Thank you for that excellent question.
I think the federal government needs to take, first and foremost, an inclusive, all-of-society and all-of-democracy approach to this. Of course, government needs to be part of that discussion to develop a strategy to combat this, but it also means reaching out to civil society actors who are often, like me, on the front lines of this battle against foreign information operations.
It also means reaching out and working with the social media giants. I know from my discussions with them and observing how they have reacted to regulation in the past that they don't react well to it. There are very good examples of governments reaching out to social media and actually working with them and continuing to work with them very effectively to combat foreign disinformation.
I look to Taiwan. Taiwan has developed a strategy whereby they work very closely with civil society groups and with social media to quickly detect information operations and information warfare when it's targeting Taiwan. Taiwan is at the receiving end of a lot of that coming from China.
They've worked specifically with Facebook, quite remarkably, because they don't seem to want to co-operate too much, at least here in North America. In Taiwan, once the civil society detects an incoming information operation, the government and Facebook are alerted. Facebook has agreed to throttle those sorts of narratives when they appear, pulling them off of people's news feeds when they come in.
The government itself has produced a policy whereby when that information operation comes in, the specific ministry that's being targeted is then tasked with producing a counter-narrative within 60 minutes, usually using humour or something like that. This has turned out to be very effective for the Taiwanese, so I would look to other countries in this way.
As well, Sweden announced in January the formation of a government psychological defence unit, which also brings in civil society actors, to protect Swedes from cognitive warfare, and specifically Russian cognitive warfare.
I think this is—