Good morning. Thank you.
My name is Kate Robertson. I'm a lawyer and currently a researcher at the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab.
My comments draw on Citizen Lab's research on cybersecurity and telecommunications, as well as constitutional law analysis that I submitted in a brief to this committee.
Parts two and three of my brief set out amendments to address constitutional deficits and cybersecurity risks in the bill. Out of those recommended changes, the introduction of the brief identifies two priorities.
The first is to explicitly protect encryption technology in Canada's telecommunications networks. At present, the broad powers in the bill could have the effect of compromising encryption standards for lawful access purposes.
For example, under proposed section 15.2 of part I of the bill, the minister could require that a telecom operator implement “specified standards”. The minister could prohibit a telecom operator “from using any specified product or service”. The minister could also “impose conditions on [the]...use of any product or service”. These are just some examples.
While officials have stipulated that this law is not a surveillance bill and that these provisions don't authorize the compromise of encryption, there is no explicit clause to ensure this. Future governments could interpret proposed section 15.2 very differently, arguing that heightened surveillance capabilities would promote Canada's security interests. An interpretive clause is essential to protect encryption, which is an essential form of cybersecurity.
I note in my brief that even the recently tabled Bill C-2, which also proposes very broad powers to order changes in telecom networks, has a specific clause that the government has pointed to as a proposed means of ensuring that orders won't compromise encryption. In contrast, there is still nothing comparable in Bill C-8.
Recommendation eight of my brief suggests that language should be added to stipulate that orders cannot be used to compromise the confidentiality, availability or integrity of a telecommunications service. This phrasing is a widely recognized term to describe the three essential elements of strong cybersecurity. It is a term that is used by federal agencies in Canada.
I can also answer questions about alternative language that would also be workable. I can submit those suggestions in writing after this hearing, if it's helpful.
Ultimately, since the intent of the legislation, as we’ve been told, is not surveillance or encryption-breaking, this should not be a controversial improvement to the bill.
As a second priority, the law's broad and warrantless collection power under proposed section 15.4 is a significant constitutional deficiency. As we know, telecom providers are conveyors of the most private information known to our legal system. I must respectfully disagree with the view that this law would only apply to technical information. The actual text of the legislation—which is what matters—creates a broad and warrantless power to collect personal and de-identified information from telecommunications companies.
I share the view of the intelligence commissioner of Canada—who has previously testified—that the warrantless search and seizure powers are a constitutional flaw in the bill with no apparent justification. I agree with Mr. Noël’s recommendation that when it comes to the CSE specifically, an important change would be to require that the CSE’s use of information be subject to annual ministerial authorization and, ultimately, approval by the intelligence commissioner. This would be a very notable improvement, but as he noted, there still would remain a warrantless collection flaw in Bill C-8 generally, which he testified is a problem that he would leave for others to address.
Recommendation three in my brief addresses this larger gap by proposing Federal Court authorization for the collection of personal and de-identified information. This is critical in order to place Bill C-8 on much stronger constitutional footing.
Given my time, I would invite a follow-up question from this committee on why the current safeguards in the bill, which are for the most part inapplicable to the collection power under section 15.4, are inadequate to remedying this constitutional deficit.
Thank you for your attention. I defer to my brief for my remaining recommendations.
