Understood.
Canada is in the unique position of sharing a border with the largest economy in the world. Keeping the border with the United States open is economically existential for Canada but not for the United States.
Canada also shares a land border with the largest weapons and drug market in the world. These asymmetries generate criminogenic effects that necessarily precipitate negative spillover effects. In 2024, 88% of the crime guns seized by the Toronto Police Service were traced to the United States.
First, our framework for managing borders is not well positioned for the challenges of the 21st century. The international refugee system, for instance, was designed for a time when travel was difficult and expensive. Travel information was hard to come by, and principal threats to citizens were presumed to emanate from state actors. Today, travel is cheap and easy. Information is ubiquitous, and threat vectors emanate primarily from multi-faceted, well-financed non-state actors in naturogenic phenomena such as climate change.
Put differently, the ontology of our approach to managing borders is based on territory, while the threat vectors we are trying to contain and disrupt are characterized by transnational mobility of people, money, drugs, illicit trade, terrorism and the like.
CUSMA illustrates Canada's “de-connected” territoriality. With sealed trucks from Mexico destined for Canada, Mexico is now effectively part of Canada's land border.
Second, the nature of borders is changing. Borders are being pushed outwards, for instance in the form of pre-clearance, such as enhanced travel authorizations, pre-screening of inbound cargo and people; and pushed inward—think of deportations.
Moreover, much of money laundering, fraud and radicalization happens in cyberspace, which has no borders. People think of the border as a line, but the threat vectors are near impossible to manage effectively at the line. They need to be managed well before they ever reach that border. That requires extensive co-operation, coordination—such as shiprider, which the U.S. is now on record as wanting to extend to the land and air domains—and collaboration.
Third, for over 85 years, Canada and the United States have had a shared border strategy to have one another's backs. After the attacks of 9/11, then prime minister Jean Chrétien's approach to keeping the border open consisted of reassuring the United States that Canada had America's back. Canada adjusted its national security laws and posture within weeks and months. Chrétien understood intuitively that to keep the border open, it had to be well managed.
Both the Biden and the Trump administrations, Congress and the U.S. northern border caucus have repeatedly made it clear that rightly or wrongly, Canada is no longer living up to its end of the bargain. They are specifically concerned that Canada has become a high-value, low-risk back door to the United States, whose proliferating legislative and structural weaknesses are being exploited by powerful and dedicated state and non-state actors to undermine the social fabric, economic prosperity—