Thank you, Mr. Chair, vice-chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to address the critical issue of foreign interference and criminal activities in Canada, specifically by agents of the Government of India.
To me, this issue strikes at the heart of our national sovereignty and public safety and, indeed, the integrity of our democracy. In my remarks today, I want to help clarify what happened, why it happened and what I think you can do about it.
Number one is what happened. The assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in June 2023 was a flashpoint in uncovering the extent of foreign interference activities conducted by agents of the Government of India. Through investigations led by the RCMP and supported by CSIS, it became evident that these actions are part of a broader pattern of transnational repression. Indian diplomatic officials in Canada have been implicated in coordinating intelligence-gathering efforts and collaborating with criminal networks to intimidate and harm Canadian citizens.
The methods include espionage, whereby Indian officials gather intelligence on individuals within the Indo-Canadian community using diplomatic channels and coerced proxies, and criminal facilitation, whereby organized crime groups such as the Lawrence Bishnoi gang have been directed to carry out acts of violence, including assassination plots, intimidation campaigns and disinformation campaigns. Indian narratives have sought to polarize communities in Canada, labelling lawful advocacy for Sikh rights as extremism while amplifying propaganda through diaspora-targeted media.
This interference, however, is not isolated. Believe me, it reflects a deliberate strategy to suppress dissent and manipulate Canadian political and social systems to align with India's interests. Despite multiple diplomatic meetings and law enforcement interventions, the problem has persisted, underscoring the need for a stronger and more coordinated response.
Number two is why it happened. India perceives segments of the Canadian Sikh diaspora, particularly those advocating for Khalistan independence, as a direct threat to its national security and territorial integrity. This perception has driven the Indian government to conflate lawful political advocacy with violent extremism, resulting in a systematic campaign of surveillance, intimidation and violence targeting individuals and communities in Canada. India's actions are fuelled by its long-standing internal conflicts and an aggressive foreign policy aimed at silencing dissent abroad.
Number three is what I think you can do about it. First, expand CSIS and RCMP resources for counterintelligence operations targeting Indian proxies and agents. Under this, I think you should look at strengthening the threat reduction measures, or TRMs as they're referred to, to disrupt foreign intelligence networks and prevent imminent threats.
Second, use legislative and policy measures. Leverage the new tools under Bill C-70, such as production orders and cross-border information collection, to enhance investigations. Continue statutory reviews of intelligence legislation to make sure you're keeping pace with evolving threats and have flexibility in addressing emerging tactics.
Third is community protection and public outreach. I've heard other witnesses talk about the duty to warn. I think you need to maintain timely, transparent warnings for individuals facing credible threats, while also pairing these with robust protective measures, including law enforcement support and safety planning. There would be nothing quite like getting a notice that you are being targeted for assassination from a foreign state actor without anything else other than the warning. Build resilience within affected diaspora communities through education, direct engagement, public awareness campaigns and ensuring trust in Canadian institutions. Look at addressing the disinformation campaigns by countering narratives spread by Indian state media through coordinated efforts with the Department of Canadian Heritage and the CRTC.
The fourth area is diplomatic and multilateral efforts, so coordinating through coalitions like the Five Eyes and bilateral diplomatic channels. You need to make clear that violations of sovereignty through interference and violence will prompt significant consequences, and you can't just say it—you have to do it. You have to raise the cost.
The fifth area is a new idea that I don't think anyone else will have said. We should look at using speaking indictments. What I mean by that is that Canada should follow examples of jurisdictions like the United States in using speaking indictments to address and expose foreign interference.
A speaking indictment is more than a legal document. It's a public accountability tool. It details the evidence behind the criminal charges. It outlines the methods and actors involved and explains the broader context of foreign interference. It creates a clear narrative for the public. It names specific actors, including diplomats, proxies and criminal networks in an indictment, and it publicizes the risks and consequences of engaging in these activities.
As an example, in the United States, the Vikas Yadav superseding indictment effectively exposed the methods and coordination of foreign operations. In Canada, a similar tool could be used to detail India's role in directing and facilitating acts of violence, coercion and disinformation through both state and non-state actors. That superseding indictment read like a spy novel, but no one took issue with it. When it was an indictment, it did exactly what it was supposed to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
