my first recommendation is to move forward Bill C‑367, which amends the Criminal Code to prohibit hate speech at religious ceremonies, such as processions or festivals.

My second recommendation is that every prime minister of Canada since Jean Chrétien has visited Punjab on an official visit to India, which India perceives as a celebration of Sikh separatism.

This perception emerged under the Harper administration and was amplified under the Trudeau administration. It would be desirable for the upcoming visit of a Canadian prime minister to India to avoid a trip to Punjab as a goodwill gesture aimed at resolving geopolitical tensions between India and Canada.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Granger.

We go now to Mr. Wark to make an opening statement.

You have up to five minutes, please.

[Dr. Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, As an Individual]

Thanks, Mr. Chair, and happy Halloween to everyone.

I would like to use my time to provide some insights into the role of India's foreign intelligence service in the conduct of covert operations abroad. I know that a question was asked about this in the committee's last meeting, and Mr. Rogers, the new CSIS director, said that he couldn't provide any details.

The name of that service is the research and analysis wing, or RAW. It operates from within the Prime Minister's office. It is subject to direction from the Prime Minister's national security adviser and is not publicly or judicially accountable for its actions. RAW sometimes enjoys heroic treatment within Indian popular culture as a defender of Indian security.

RAW has a long history, tracing its roots back to a British-run organization during the period of the Raj. After Indian independence, it was reformulated but struggled to attain any real professional capacity. It was significantly reformed and founded as RAW in 1968. For decades, the focus of its foreign operations was in intelligence-gathering targeting regional geopolitical adversaries, China and Pakistan in particular. From the late 1980s, RAW began to turn its attention to a different sort of perceived enemy—advocates of the Khalistan separatist movement. RAW slowly began to push its covert operations targeting Khalistani activists outward from India's near abroad, where it devoted special attention to operations in Pakistan. Some of the methods it deployed in Pakistan have now been exported to the west, to the United States and Canada, to elements of the Sikh diaspora living farther afield.

RAW posts officers under diplomatic cover to Indian embassies and consulates abroad. The power that RAW possesses as an independent arm of the Prime Minister's conduct of global diplomacy gives its sway over India's diplomatic corps and means that it can deploy India's foreign ministry officials as dutiful instruments in intelligence collection and as support for the conduct of covert operations. RAW, in my view, has joined the ranks of the Russian SVR and FSB and the Chinese MSS as posing a critical national security threat to Canada.

In September 2023, as members of this committee will know, the Prime Minister made an announcement in the House of Commons regarding “credible allegations” held by Canadian security agencies “of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen”. On the same day, Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly announced that Canada had expelled a top Indian diplomat. In a press briefing, the minister confirmed that the Indian diplomat who had been PNG'd was actually the head of India's RAW office in Canada. His name was Pavan Kumar Rai.

A little over a year later, immediately following the RCMP press conference that stimulated this committee's study, it was announced that six Indian diplomats, including the Indian high commissioner, were being expelled from Canada. The expulsion was part and parcel of an effort to urgently disrupt violent Indian foreign interference in Canada by breaking the chain between Indian diplomats collecting covert intelligence and the transmission of this information to proxy agents and criminal gangs operating within Canada to engage in intimidation, harassment and murder. This is a clear illustration of how Indian diplomats are being drawn into the RAW network of covert operations abroad.

What is to be done? The activities of RAW in Canada require a strong counter-intelligence response by CSIS and CSE in particular, in association with GAC and the RCMP. The task before these agencies is to identify RAW officials, monitor their activities and disrupt them whenever possible. Known or suspected RAW officers can be refused visas and diplomatic accreditation and kept out of the country. Those discovered to be engaged in covert foreign interference can be expelled. Proxy networks can be disrupted, investigated and charged. This is not an easy task. Our agencies will need the resources and expertise to do this job. It requires a coordinated and sustained effort. Canada must also use every opportunity to leverage its membership in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to benefit from shared intelligence on RAW operations globally.

Canada also needs to mobilize a broad diplomatic national security coalition of allies—starting, but not ending, with Washington—to put constant pressure on the highest levels of the Modi government to force a stop to intolerable Indian covert operations. Much of this pressure campaign will, of necessity, operate away from the public eye, but on occasion, publicity might help, as the RCMP clearly believes in terms of their recent press conference. There is much more to be done, including through law enforcement, outreach to the South Asian community and more national security strategic transparency to make Canadians as a whole aware of the threat.

We must conduct a harder-edged, pragmatic diplomacy toward India, not over-invest in India as a counterweight to China. It is a role that recent events, such as the BRICS meeting, suggest it may not be interested in playing. However, the counter-intelligence effort is foundational, and it's one that, typically, our security and intelligence agencies have underinvested in in the past.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

We'll start our first round of questions with Ms. Dancho for six minutes, please.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you to the witnesses for being here and for their expert testimony.

Mr. Wark, I'll start with you. I appreciated your insight on RAW, particularly when you mentioned our leverage with Five Eyes intelligence. I was wondering if you could enlighten the committee.

When we heard from Nathalie Drouin and the deputy minister the other day, we understood then that there were a number of attempts made by Canada to meet with India to discuss this. We were brushed off, we were stood up and we had visas denied. There were all types of excuses for not being met with.

Can you tell the committee, from your experience or your thoughts, why India feels so comfortable brushing us off like that? It just seems quite insulting.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

It's a good question, Ms. Dancho, and I thank you for it.

I think there are two things at play here. One is that India believes it can be more muscular in its approach to Canada and, as you say, brush us off and treat senior Canadian officials with extraordinary degrees of contempt. It simply believes it has the power to do that.

I've described India before as being stuck in what I call a plausible deniability box. It's finding it difficult to get out of that box by taking responsibility or being accountable for some of the covert operations it has been linked to.

It is in an embarrassing position with regard to the United States, in that it has been forced by the U.S. to agree to an investigation into covert operations conducted against American citizens. It would like to be able to treat Canada differently, so it would bend to the United States, but not bend to Canada, as a way of saving face while the Indian government figures out a real escape route from its past practices.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Mr. Wark, they wouldn't feel as confident treating the United States that way. Would they feel as confident treating the U.K. that way, for example, or another of our Five Eyes allies? It seems like it's Canada, but perhaps it's not just Canada.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

What we've seen, Ms. Dancho, is that these kinds of covert operations, which I suggest were first conducted at scale in Pakistan by RAW, have been exported to the west, including to the U.K., Germany, the United States, obviously—we know one case in particular there—and Canada. India will approach each of these countries and the ties with them selectively on a case-by-case basis. There are particular frictions, of course, given the past history between India and Britain, but there is recognition, I think, on the part of India that both Britain and Germany are, in many respects, significant powers in ways that Canada is not, in their eyes.

They have seen, certainly in the past, Canada as a power that they can push around on the global stage and a power that it makes sense for them in domestic politics.... Their official line is that successive Canadian governments never take seriously their concerns about violent extremism abroad targeting their country. They have made Canada a bit of a target, and it will be, in my view, very interesting to see how they respond next to a forceful push-back, as I would call it, by the Canadian authorities.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you.

As I mentioned, you also talked in your opening remarks about the Five Eyes alliance that we have to share intelligence with. My understanding of the way it works is that we get out of the Five Eyes what we put in, so if we're contributing intelligence, we'll get a relatively similar degree back. My understanding as well is that the Five Eyes can provide us a lot of intelligence to tip us off on what may be going on here, so it's critical that we have a strong presence there and are contributing.

Do you feel that Canada is contributing to the level it should be? Are we getting the most that we can out of this, or should we be doing more?

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

I think a lot of our Five Eyes partners would like to see Canada do more, frankly. This has been expressed from time to time, particularly in terms of certain kinds of capacities to collect intelligence globally. There have been criticisms directed at Canada that we do not have, for example, a foreign intelligence service, unlike all of our Five Eyes partners. That's an area where Canada continues to face pressure.

I think where Canada is highly regarded as a partner within the Five Eyes is with regard to its signals intelligence capabilities in foreign intelligence collection and cybersecurity. Canada is also regarded as a useful partner in the kinds of strategic intelligence assessments it can share with our Five Eyes partners, and that Canadian view is often regarded as a useful touchpoint for other countries to consider how they're looking at global threats.

On your opening remark about the Five Eyes being an equal trading relationship, the reality is that it's never been that. The United States is by far and away the largest and greatest intelligence power in the Five Eyes. Other countries try to make their contribution, but we get a lot more out of the Five Eyes than we can put in, and no one has ever suggested that we should have an equal trading relation on intelligence there.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you.

Certainly we've had a number of extraordinary witnesses from government. It seems like they are working very hard to do more than we even know to keep this country safe. Of course, we're very proud of our intelligence agents and operators. I do take issue when we get criticisms from security officials around the world calling Canada a free rider, whether it's on defence or intelligence-gathering.

With my few seconds remaining, I'd like to get more advice from you on what Canada can be doing to elevate our position, to prevent us from being, in essence, bullied by foreign countries.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Again, I think it would be a tougher diplomatic response to various forms of Indian aggression and a more robust capability. Especially, I would come back to the question of how well positioned we really are to conduct significant penetrating counter-intelligence operations against Indian officials in Canada.

We have the laws to allow us to do that, but CSIS as an organization these days is overstretched, and the RCMP certainly is. India would never have been regarded as a principal counter-intelligence mission for the Canadian community until recently, so there's going to have to be a surge of capabilities and talent into that area. It may take time to achieve it. I suspect the recognition is there, but there's probably going to be a gap between understanding there's a new kind of counter-intelligence mission that has to be performed and the ability to perform it fully.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Ms. Dancho.

We go now to Ms. Damoff for six minutes.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Wark, I said to you that you need a frequent flyer card for the number of times you've come to this committee over the years.

My first question is for both of you, and it's a fairly simple one. Do you think all of the leaders in the House should get a top secret security clearance to get briefings on this issue and any others that impact the national security of the country?

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

I'm happy to go first.

I should just say that I'll preview a submission that I'm writing on behalf of the Centre for International Governance Innovation to the foreign interference inquiry. One of the recommendations we're going to offer to Justice Hogue is precisely this, that it would be beneficial for all leaders of opposition parties to have a top secret clearance and to be briefed by officials from the security intelligence community.

It's beneficial for two reasons. One reason is to expand their understanding of national security threats—not just foreign interference, but a wide range of them—and allow them to perform the mission they will all have of holding the government to account. Second, and we've heard much about this in this committee and in other forums, would be to enhance their ability to understand the potentially direct impacts of foreign interference within their own caucuses.

So, the answer is yes.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Granger.

[Serge Granger]

My answer would be yes also, for two reasons. First of all, it's always important to know exactly the issues about national security you're dealing with, especially with India.

Second, whenever the next trip of the Canadian Prime Minister to India will be, I think he should be aware of who's surrounding him, making sure this trip goes smoothly. If you compare other trips in the past, I would say there were some mishaps. Also, as we're going through India when we travel there, there's the message that the Prime Minister is a representative not only of political parties, but of Canada. This is also why the obsession of always visiting Punjab maybe should be questioned. This is a way of.... I would not say it's confronting India in its own homeland, but for sure it does not make them very comfortable when they have this type of visit. It basically celebrates some.... It fragilizes in a certain way the perception of their own unity.

I would say, yes, everybody should be aware of what they're doing. Also, all the leaders of the political parties should know exactly who's dealing with our relations with India within their party, and also, of course, within the different ministries.